1.
Please provide a summary of your organization's overall comments on the Resource Adequacy Modeling and Program Design (RAMPD) Revised Discussion Paper and Final Recommendation Plan posted on July 26, 2024.
The Public Advocates Office at the California Public Utilities Commission (Cal Advocates) is the state-appointed independent ratepayer advocate at the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC). Our goal is to ensure that California ratepayers have affordable, safe, and reliable utility services while advancing the state’s environmental goals. Our efforts to protect ratepayers include energy, water, and communications regulation advocacy.
The California Independent System Operator (CAISO) released the RAMPD Revised Discussion Paper & Final Recommendation Plan, Version 3, on July 26, 2024 (RAMPD Final Plan).[1] Cal Advocates appreciates the CAISO’s progress and coordination with stakeholders in this initiative and generally supports the RAMPD Final Plan. Cal Advocates provides the following recommendations:
- CAISO’s plan to conduct a Loss of Load Expectation (LOLE) assessment must include an early stakeholder review of the assessment methodology, and
- The Capacity Procurement Mechanism (CPM) soft offer cap should not be adjusted to be based on market prices.
The CAISO’s plan to conduct a reliability assessment must include an opportunity for stakeholder feedback on the design of the LOLE model
The RAMPD Final Plan includes an “updated path forward” that describes the CAISO’s plan to conduct a reliability assessment of the CAISO Balancing Authority Area (BAA).[2] The plan does not include a step to allow the CAISO to describe the LOLE model to stakeholders nor does it include a step to solicit stakeholder feedback on the design of the LOLE model. However, the CAISO notes that it intends to “work closely with stakeholders to review and update model inputs and discuss the assessment methodology and tools throughout the process.”[3]
Before the assessment runs, the CAISO should ensure that the process includes a step for stakeholders to review and provide feedback on the methodology to be used in the assessment. As Cal Advocates has noted,[4] LOLE studies are inherently complex and may use different modeling approaches, inputs, and tools. Stakeholder participation is necessary to build consensus on an assessment methodology that may be used to assess reliability plans and contract activities of CAISO-participating Local Regulatory Areas (LRA).[5] A review process would also facilitate transparency in the assessment methodology and process, enabling stakeholders to help identify any design flaws and better understand assessment results that could impact their industry or LRA.[6]
The CPM soft offer cap should not be adjusted to be based on market prices
The CAISO hypothesizes that reduced amounts of offers in the Competitive Solicitation Process (CSP) may be driven in part by sellers having alternative options that can pay well above the CPM soft offer cap.[7] The CAISO is open to a discussion to link the soft offer cap to bilateral market prices as one solution.[8]
The CAISO should not modify the CPM soft offer cap to base it on market values. The current soft offer cap design, intended to represent the going-forward fixed costs of a benchmark generator, is an important market power mitigation feature, as acknowledged by the CAISO.[9] A soft offer cap based on market values[10] would cause CPM designations to compete with the RA market, would remove the soft offer cap’s market power mitigation function, and would likely cause disruption in the RA market.[11] Cal Advocates recommends that the CAISO continue to use going-forward fixed costs to calculate the CPM soft offer cap.
[1] Available at: https://stakeholdercenter.caiso.com/InitiativeDocuments/Revised-Discussion-Paper-and-Final-Recommendation-Plan-Resource-Adequacy-Modeling-and-Program-Design-Working-Group-Jul-26-2024.pdf.
[2] RAMPD Final Plan at 13.
[3] RAMPD Final Plan at 13.
[4] Cal Advocates Comments on the March 13, 2024 RAMPD Working Group, March 27, 2024 at Section 8. Available at: https://stakeholdercenter.caiso.com/Comments/AllComments/a79881e1-374a-4d13-aa17-cbbf7e631b3a#org-aae696bf-1f5d-4356-b1cd-f864e295bc13.
[5] The Track 1 problem statement intends to assess and communicate the system-wide sufficiency of the CAISO BAA with respect to the contracted RA fleet, and understand LRA contributions to overall system reliability. RAMPD Final Plan at 8.
[6] The RAMPD Final Plan does not include all potential actions that may be taken with respect to assessment results but intends to facilitate, “Addressing such concerns around CAISO BAA System-wide RA sufficiency in a timely and efficient manner.” RAMPD Final Plan at 8.
[7] RAMPD Final Plan at 24-25.
[8] RAMPD Final Plan at 28-29.
[9] RAMPD Final Plan at 24-25.
[10] Market prices such as the Resource Adequacy (RA) market or intertie hub prices.
[11] The California Community Choice Association (CalCCA) raised similar points:
RA market prices currently do not appear to be based on cost but rather on whatever buyers will pay. Under these conditions, sellers will search for any available opportunity cost signal and, therefore, what price they can offer. Changes to the CAISO SOC will provide such a signal. Because markets should function competitively, and the SOC is a market power mitigation mechanism, the CAISO should set the CPM SOC to reflect cost, as it does in energy markets with default energy bids. The soft-offer cap already does this and provides an opportunity to get a higher payment if a higher cost can be proven at the FERC.
CalCCA Comments on the April 29-30, 2024 RAMPD Working Groups, May 17, 2024 at Section 1. Available at: https://stakeholdercenter.caiso.com/Comments/AllComments/4726dcff-0976-4bbe-a424-6382c3a38012#org-c3024a68-903e-4503-8e9b-d78c3ab0666a.