

Flexible Ramping Product Refinements

Stakeholder Call 3/23/20



Time	Торіс	Presenter
10:00 - 10:10	Welcome	Kristina Osborne
10:10 – 10:35	 Proxy Demand Response Default Setting Full Network Model Buffer Interval Scaling Flexible Ramping Product (FRP) Requirement Scarcity Pricing with FRP Demand Curve 	Don Tretheway
10:35 - 11:00	Minimum BAA Requirement	Robert Fischer
11:00 - 11:50	Nodal Delivery of FRP	George Angelidis
11:50 – 12:00	Next Steps	Kristina Osborne

ISO Policy Initiative Stakeholder Process





Changes from Issue Paper/Straw Proposal

Issue	Change from issue paper/straw proposal
Proxy demand response eligibility	Tariff change to set default at 60-minute dispatchable
Ramp management between FMM and RTD	None
Minimum FRP requirement	Describes method to calculate minimum requirement. Applicable to all BAAs in the EIM.
Deliverability enhancement	Selected nodal procurement
FRP demand curve and scarcity pricing	New. Describes how FRP demand curve results in energy prices gradually rising prior to relaxing the power balance constraint.
Scaling FRP requirement	New. Describes methodology to incorporate load, wind and solar forecasts into requirement



Proxy Demand Response (PDR) eligibility can be addressed through BPM and Tariff changes

- ESDER 3A implemented additional scheduling options for PDR
- In Master File, can elect 60-minute, 15-minute, or 5-minute dispatchable
- 60-minute and 15-minute options are ineligible to receive FRP award
- Proposal to modify default setting in Tariff to 60-minute dispatchable, as opposed to 5-minute dispatchable
 - SC must ensure their PDR resource can be dispatched in either 15minute or 5-minute intervals



Maintaining FRP awards in buffer interval for Fall 2020 implementation requires BPM changes (1 of 3)





Maintaining FRP awards in buffer interval for Fall 2020 implementation requires BPM changes (2 of 3)

- FMM requirement is 1st advisory FMM interval to binding RTD intervals in same time period
- Not enforcing FRP requirement in buffer interval can release FRP intended for RTD
 - Ramp capability is used to meet FMM schedule
 - Ramp capability leads to different unit commitment
- Propose maintaining FRP awards in the buffer interval
 Up to 100% of the award



Maintaining FRP awards in buffer interval for Fall 2020 implementation requires BPM changes (3 of 3)

- Resource
 - Pmin = 100 MW, Pmax = 200 MW, 5 MW/Min ramp rate
- Current implementation



• Assume maintain 100% of FRP up award in buffer

 Buffer
 FMM
 A1
 Advisory
 Advisory
 A1 Energy = 100 MW, FMM FRU 75 MW

 Buffer
 FMM
 A1
 Advisory
 FMM Energy = 100 MW, Buffer FRU 75 MW



Enhancing methodology for setting real-time FRP requirements to incorporate load, wind, and solar forecasts into formulation

- Existing histogram methodology is a simplistic approach that only utilizes historical data in the calculation
- Proposing to adopt a quantile regression approach to provide more informed requirements based on multiple sets of predictors
- Specific results and formulation of regression model will be outlined in the BPM for Market Operations
 - Determine approach to calculate demand curve



ISO Public

FRP demand curve results in energy prices gradually rising prior to relaxing power balance constraint (1 of 2)

- FRP design includes a procurement demand curve that was intended to provide scarcity pricing signals in the real-time market
 - But, FRP requirement is not always relaxed prior to the power balance constraint due to congestion
- Nodal procurement will ensure the FRP requirement is fully relaxed prior to the power balance constraint being relaxed
 - Market will no longer make FRP awards to transmission infeasible capacity
 - Produces stepped scarcity pricing up to \$1,000/MWh



ISO Public

FRP demand curve results in energy prices gradually rising prior to relaxing power balance constraint (2 of 2)

• Example demand curve

Relax Qty	Relax Price	Marginal Energy	Marginal Energy Price
50 MW	\$40	\$45	\$85
100 MW	\$110	\$120	\$230
150 MW	\$200	\$230	\$430
9999 MW	\$247	\$250	\$497

- For EIM entities, FRP is relaxed prior to calling on Available Balancing Capacity
 - PBC violation only after both FRP and ABC exhausted

California ISO

Minimum BAA requirement for CAISO for Fall 2020 implementation requires BPM changes (1 of 3)

- Import/export capabilities reduce a BAA's FRU/FRD requirement
 - Only considers transfer capability with adjacent BAAs
 - Therefore, cannot assume access to resources in non-adjacent BAAs
- Generally, all BAAs have import/export capability above their BAA FRP requirement
- Therefore, FRP procurement is driven by the system-wide requirement



Minimum BAA requirement for CAISO for Fall 2020 implementation requires BPM changes (2 of 3)

- CAISO is the largest driver of the FRP requirement
- Enforce a minimum requirement that results in more local awards than system-wide constraint provides
- Reduces amount of FRP potentially unavailable to CAISO
- Evaluate historical FRP procurement to adjust minimum requirement
 - Also, determine if other BAAs need minimum requirement
- With nodal FRP, there is no need for minimum requirement



Minimum BAA requirement for CAISO for Fall 2020 implementation requires BPM changes (3 of 3)

- Proposal to set EIM procurement targets in two tiers:
 - 1st Tier: sets a min requirement for EIM BAAs when their requirement is a pivotal share of the entire systems or EIM areas requirement
 - Calculated based on existing FRP requirements
 - Pivotal areas requirement based on:
 - Uncertainty calculations
 - Historical percentages comparison of area to EIM footprint
 - Diversity benefit factors
 - 2nd Tier: ensures that when a min requirement is imposed or when a BAA is separated due to lack of transfer capability or failed sufficiency test, the EIM level requirement is properly balanced due to the increased procurement in that area



Example: minimum requirement calculation with no resource sufficiency failures

BAA Group	BAA Requirement	Diversity Benefit Factor	BAA Percentage of EIM Requirement	Min Requirement	DB MW amount per BAA	BAA Min Requirement
2.11 0104p	2111 110401101101		211 1010010030 01 211 1040110100		DB Factor x BAA	Diri inin noqurromono
	MW	EIM REQ/BAA TOT	BAA/EIM	If BAA>60% => TRUE	Requirement	Max (DB, BAA Req-DB)
	BAA REQ	DBF	DBP		DB BAA	MIN REQ BAA
CISO	539.00	0.37	90.74%	TRUE	200.48	338.52
PACE	185.00	0.37	31.14%	FALSE	68.81	
PACW	116.00	0.37	19.53%	FALSE	43.15	
PGE	121.00	0.37	20.37%	FALSE	45.01	
BCHA	206.00	0.37	34.68%	FALSE	76.62	
PSEI	113.00	0.37	19.02%	FALSE	42.03	
IPCO	98.00	0.37	16.50%	FALSE	36.45	
NEVP	57.00	0.37	9.60%	FALSE	21.20	
AZPS	147.00	0.37	24.75%	FALSE	54.68	
BANCSMUD	15.00	0.37	2.53%	FALSE	5.58	

EIM Area Requiremen	Sum of BAA Requirement	Diversity Benefit Factor	Proposed EIM Requirement
MW	MW	EIM/Total	EIM REQ+Min(MIN REQ BAA, BAA REQ x DBF)
EIM REQ	BAA TOT	DBF	EIM REQ PROPOSED
594.00	1,597.0	0.37	794.48



Example: minimum requirement calculation with a resource sufficiency failure

			BAA Percentage of EIM			
BAA Group	BAA Requirement	Diversity Benefit Factor	Requirement	Min Requirement Applied	DB MW amount per BAA	BAA Min Requirement
					DB Factor x BAA	
	MW	EIM REQ/BAA TOT	BAA/EIM	If BAA>60% => TRUE	Requirement	Max (DB, BAA Req-DB)
	BAA REQ	DBF	DBP		DB BAA	MIN REQ BAA
CISO	539	0.37	91%	TRUE	200.48	338.52
PACE	185	0.37	31%	FALSE	68.81	
PACW	116	0.37	20%	FALSE	43.15	
PGE	121	0.37	20%	FALSE	45.01	
ВСНА	206	0.37	35%	FALSE	76.62	
PSEI	113	0.37	19%	FALSE	42.03	
IPCO	98	0.37	16%	FALSE	36.45	
NEVP	57	0.37	10%	FALSE	21.20	
AZPS	147	0.37	25%	FALSE	54.68	
BANCSMUD	15	0.37	3%	FALSE	5.58	

Assume Pace Failed Flex Test and 0 MW Credit therefore Effective requirement (EFF REQ) is 185 MW

EIM Area Requirement	Sum of BAA Requirement		Proposed EIM	Proposed EIM Requirement
(Original)	(Total EIM)	Diversity Benefit Factor	Requirement from Min	from Min and Failed Test
			EIM REQ+Min(MIN REQ	EIM REQ W/MIN+ Min(EFF REC
MW	MW	EIM/Total	BAA, BAA REQ x DBF)	DB BAA,EFF REQ)
EIM REQ	BAA TOT	DBF	EIM REQ W/MIN	
594.00	1597.00	0.37	794.48	910.6



Improve deliverability by not awarding FRP to resources that have a zero opportunity cost because of congestion. Target implementation Fall 2021

- Flexible ramping up awarded to resource behind constraint
 - Next market run unable to dispatch higher than current output
- Flexible ramping down awarded to resource providing counterflow
 - Next market run unable to dispatch lower than current output

Similar issues will exist with day-ahead imbalance reserves



What is the Flexible Ramping Product?

- ForecastedMovement (FM)
 - Energy dispatch difference from interval *t*–1 to *t*
- Flexible Ramp Award (FRU/FRD)
 - Reserved ramp capability from interval *t*–1 to *t* for uncertainty





FRU/FRD Deployment Scenarios



FRU/FRD Deployment Scenario Setup

- FRU/FRD awards are deployed in all BAAs while the demand forecast in the EIM Area is increased/decreased to balance
- VERs scheduled at forecast with FRD awards
- All physical transmission constraints (base case and contingencies) enforced
- All scheduling limits (ETSR limits, ITCs/ISLs) enforced



FRU/FRD Procurement Simplification

- Separate procurement for BAAs that fail the FRU/FRD sufficiency test; no FRU/FRD credit
- Common procurement for BAAs that pass the FRU/FRD sufficiency test
 - Common FRU/FRD requirements for the BAA group
 - Common demand price elasticity in the BAA group
 - Energy and deployed FRU/FRD awards in the deployment scenarios are subject to transfer limits
 - No need for complex and approximate FRP adjustments by net import/export capacity (NIC/NEC)



EIM Optimization Model







Flexible Ramp Sufficiency Test





FRU/FRD Procurement

- PU: set of BAAs that pass the FRU sufficiency test
- PD : set of BAAs that pass the FRD sufficiency test
- FRUS/FRDS: FRU/FRD demand elasticity

$$\begin{split} &\sum_{j \in PU} \sum_{i \in BAA_j} FRU_i + FRUS_{PU} = FRUR_{PU} \\ &\sum_{i \in BAA_j} FRU_i + FRUS_j = FRUR_j \\ &T_j \geq \tilde{T}_j \\ &\sum_{j \in PD} \sum_{i \in BAA_j} FRD_i + FRDS_{PD} = FRDR_{PD} \\ &\sum_{i \in BAA_j} FRD_i + FRDS_j = FRDR_j \\ &T_j \leq \tilde{T}_j \\ \end{split}, \forall j \notin PD \end{split}$$



FRU/FRD Deployment Transfer Constraints

$$\begin{split} T_{j}^{(u)} &= T_{j}, \forall j \notin PU \\ T_{j}^{(u)} &= T_{j} + \sum_{i \in BAA_{j}} FRU_{i} - (FRUR_{PU} - FRUS_{PU}) \frac{D_{j}}{\sum_{j \in PU} D_{j}}, \forall j \in PU \\ T_{j}^{(d)} &= T_{j}, \forall j \notin PD \\ \end{split}$$

$$\begin{split} T_{j}^{(d)} &= T_{j} - \sum_{i \in BAA_{j}} FRD_{i} + (FRDR_{PD} - FRDS_{PD}) \frac{D_{j}}{\sum_{j \in PD} D_{j}}, \forall j \in PD \\ T_{j}^{(u)} &= \sum_{k \in EIM} \sum_{l} \left(ET_{j,k,l}^{(u)} - IT_{j,k,l}^{(u)} \right) \\ T_{j}^{(d)} &= \sum_{k \notin j} \sum_{l} \left(ET_{j,k,l}^{(d)} - IT_{j,k,l}^{(d)} \right) \\ \end{bmatrix}, \forall j \in EIM \begin{array}{l} 0 \leq ET_{j,k,l,t}^{(u)} \leq \overline{ET}_{j,k,l,t} \\ 0 \leq IT_{j,k,l,t}^{(d)} \leq \overline{ET}_{j,k,l,t} \\ 0 \leq IT_{j,k,l,t}^{(d)} \leq \overline{ET}_{j,k,l,t} \end{array} \end{split}, \forall j, k \in EIM \end{split}$$



Transmission Constraints

$$\begin{split} LFL_{m} &\leq \tilde{F}_{m} + \sum_{i} \Delta EN_{i} \ SF_{i,m} \leq UFL_{m} \\ LFL_{m} &\leq \tilde{F}_{m} + \sum_{i} \Delta EN_{i} \ SF_{i,m} + \sum_{i} FRU_{i} \ SF_{i,m}^{(u)} \leq UFL_{m} \\ LFL_{m} &\leq \tilde{F}_{m} + \sum_{i} \Delta EN_{i} \ SF_{i,m} - \sum_{i} FRU_{i} \ SF_{i,m}^{(d)} \leq UFL_{m} \\ \end{split}$$



Price Formation

$$\begin{split} \sum_{i \in BAA_j} EN_i - D_j &= T_j, \forall j \in EIM \\ \lambda_j \\ \sum_{i \in BAA_j} FRU_i + FRUS_j &= FRUR_j, \forall j \notin PU \\ \rho_{j,t} \\ T_j^{(u)} &= T_j + \sum_{i \in BAA_j} FRU_i - (FRUR_{PU} - FRUS_{PU}) \frac{D_j}{\sum_{j \in PU} D_j}, \forall j \in PU \\ \lambda_j^{(u)} \\ \sum_{j \in PU} \sum_{i \in BAA_j} FRU_i + FRUS_{PU} &= FRUR_{PU} \\ \sum_{i \in BAA_j} FRD_i + FRDS_j &= FRDR_j, \forall j \notin PD \\ \sigma_j \\ T_j^{(d)} &= T_j - \sum_{i \in BAA_j} FRD_i + (FRDR_{PD} - FRDS_{PD}) \frac{D_j}{\sum_{j \in PD} D_j}, \forall j \in PD \\ \lambda_j^{(d)} \\ \sum_{j \in PD} \sum_{i \in BAA_j} FRD_i + FRDS_{PD} &= FRDR_{PD} \\ \rho_{PD} \\ \sigma_{PD} \\ \sigma_{$$

🍣 California ISO

Marginal Prices

$$LMP_{i} = \frac{\lambda_{j}}{LPF_{i}} - \sum_{m} SF_{i,m} \mu_{m} - \sum_{m} SF_{i,m}^{(u)} \mu_{m}^{(u)} + \sum_{m} SF_{i,m}^{(d)} \mu_{m}^{(d)}, \forall i \in BAA_{j} \land j \in EIM$$

$$FRUMP_{i} = \begin{cases} \rho_{j} - \sum_{m} SF_{i,m}^{(u)} \mu_{m}^{(u)}, \forall i \in BAA_{j} \land j \notin PU \\ \lambda_{j}^{(u)} + \rho_{PU} - \sum_{m} SF_{i,m}^{(u)} \mu_{m}^{(u)}, \forall i \in BAA_{j} \land j \in PU \end{cases}$$

$$FRDMP_{i} = \begin{cases} \sigma_{j} + \sum_{m} SF_{i,m}^{(d)} \mu_{m}^{(d)}, \forall i \in BAA_{j} \land j \notin PD \\ -\lambda_{j}^{(d)} + \sigma_{PD} + \sum_{m} SF_{i,m}^{(d)} \mu_{m}^{(d)}, \forall i \in BAA_{j} \land j \in PD \end{cases}$$



FRP Settlement and Cost Allocation

- No change in Forecasted Movement or FRU/FRD award settlement
 - Locational Marginal Prices
- No change in Forecasted Movement cost allocation
 - No change in FRU/FRD cost allocation
 - 2-tier cost allocation by resource category
 - Separate for each BAA that fails the FRU/FRD test
 - Common for all BAAs that pass the FRU/FRD test



Next steps

Item	Date
Post Revised Straw Proposal	March 16, 2020
Stakeholder Conference Call	March 23, 2020
Stakeholder Comments Due	April 6, 2020
Draft Final Proposal	May 5, 2020
BPM Language within a Proposed Revision Request – Buffer, Minimum, Requirement	Aligned with Fall 2020 release
Complete Business Requirement Specifications and Tariff Development	October 2020
EIM Governing Body Briefing	November 4, 2020
ISO Board of Governors Decision	November 18-19, 2020

Please send written comment using the comments template available on the initiative <u>webpage</u> to <u>initiativecomments@caiso.com</u>.

