3.
Working Group Session – Please share your organization’s feedback on the topics/themes presented in the discussion paper in order of most to least important.
The Public Advocates Office at the California Public Utilities Commission (Cal Advocates) is the state-appointed independent ratepayer advocate at the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC). Our goal is to ensure that California ratepayers have affordable, safe, and reliable utility services while advancing the state’s environmental goals. Our advocacy efforts to protect ratepayers include energy, water, and communications regulation.
Cal Advocates ranks the themes listed in the discussion paper as follows, with additional consideration and feedback listed below certain ranked items:
- Review of existing ISO market mechanisms
Cal Advocates supports prioritizing a review of the existing ISO market mechanisms as a level-setting tool for stakeholders to improve their understanding of the issues in the Price Formation Enhancements initiative. Cal Advocates recommends that the CAISO review existing incentive and penalty tools for performance and availability in the day-ahead market, including the CAISO’s Resource Adequacy Availability Incentive Mechanism (RAAIM). CAISO suggested that RAAIM will be a topic covered in the recently-started Resource Adequacy Modeling and Program Design initiative; therefore, this may represent an efficient opportunity for CAISO staff to meet stakeholder needs in both initiatives.
- Reflecting the value of reliability in prices
Cal Advocates’ ranking of this theme is driven by the need to ensure that ratepayer costs are just and reasonable. To that end, Cal Advocates suggests that any problem statements need to define what the value of reliability and scarcity pricing mean and what they are intended to achieve. The California Community Choice Association (CalCCA) states that “[m]odifications to Scarcity Pricing are not needed to send a price signal to build new resources; those price signals already exist. Resource Adequacy (RA) prices are signaling that capacity is scarce.”[1] Indeed, the Market Price Benchmark for System RA increased by 77% from 2022 to 2023—an unmistakable signal of need.[2] Generators should not be provided multiple opportunities to extract further rents caused by supply scarcity. CalCCA goes on to state,
[m]odifications to Scarcity Pricing could be needed if the existing Scarcity Pricing mechanisms do not incentivize existing resources to be available to the market at the right times during times of scarcity. However, this need has not yet been fully demonstrated. The next phase of this initiative should be for the CAISO to demonstrate with analysis that the existing Scarcity Pricing mechanisms do not do this.[3]
Cal Advocates supports CalCCA’s clarification that scarcity pricing should be limited to a focus on existing resources. Focusing on existing resources will allow stakeholders to narrow the scope of this initiative and have realistic expectations surrounding what scarcity pricing could achieve in a reliability emergency. Finally, Cal Advocates echoes CalCCA’s doubt that existing Scarcity Pricing mechanisms are not sufficiently incenting resources to be available during scarcity events.
- How and when to enact and end scarcity pricing
- Scarcity Pricing's competitiveness with bi-lateral transactions that occur during scarce conditions
- BAA-level MPM
- Compatibility with pricing and RA in broader West and other markets to appropriately signal (i.e. reflective of performance and delivery) voluntary supply
- Out of market actions
While Cal Advocates understands that the CAISO generally prefers to minimize out of market actions, problem statements should also acknowledge that out of market actions involve tradeoffs with some positive benefits. For instance, the California Department of Water Resources’ Electric Supply Strategic Reliability Reserve (ESSRR) is funded by taxpayers via capacity payments. If the CAISO has a choice between dispatching ESSRR resources or enabling a scarcity pricing mechanism that substantially increases the clearing price of electricity for the entire fleet of generators to hopefully attract an equivalent amount of generation, the CAISO should choose the cheaper option even if it is an out of market action. Any discussion of out of market actions in this initiative should include the decision-making process to execute such actions against alternatives such as exercising scarcity price tools.
[1] Comments of the California Community Choice Association at #2 (no emphasis added), September 28, 2023, available at: https://stakeholdercenter.caiso.com/Comments/AllComments/969b55a3-402f-435b-a97f-270ab94c2beb#org-163889a3-9f08-49f8-8adf-32c5edbd441d.
[2] California Public Utilities Commission, Calculation of the Market Price Benchmarks for the Power Charge Indifference Adjustment Forecast and True Up, September 30, 2022 and October 2, 2023. Both available at: https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/industries-and-topics/electrical-energy/electric-power-procurement/power-charge-indifference-adjustment.
[3] Comments of the California Community Choice Association at #2 (no emphasis added), September 28, 2023, available at: https://stakeholdercenter.caiso.com/Comments/AllComments/969b55a3-402f-435b-a97f-270ab94c2beb#org-163889a3-9f08-49f8-8adf-32c5edbd441d.