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## CAISO ENERGY STORAGE ENHANCEMENTS WORKING GROUP

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## RECOMMENDATIONS

# Reconsider using the minimum state of charge (MSOC) requirement

- The short real-time market horizon does not cause chronic discharge early in the day
- Focus on reforming the bidding interface for energy storage resources
  - Current bidding interface creates unique challenges for energy storage to represent real marginal costs to the market
  - Unlock better market efficiency and more flexible operation
  - Incorporate real marginal costs into market clearing prices rather than nontransparent uplift charges



#### WHY WOULD REAL-TIME DISPATCH (RTD) MANAGE ENERGY STORAGE DIFFERENTLY THAN OTHER RESOURCES?

- Energy storage resources have upper and lower state-of-charge limitations
  - If these limitations cannot bind over the next 65 minutes, the battery operates based on bids exactly like other resources (i.e. the "normal use")
  - If the upper state-of-charge limitation can bind over the next 65 minutes, the battery charges at lowest priced opportunities (i.e. the "picky charger")
  - If the lower state-of-charge limitation can bind over the next 65 minutes, the battery discharges at highest priced opportunities (i.e. the "picky discharger")



## EXAMPLE ("NORMAL USE")

- 400 MWh battery with 100 MW pmax and infinite ramp rate
  - Battery currently has 200 MWh SOC
  - Charge bid = \$50, Discharge bid = \$250
- Resource SOC constraints not limiting battery use over the 65-minute RTD horizon, battery dispatched based on bid
  - When market prices are \$49: Battery will charge
  - When market prices are \$100: Battery will not charge or discharge
  - When market prices are \$251: Battery will discharge

## Key observations when there is limited charging capability

- If prices are rising throughout the RTD horizon: battery will charge when charge bid is inmerit and discharge when discharge bid is in-merit.
- Out-of-merit battery will not charge due to higher prices later in the RTD horizon because it already has enough energy stored to meet at least 60 minutes of in-merit discharge



## EXAMPLE ("PICKY CHARGER")

## 400 MWh battery with 100 MW pmax and infinite ramp rate

- Battery currently has 308.33 MWh SOC
- Charge bid = \$50, Discharge bid = \$250
- Resource SOC constraints limit battery charging over the 65-minute RTD horizon, battery only charges if in-merit and it's among the cheapest opportunities
  - When market prices are \$49: Battery will charge if binding interval price is not the highest priced in the RTD horizon
  - When market prices are \$100: Battery will not charge because it is cheaper to use stored energy to meet future high prices
  - When market prices are \$251: Battery will discharge in-merit

Key observation when there is limited charging capability

If prices are rising throughout the RTD horizon: battery will charge when charge bid is in-merit



## **EXAMPLE ("PICKY DISCHARGER")**

## 400 MWh battery with 100 MW pmax and infinite ramp rate

- Battery currently has 91.67 MWh SOC
- Charge bid = \$50, Discharge bid = \$250
- Resource SOC constraints limit battery discharging over the 65-minute RTD horizon, battery discharges if in-merit and it's among the highest priced opportunities
  - When market prices are \$49: Battery will charge
  - When market prices are \$100: Battery will not charge or discharge
  - When market prices are \$251: Battery will discharge if binding interval price is not the lowest priced in RTD horizon

Key observation when there is limited discharge capability

If prices are rising throughout the RTD horizon: battery will not discharge when discharge bid is in-merit



## EVALUATE EXPECTED DISPATCH OVER THE DAY







## ENERGY STORAGE RESOURCES WILL TEND TO CHARGE AND HOLD CHARGE INTO THE EVENING



#### G D S A S S O C I A T E S . C O M



## SCHEDULING COORDINATORS UPDATE BIDS THROUGHOUT THE DAY



#### G D S A S S O C I A T E S . C O M



SOC

MID

HIGH

LOW

## **BIDDING INTERFACE: SQUARE PEG, ROUND HOLE**

- Bidding interface accepts \$/MWh cost curve
- □ Actual operating cost is a function of throughput *and state-of-charge*
- Energy storage operators must incorporate assumptions into their bids to ensure cost recovery
  - Delay between bid submission and dispatch introduces assumptions and cost
  - Actual operating cost depends on energy storage use profile
- More required assumptions lead to less market efficiency and less operational flexibility



## MARGINAL COST AND VARIABLE O&M

#### Marginal Costs stem from three "categories"

#### Energy cost

- Cost to buy energy from the grid, parasitic loses, and round-trip efficiencies

### Opportunity costs

 Failing to charge during the lowest priced hours or failing to discharge during the highest priced hours.

### Cycling costs

- Function of depth of discharge, current rate, and average state of charge
- <u>Service Life:</u> Cost related to run hours on equipment, increased maintenance intervals, or to account for unplanned increased end-of-life costs
- <u>Degradation</u>: Cost related to degradation of batteries and energy capacity lifecycle management.



## **O&M COST EXAMPLE**

- 6-month preventive maintenance intervals on most major equipment
- □ HVAC repair and service
- Minor overhaul may occur at some point in the project to add batteries or to replace HVAC, inverters, other major equipment.
- End of life can cost 3%-8% of Capex depending on chemistry







## **BATTERY DEGRADATION**

- More throughput (MWh) tends to increase capacity Fade and is typically the most impactful variable
- Higher currents will accelerate degradation
- SoC movement during cycling and average SoC can significantly impact degradation
- Temperature and thermal management performance can also impact degradation

Typical Energy Capacity Cycle Degradation Per cycle under different circumstances <b>(%/hour)</b> <sup>1</sup>				
	%DOD			
Average SOC	100%	75%	50%	25%
<u>2 Hour Rate</u>				
75%			0.00054%	0.000127%
63%		0.00087%	0.00044%	0.000113%
50%	0.00124%	0.00071%	0.00033%	0.000099%
38%		0.00054%	0.00029%	0.000079%
25%			0.00025%	0.000059%
<u>4 Hour Rate</u>				
75%			0.00026%	0.000096%
63%		0.00041%	0.00022%	0.000087%
50%	0.00055%	0.00034%	0.00018%	0.000077%
38%		0.00027%	0.00015%	0.000062%
25%			0.00013%	0.000047%
<u>8 Hour Rate</u>				
75.00%			0.00020%	0.000083%
62.50%		0.00043%	0.00018%	0.000075%
50.00%	0.00039%	0.00032%	0.00016%	0.000068%
37.50%		0.00021%	0.00013%	0.000055%
25.00%			0.00010%	0.000043%
20 Hour Rate				
75.0%			0.00020%	0.000078%
62.5%		0.00027%	0.00017%	0.000071%
50.0%	0.00036%	0.00024%	0.00015%	0.000064%
37.5%		0.00021%	0.00012%	0.000053%
25.0%			0.00010%	0.000041%



## DELAY BETWEEN BID SUBMISSION AND DISPATCH INTRODUCES COSTS

- Many use profiles can materialize
- Each with different probability and different cost implications
- Structuring market
  bids to ensure cost
  recovery requires
  assumptions





## **USE PROFILE DRIVES OPERATIONAL COSTS**







### RECOMMEND INVESTIGATING THE BENEFITS AND FEASIBILITY OF THE FOLLOWING BIDDING INTERFACE ENHANCEMENTS

#### Enhancements

- Allow energy storage resources to update market bids as close to the fifteenminute market execution as possible
- Allow energy storage resources to provide cost adder that is a function of average state-of-charge and depth-of-discharge over the market horizon
- Benefits
  - Allows scheduling coordinators to provide accurate marginal cost information to the market
  - Allows the market to produce an efficient and flexible dispatch



## **ABOUT US**



#### **Perry Servedio**

Mr. Servedio has over 13 years of experience in the electric energy industry with more than three years of service at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and nine years of operations and policy development experience at California ISO (CAISO). Mr. Servedio has led the design, contemplation, and review among stakeholders of CRR market, day-ahead market, and real-time market reforms. His expertise in CAISO markets and the Western Energy Imbalance Market provides an excellent resource to evaluate changing market landscape in California and the Western Interconnection.



#### **Matt Smith**

Mr. Smith has over 17 years of engineering experience in utility scale renewable power generation technology and battery energy storage systems. A large part of his professional career has been centered around technical analysis of solar, wind, and battery energy storage systems, and supporting the economic feasibility analysis for performance and maintenance of those assets, including appropriate O&M schedules and programs to maintain reliability of the projects for the duration of the expected life. His extensive expertise in battery performance and operations, maintenance protocols, and capacity sizing provides an excellent resource to asset developers, owners, and operators.

