Comments on revised draft tariff language

Market enhancements for summer 2021 readiness

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Comment period
Apr 08, 12:00 pm - Apr 15, 05:00 pm
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Balancing Authority of Northern California
Submitted 04/15/2021, 03:14 pm

Submitted on behalf of
Balancing Authority of Northern California

Contact

Kevin Smith (smith@braunlegal.com)

1. Please Include redlined comments in the word version of the tariff language posted on the initiative webpage and attach below.

The Balancing Authority of Northern California (BANC) provides the following comments in response to the California Independent System Operator’s (CAISO) April 8, 2021, “Market Enhancements for Summer 2021 Readiness Revised Draft Tariff Language,” and more specifically, with respect to “Priorities for Internal Demand, Export, and Wheeling Through Transactions.”

BANC supports the CAISO’s additions to Tariff Sections 9.3.1.3.1 (Maintenance Outages Requested Before Cure Period), 9.3.1.3.2 (Maintenance Outages Requested After Cure Period), 9.3.10.2 (addressing Scheduling Coordinator (SC) notifications of partial derates of a resource), and 40.6.6 (Requirement for Partial Resource Adequacy Resources).  All of these provisions were added to ensure that exports supported by non-Resource Adequacy (RA) capacity (non-RA) in the CAISO, or a “Supporting Resource,” are treated on par with internal CAISO demand by addressing a deficiency in the application of derates to partial non-RA/RA resources, as described further below.  Indeed, ensuring similar treatment of non-RA used for supported exports and RA dedicated to CAISO load serving entities has been the policy of the CAISO since the inception of its Market Redesign and Technology Upgrade (MRTU).  Moreover, it is consistent with prior Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) MRTU orders, requiring the CAISO to accommodate firm exports from capacity in the CAISO not already committed to a CAISO RA obligation.  For example, in its April 20, 2007 order, FERC stated:

[C]urtailment priority of exports from generating units that have committed only part of their output as RA capacity in CAISO must be resolved prior to MRTU. If this issue is not resolved, the portion of capacity from a generator that does not otherwise have a resource adequacy commitment within the CAISO could become trapped in the CAISO and entities outside the CAISO will not be able to contract on a firm basis for such capacity. Such a situation could create unnecessary adverse reliability and financial consequences for those entities that have bought or sold, or intend to buy or sell, capacity from a partial RA generating unit. In addition, to the extent that an entity relies on the capacity from a partial RA generating unit for its own resource adequacy needs, curtailment of such generation can create reliability impacts for such an entity. Therefore, we direct the CAISO to resolve this issue prior to the implementation of MRTU Release 1 and ensure that the MRTU systems and software can properly account for partial RA units. As part of its readiness certification, we direct the CAISO to affirm that the MRTU systems and software can accommodate partial RA units or that the CAISO has developed a manual work-around. See “Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Requests for Clarification and Rehearing,” 119 FERC ¶61,076, at 81, ¶202, April 20, 2007, emphasis added.

While this is the intention of the non-RA/Supporting Resource construct, the events of last summer exposed an inconsistency in the CAISO’s treatment of the application of derates on partial RA/non-RA resources in its market software.  More specifically, the non-RA portion of the resource was bearing the entirety of the derate, as opposed to its pro rata share.  This occurred because the non-RA capacity calculation used by the CAISO left a Supporting Resource export with was what was left over after the full unit capacity, including derates, had the full RA quantity (which was a static number) subtracted out. 

For example, if a 400 MW unit, with 100 MW under a non-RA contract as a Supporting Resource and 300 MW dedicated to RA, derated down to 300 MW, the amount of capacity available to the non-RA export would be 0 MW (i.e., 400 MW (PMax) -100 MW (Unit Derate) – 300 MW (CAISO RA) = non-RA/Eligible Export Capacity (EEC), or 0 MW, in this example). 

However, the derates on resources partially dedicated as Supporting Resources, which are on par with internal CAISO Demand, are supposed to be shared on a pro rata basis (unless, of course, there are some other contractual provisions to the contrary.)  In this prior example, based on a pro rata allocation of the derate -- i.e., 25 % (non-RA) and 75 % (RA) -- the correct EEC (non-RA export) should be 75 MW (.25 x 100 MW), while the RA portion is reduced to 225 MW (.75 x 300 MW.)  In this case, it is up to the SC of the resource to address its 75 MW RA deficiency in accordance with the CAISO Tariff, not have the CAISO calculation inadvertently shift the burden to the non-RA side of the resource. 

As was the case with other market issues that went undetected prior to the Summer of 2020 --such as the need to use the Residual Unit Commitment run, not the Integrated Forward Market run, to set the proper level of exports in the Day Ahead Market[1] -- this calculation never came to light until supplies were greatly constrained.  Thus, BANC views these tariff additions as mere corrections to ensure consistency with the established policy.  Namely, the policy that exports with a non-RA Supporting Resource be treated on par with internal CAISO Demand for purposes of curtailment.  Without addressing this, under tighter supply conditions and derates to Supporting Resources, these exports would be treated clearly inferiorly to internal CAISO Demand.  BANC, therefore, greatly appreciates the CAISO’s recognition of this issue and its willingness to correct this in advance of Summer 2021.


[1] Reflected in the CAISO’s September 5, 2020 emergency BPM change (PRR 1282).

California Community Choice Association (CalCCA)
Submitted 04/15/2021, 09:55 pm

Submitted on behalf of
California Community Choice Association (CalCCA)

Contact

Doug Boccignone (dougbocc@flynnrci.com)

1. Please Include redlined comments in the word version of the tariff language posted on the initiative webpage and attach below.

California Community Choice Association (CalCCA) supports as a reasonable interim solution CAISO’s revised final proposal dated April 14, 2021[1] (Revised Final Proposal) to base the PT wheel quantities used in the post-HASP pro-rata allocation on the lowest of 1) 110 percent of the submitted day- ahead market PT wheel self- schedule, 2) the submitted real- time market PT wheel self- schedule, or 3) the PT wheel quantity requested 45-days in advance of the month. The discussion during the April 14, 2021 stakeholder call and a review of the draft Market Surveillance Committee Opinion on Market Enhancements for Summer 2021 Readiness: Export, Load and Wheeling Priorities (MSC Draft Opinion),[2] highlight the need for incorporating reasonable limitations on the amount of PT Wheel energy that could show up in real-time. The MSC Draft Opinion observed that the CAISO should consider aligning the day-ahead must-offer requirement for RA imports and PT wheeling transactions, rather than allowing PT wheels to just participate in the real-time market.[3] As parties commented during the April 14 stakeholder call, absent a requirement for PT Wheels to participate in the day-ahead market, CAISO may not be able to reliably serve CAISO load as a result of having to accommodate PT wheels that were not scheduled in the day-ahead market. CalCCA believes that the approach described in the Draft Final Proposal is a reasonable interim measure. However, it is critical that CAISO includes in its filing a commitment to initiate a separate stakeholder process to develop a longer-term solution that further considers the responsibility of Balancing Authorities faced with the decision to use transmission to serve wheels compared to obligations to serve native to load. This process also should consider the extent to which other BAs provide comparable access to their transmission systems. As the MSC Draft Opinion noted, access truly comparable to what some of the non-CAISO BAs have requested of the CAISO would require that those BAs market all of their transmission capacity on a daily basis and treat those transactions with the same priority as their own load.[4]

 

 

 


[1] http://www.caiso.com/InitiativeDocuments/Addendum-DraftFinalProposal-MarketEnhancements-Summer2021Readiness-Export-Load-WheelingPriorities.pdf

[2] Opinion on Market Enhancements for Summer 2021 Readiness: Export, Load and Wheeling Priorities, Draft of April 14, 2021- http://www.caiso.com/Documents/MSCOpinion-MarketEnhancements-2021SummerReadiness-ExportLoad-WheelingPriorities-Apr16-20221.pdf

 

[3] Ibid, p. 13

[4] Ibid, p. 15

California ISO - Department of Market Monitoring
Submitted 04/15/2021, 09:53 pm

Contact

Adam Swadley (aswadley@caiso.com)

1. Please Include redlined comments in the word version of the tariff language posted on the initiative webpage and attach below.

Please see DMM comments in attached PDF.

California Public Utilities Commission - Energy Division
Submitted 04/19/2021, 01:47 pm

Contact

Michele Kito (MK1@cpuc.ca.gov)

1. Please Include redlined comments in the word version of the tariff language posted on the initiative webpage and attach below.

CPUC staff appreciates the opportunity to comment on CAISO’s revised final proposal posted on April 15th and draft tariff language posted on April 8th and appreciates the changes that have been made with regarding to PT wheel through transactions related to real-time submissions. The major revisions included in CAISO’s April 15th draft include the following: 

  • CAISO removed the firm cut-off date to register PT wheeling transactions (proposed to be April 23 or the date of the FERC filing) and changed the process to allow PT wheeling transactions to register on an on-going basis (June 29 for July and August and 45 days before the month until June of next year).  

  • CAISO changed the post-HASP process to allocate only between RA imports and PT wheels, rather than RUC imports (including RA and non-RA transactions) and explained that it would run the post-HASP process if it could not support load or all of the PT wheeling transactions.  

  • CAISO changed its tariff language to allow VERS to support PT exports, where previously this was not allowed.  

CPUC staff opposes these changes, as they could lead to additional reliability concerns this coming summer.  CAISO also changed the PT export requirement that the scheduling coordinator needs to positively affirm that it can support a PT export to requiring the scheduling coordinator to notify CAISO if it is not able to support the PT export. CPUC staff does not oppose this change, but seeks clarification that the masterfile flag defaults to “no” (cannot support a PT export) and that a PT export with a masterfile flag set to “no” cannot support a PT export. 

In addition, CPUC staff reiterates comments made previously regarding this initiative: 

CPUC staff recognizes that California is interconnected to the entire Western electric grid and, as such, must work with neighboring balancing authorities and must treat in state and out of state entities fairly when it comes to access to the bulk transmission grid. We appreciate the challenges the CAISO faces in ensuring equal access to entities that are either exporting from California, or wheeling through California, while also meeting its obligations to provide reliable service to the load within the balancing authority. However, we are concerned that in some circumstances the proposals will unnecessarily increase the risks to California load. 

CPUC staff is concerned that the existing and proposed rules prioritize exports and wheels over native load and, if allowed to continue, will seriously jeopardize reliability in the state and undermine the resource adequacy and transmission planning processes. To this end, CPUC staff agrees with the CAISO, the IOUs and other parties that ultimately a durable solution will need to be developed and ask the CAISO to make further development of these rules a priority.  

CPUC staff is particularly concerned about this issue because of the uncertainty of the magnitude of wheeling transactions. If wheel throughs are limited to a few hundred MWs, the challenge would be manageable this coming summer, but staff is concerned that wheeling transactions could approach thousands of MWs. For example, during the 2020 August stressed system conditions, the CAISO system was exported 4,000 - 5,000 MW, primarily to the Southwest.  CPUC staff agrees that that recent actions by the CAISO have foreclosed this risk going forward but, we are concerned that these export transactions during tight system conditions will migrate to wheeling transactions. CPUC staff’s concern is further exacerbated by the fact that entities wheeling through the state do not need to reserve this space in advance, nor pay for the entire month or schedule every day. Thus, there is little visibility regarding the magnitude of the issue and little opportunity to plan for and address it, should it arise.  

Further, given that prices are now considerably higher at Palo Verde (in the south) than at Malin (in the north), CPUC staff expects that this could further increase wheeling transactions and, as a result, displace California resource adequacy import contracts for energy and the movement of energy from northern California (where there is typically excess generation) across the constrained transmission system to southern California. In other words, CPUC staff is concerned that the use of the California transmission system to move power from the Northwest to the Southwest could use valuable transmission space and crowd out use by Californians themselves and thereby jeopardize reliability this coming summer. 

Finally, CPUC staff is concerned that any number of entities could indicate that they have signed a contract to obtain PT wheeling status to reserve space, but that these contracts could be provisional or have no penalty provisions, because there are no clear requirements or upfront costs. Thus, it seems possible that CAISO could give PT wheeling status to many entities for large quantities of MWs, which may or may not materialize in the operational space and, if they do, would be given priority over load in all instances, except when there is load shedding in which case they would be given a pro rata allocation, to the detriment of reliability for California customers.1    

In addition, for situational awareness, CPUC staff had encouraged CAISO “to request that parties provide information on the wheeling transactions that are signed as of the date of the FERC filing as soon as possible to allow for coordinated planning for this coming summer.” However, in the latest iteration of its proposal, CAISO has moved the filing date back for PT wheeling transactions for July and August to June 29th, and now proposes to allow additional PT wheels to be nominated on a monthly basis.  CPUC staff continues to support a firm cut-off date for PT wheeling status, as explained further below. At a minimum, however, RA imports are specifically limited by CAISO’s maximum import capability (MIC) process at each intertie point and CPUC staff requests that PT self-scheduled wheel through transactions be similarly limited. 

The remainder of these comments focus on the changes made to the revised proposal and revised tariff provisions. 

CPUC staff does not support moving the contract execution date for PT wheels from the FERC filing date to June 29 and allowing PT wheels on a continuing basis 

CAISO removed the firm cut-off date to register PT wheeling transactions (proposed to be April 23 or the date of the FERC filing) and changed the process to allow PT wheeling transactions to register on an on-going basis (June 29 for July and August and 45 days before the month until June of next year). CPUC staff does not support this change.   

CAISO’s initial rationale for the cut-off date was the following:  “Several stakeholders commented they had secured imported energy to serve their load that they planned to import using wheeling schedules across the CAISO balancing authority area. They stated they had planned these transactions in reliance on the CAISO’s current treatment of wheeling schedules and that the approach outlined in the draft final proposal, without a forward process to procure transmission, would violate open access principles.”  CAISO changed this proposed policy based on further stakeholder feedback “that requirements for CAISO imports and PT wheels were not balanced” and now proposes “to rather require such a contract by June 29, 2021, for July and August 2021, and 45 days prior to the month for subsequent months,” reasoning that “[t]he requirement for LSE procurement of monthly firm transmission shows an external LSE’s dependence on using the CAISO system to routinely serve its load, demonstrating a similar level of dependence and commitment as CAISO load serving entities.”   

CPUC staff supports the notion that there should be some grandfathering provisions to account for paradigm shifts, but does not agree that it is appropriate to continue this practice through the critical summer months as it could lead to additional PT wheeling transactions, crowding out RA imports and jeopardizing reliability this coming summer.  Further, CPUC staff notes that wheeling transactions during the tight system conditions last summer amounted to only about 300 MW, belying the notion that external entities have been relying on wheeling transactions to serve their load on a regular and continuing basis.   

CPUC staff does not support the changes CAISO made to the PT wheeling requirements and suggests further tariff revisions 

In its revised tariff language, CAISO has changed the requirements for PT wheels to seemingly reduce the stringency of these requirements. 

Initial Tariff Language:  Priority Wheeling Through Self-Schedule 

A Self-Scheduled Wheel Through that is supported by (1) a firm power supply contract to serve load in another balancing authority area that was entered into prior to April 23, 2021, and (2) monthly firm transmission under applicable open access transmission tariffs, or comparable transmission tariffs, to deliver the Wheel Through Energy from the sink to the CAISO border during all of the hours covered by the firm power supply contract.   

Revised Tariff Language:  Priority Wheeling Through Self-Schedule 

A Self-Scheduled Wheeling  Through that is supported by  (1) a firm power supply contract to serve an external  load serving entity’s  load  for  the entire calendar month  and (2)  monthly firm transmission for all the hours reflected in the power supply contract.   

CPUC staff supports the initial tariff language, with the following modifications: 

image(8).png

We note that some parties have proposed fairly lenient provisions that would seemingly allow any short-term transaction that could arise during tight system conditions to qualify, even contracts that are as of yet not executed. For example, IID noted the following in their comments: 

IID’s concern goes to the phrase, “for the entire calendar month” with a potential, related concern as to the phrases, “monthly firm transmission” and “for all the hours.”  These phrases suggest that the new definition of “Priority Wheeling Through Self-Schedules” does not contemplate partial month commitments.  IID’s foreseeable monthly contracts for power supply that would need to be wheeled through the CAISO’s Balancing Authority Area (BAA) would not necessarily involve consistent supply each day of the calendar month.  Were the CAISO to mean that an entity wheeling-through the CAISO be required to wheel consistently equal quantities day-to-day or more extreme, round-the-clock, such contracts would be infeasible for IID.  In addition, IID wishes to ensure that it would subject to a Wheeling Access Charge only when the supply was actually intended to be scheduled as opposed to being charged Wheeling Access Charges for time periods that are not needed. 

The CAISO may not intend the provision to be implemented in the ways outlined above, but for clarity, but IID requests that the CAISO modify the proposed Tariff language in the following or substantially similar manner: 

Priority Wheeling Through Self-Schedule 

A Self-Scheduled Wheeling Through that is supported by  (1) a firm power supply contract to serve an external load serving entity’s load for during the entireapplicable calendar month and (2) monthly firm transmission for all the hours reflected in the power supply contract. 

Further, the bar to have firm transmission would seem to be low because numerous entities have firm transmission to the CA border, as shown in the table below, which was submitted by Morgan Stanley in the CPUC’s proceeding.2  This suggests that significant quantities of PT wheel could be designated through CAISO’s process and crowd out RA imports needed to serve load during critical reliability events, thereby jeopardizing reliability this coming summer. 

 image-20210419120624-1.png 

 

Post-HASP process needs further clarification and could still lead to real-time reliability issues 

CAISO changed the post-HASP process to allocate only between RA imports and PT wheels, rather than RUC imports (including RA and non-RA transactions) and explained that it would run the post-HASP process if it could not support load or all of the PT wheeling transactions. CPUC staff does not support this change and recommends that the post-HASP process allocate to RUC imports (including RA and non-RA transactions) and wheels.  

In addition, CPUC staff has identified several  issues that require further clarification, including the following: 

  1. CAISO indicates that it plans to allocate import capability based on the post-HASP process. It would be helpful to clarify what CAISO means by import limit in its examples – is this total import capability or maximum RA import capability and is this after taking out ETCs and TORs? See figure below. Also, in CAISO’s examples, how could RA transactions ever exceed the import limit? 

image-20210419120624-2.png

  1. Does CAISO intend to limit PT wheels to the RA import capacity?  If would seem inconsistent to limit RA transactions at a tie to seemingly feasible transactions, but not to limit PT wheels in the same fashion. For example, assume RA transactions at Malin are limited to 2000 MW due to the maximum import capability (and the existence of  existing transmission contracts). Why would it make sense to allow PT wheels to attempt to schedule 4,000 MW across this tie?  CPUC staff request that CAISO clarify this issue and limit PT wheels to the maximum import capability assigned to RA imports, since this will affect the post-HASP pro rata allocation ratios.   

  1. Does CAISO intend that the post-HASP process only occurs if day-ahead PT wheels or demand is infeasible or also if RT PT wheels or LPT wheels make the schedule infeasible?  For instance, assume there is an intertie with 4,000 MW of capacity and 2,000 MW of non-RA import and 2,000 MW of PT wheels, and the schedule is feasible in IFM and RUC. If RT PT wheels do not make the schedule infeasible, this schedule would continue. If this is the case, what happens if an additional 2,000 MW of PT wheels come in the real-time and there are now uneconomic adjustments?  Would the calculation be as follows: RA transactions/(RA transactions + wheels), so 0/(0+2000) = 0, so in this case, would 2,000 MW of day-ahead wheels get scheduled or would 4,000 MW of PT wheels?  If it is the case that 4,000 MW of PT wheels get scheduled, then again CAISO would have an unexpected reliability issue in the real-time, precisely the outcome we are attempting to avoid. CAISO’s proposal attempts to address this by only including day-ahead wheels in this calculation, but this fails to take into account the interaction between real time wheels and RA bids. To address this, CPUC staff recommends that CAISO revert to its initial proposal, which includes RUC imports (including RA and non-RA transactions) in the post-HASP adjustment or only allow PT wheels that are scheduled in the day-ahead process. 

 

The post-HASP process for allocating the scarce transmission across Path 26 should be revised 

In its revised final proposal, CAISO indicates that it will use the following process for allocating Path 26 transmission capacity between load and PT wheeling transactions: 

The administrative schedule adjustment process after HASP will also be applied for flowgate congestion, e.g., Path 26 north to south congestion, which results in uneconomic adjustments among generation/import schedules north of Path26 and high priority wheels southbound through Path26, and or under-generation power balance constraint relaxation because the load forecast south of Path 26 cannot be served. This administrative schedule adjustment for Path 26 north to south congestion is similar to the one applied for congested interties in the import direction if the problem is transformed as follows:  

  • The Import Limit is the Path26 north to south limit.  

  • The RA Bid/Self-Schedule is the sum of the RA bid capacity in HASP from all RA resources north of Path26 (generators, NGRs, and imports).  

  • The PT Wheel Self-Schedule is the sum of all PT Wheel Self-Schedules from wheels that cross Path26 in the north to south direction.  

  • The demand forecast of the PG&E TAC is subtracted from the RA Bid/Self-Schedule to yield the RA supply that competes with PT wheels for transmission capacity on Path26. 

It would be helpful if CAISO could clarify the following: 

  • Will CAISO be using the import limit on Path 26 or the import limit after taking into account any firm transmission rights across this path? 

  • Will CAISO be using bids from all RA resources or just bids up to the NQC of RA resources? For example, assume that the NQC of RA resources in the north is 15,000 MW but these RA resources are bidding 20,000 MW (recall that the CPUC reduces the NQC below pmax for hydro, solar and wind to address reliability concerns but that at any time, the RA resources can be bidding above their NQC).  This will matter especially during stressed system conditions, when we expect RA resources could be bidding above their NQCs, which have been estimated low for reliability purposes but can exceed these estimates under stressed conditions when resources are being called upon to generate the maximum amount of energy possible.  This issue was noted in DMM’s report on the August events, in which they showed that bids from RA resources were in excess of their NQCs. 

Also, as stated above, PT wheels should be limited in the above calculation to the maximum RA import capability.   

VERS should not be able support firm PT exports, as this could lead to real-time reliability issues  

As noted by the CPUC staff in previous comments, variable energy resources (VERS) should not be able support firm, hourly block PT export and be given priority equal to load, because the forecast for VERS can material differ from actual production.  

Notably, CPUC staff does not object to VERS being exported, but objects to allowing VERS to support PT exports  with priority equal to load at their scheduled quantity which can result in the CAISO system exporting an amount greater than VERS production.  This can further exacerbate shortages within CAISO and jeopardize reliability if the CAISO is supporting an export from a resource whose schedule materially differs from its forecast. For example, assume a wind resource is scheduled for 200 MW (and CAISO is exporting the 200 MW PT export as a result), but the resource is only generating 20 MW -- this could result in reliability issues during tight system conditions. For this reason, CPUC staff recommended (and continues to recommend) that CAISO revert to its earlier tariff language (shown below), rather than the updated tariff language.   

CPUC staff supports previous tariff language that addresses this issue: 

image-20210419120624-3.png

CPUC staff does not support the currently proposed tariff language: 

image-20210419120624-4.png

As a solution, CPUC staff supports DMM’s suggestion that CAISO develop a manual process that would allow CAISO operators to curtail PT exports from a VERS that is operating below its scheduled quantity before curtailing internal load.  CAISO has indicated that it is unable to implement such a process this summer and, as a result, CPUC staff strongly encourage CAISO to change the tariff language to exclude VERS for this summer, given the urgent need to ensure reliability and to ensure that all reasonable actions are taken to avoid load shedding events this coming summer. 

If this suggestion is not adopted, CPUC staff request that CAISO and/or DMM provide data on PT exports during any system emergency and load shedding events to determine whether the CAISO system was exporting power at a schedule above the actual production during any tight system conditions for the upcoming summer in order to allow the CAISO and stakeholders to re-evaluate whether changes should be made for Summer 2022 and/or whether the manual process recommended by DMM could/should be implemented. 

Parameters at the end of the revised final proposal should be updated to reflect all changes that will be made this summer 

In the revised final proposal, CAISO included the penalty parameters that would be when the bid cap is $1000 per MWh and when the bid cap is $2000 per MWh.  However, these penalty parameters do not appear to be the penalty parameters that would be in place this summer, as a result of CAISO’s Summer 2021 readiness initiative.  In particular, CAISO includes the penalty parameter for export self-schedule with RUC schedule at $1500 per MWh, which is above load. Although CAISO indicated in its April 14, 2020 presentation3 that this value would be updated in a subsequent BPM, it would be helpful if this table in the revised final proposal were updated to include all penalty paraments that will be in place this summer, in order to avoid any confusion regarding what is being approved by the Board.  In addition, given that the tariff places PT exports at equal priority to load, it would be helpful if CAISO could explain why the penalty parameter for tagged exports is higher than load. 

image-20210419120624-5.png

image-20210419120624-6.png

 

Imperial Irrigation District
Submitted 04/15/2021, 04:33 pm

Submitted on behalf of
Imperial Irrigation District

Contact

Sean Neal, smn@dwgp.com, Tel.:  (916) 498-0121

1. Please Include redlined comments in the word version of the tariff language posted on the initiative webpage and attach below.

The Imperial Irrigation District (IID) thanks the California Independent System Operator Corporation (CAISO) for the opportunity to comment regarding revised draft tariff language pertaining to exports, loads, and wheel-throughs as part of the Market Enhancements for Summer 2021 Readiness Stakeholder Process.  IID appreciates the CAISO’s removal of the “cut-off” of April 23, 2021 (or alternatively, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) filing date) for demonstration of wheel-through contracts in order to receive higher priority.  While IID continues to disagree with several key elements of the CAISO’s proposals on exports, loads, and wheel-throughs, IID comments herein specifically as to the draft Tariff language regarding exports, loads, and wheel-throughs.

 

IID has a question and potential concern regarding the draft definition of “Priority Wheeling Through Self-Schedule” that was posted on April 8, 2021, and any Tariff revisions that may be related to IID’s concern.

 

The draft Tariff provision reads as follows:

 

Priority Wheeling Through Self-Schedule

A Self-Scheduled Wheeling Through that is supported by  (1) a firm power supply contract to serve an external load serving entity’s load for the entire calendar month  and (2) monthly firm transmission for all the hours reflected in the power supply contract. 

 

IID’s concern goes to the phrase, “for the entire calendar month” with a potential, related concern as to the phrases, “monthly firm transmission” and “for all the hours.”  These phrases suggest that the new definition of “Priority Wheeling Through Self-Schedules” does not contemplate partial month commitments.  IID’s foreseeable monthly contracts for power supply that would need to be wheeled through the CAISO’s Balancing Authority Area (BAA) would not necessarily involve consistent supply each day of the calendar month.  Were the CAISO to mean that an entity wheeling-through the CAISO be required to wheel consistently equal quantities day-to-day or more extreme, round-the-clock, such contracts would be infeasible for IID.  In addition, IID wishes to ensure that it would subject to a Wheeling Access Charge only when the supply was actually intended to be scheduled as opposed to being charged Wheeling Access Charges for time periods that are not needed.

 

The CAISO may not intend the provision to be implemented in the ways outlined above, but for clarity, but IID requests that the CAISO modify the proposed Tariff language in the following or substantially similar manner:

 

Priority Wheeling Through Self-Schedule

A Self-Scheduled Wheeling Through that is supported by  (1) a firm power supply contract to serve an external load serving entity’s load for during the entireapplicable calendar month and (2) monthly firm transmission for all the hours reflected in the power supply contract. 

 

If the above revisions are made, IID would have less concern about the definition stating “all the hours”, because the meaning would be clear that the term would pertain to only those hours contemplated in the relevant power supply contract.

 

IID looks forward to the CAISO’s feedback on these proposals.

Middle River Power, LLC
Submitted 04/15/2021, 01:30 pm

Contact

Brian Theaker (btheaker@mrpgenco.com)

1. Please Include redlined comments in the word version of the tariff language posted on the initiative webpage and attach below.

MRP appreciates the opportunity to submit the attached comments on the revised tariff language.  

Pacific Gas & Electric
Submitted 04/16/2021, 10:11 am

Contact

Connor Valaik (connor.valaik@pge.com)

1. Please Include redlined comments in the word version of the tariff language posted on the initiative webpage and attach below.

Requests for Immediate Changes and Clarifications 

PG&E believes the CAISO can make several incremental changes to provide a more equitable proposal and further enhance reliability this summer. We would like to reiterate that the current proposal provides more beneficial terms to short-term wheel throughs than any other BA in the West via their open access tariffs. Moreover, this point has been echoed by many stakeholders including other California LSEs, the DMM, and the MSC in their comments. PG&E believes with the below described discrete changes the CAISO can improve upon its current proposal (see attached document for our direct edits to the draft tariff language):

  • CAISO should specify that only contracts such as an WSPP Schedule C or equivalent contract could qualify as a firm power supply contract to serve load. As PG&E understands it, WSPP Schedule C is considered the standard product for firm power in the West. We are concerned that without this clarification contracts with terms that are not consistent with the resource adequacy requirements of other BAs would qualify to receive PT status. For example, Arizona Public Service requires that its network resources sourced outside its BA have a firm power supply contract equivalent to WSPP Schedule C.[1] As this appears to be a widely held standard for firm power across the West, it is reasonable to expect that LSEs outside the CAISO have been adhering to this standard and the requirement should not pose too significant of a contracting hurdle.

 

  • PG&E also believes that the CAISO should require firm transmission from source to sink, during the transition period until a durable, reliable solution ca be developed. The CAISO currently proposes to require firm transmission to the CAISO border.[2] PG&E does not understand why only this leg of the transmission service would be required. Moreover, BAs in the West, such as Arizona Public Service appear to require firm transmission from source to sink in order to qualify as an RA resource.[3] As such, we believe it is reasonable to expect the PT wheel through to have procured firm transmission from source to sink if it intends to serve as another BAs resource adequacy capacity.

 

  • PG&E also asks the CAISO to require an attestation from the LSE who has contracted for the priority wheel through. Currently, the CAISO is only requiring the SC to attest to the requirements, however, PG&E believes it is also necessary for a specific LSE outside the CAISO indicate that it has contracted for that wheel through. Without this requirement, it appears that it would be possible for an entity to attest to the requirements outlined by the CAISO and intend to use its PT wheel through as speculative supply that can be sold to any LSE during times of high prices. These types of wheels should only be considered LPT.   

 

  • CAISO should have the right to curtail PT export schedules if that resource is deviating from its schedule by a certain degree. It is PG&E’s understanding that other BAs retain this right to ensure that it does not require imbalance energy at the expense of its own reliability. PG&E understands there are some implementation issues with validating export quantities for this summer, but believes it’s important that the CAISO reserve the right to curtail these PT export schedules that are deviating from their scheduled MW quantity as it may be a necessary step to preserve CAISO reliability.

 

PG&E also has the following clarification regarding the updates to the proposal:

  • PG&E appreciates that the CAISO has included in the addendum an explanation of how it intends to allocate capacity along Path 26. However, we request the CAISO to produce some examples detailing how this process would work in practice.

 

PG&E’s Additional Concerns with the Current Proposal

PG&E would like to highlight that we believe that comparing PT wheel throughs and RA imports is a false equivalency and should not be used to determine solutions for this summer or in the future. The more accurate comparison would be to compare PT wheel throughs with native load. It is clear that FERC open access has always protected the needs of native load such that native load has priority use to the transmission system. PG&E understands that the CAISO is not able to create a process analogous to that of other ISO/RTOs by this summer and must create an interim process to provide equitable transmission access. However, it appears that some stakeholders are suggesting that all requirements for PT wheel throughs and RA imports should be the same. PG&E does not believe this suggestion is valid and that the CAISO is instead seeking to provide similar treatment between our imported RA capacity with that of another BA.

It is clear to the CAISO that RA imports are being used to serve native load as they have met the program’s requirements, are shown to the CAISO in advance, are planned for from an interconnection and transmission planning standpoint, and the LSE using the resources pay for the CAISO TAC on a long term basis. However, it is less clear that wheel throughs are in fact being used to meet another BA’s resource adequacy capacity or that entities wanting to use wheeling service want the CAISO to plan for the use and are willing to pay the associated transmission costs.  

As such CAISO should immediately prioritize additional changes for 2022 to ensure that both the CAISO BA load and outside LSEs wanting to wheel through the CAISO to serve load (and be planned for and pay the CAISO transmission charges on a long term basis) can both be met.  

 


[1] Arizona Public Service Business Practice Manual, “Designation of Network Resources,” Section 2

[2] This requirement was detailed in the April 14 stakeholder call as an element of the policy but is not accurately reflect in the tariff language. PG&E has also submitted tariff language to further clarify this requirement.

[3] Arizona Public Service Business Practice Manual, “Designation of Network Resources,” Section 2.1.6

Salt River Project
Submitted 04/15/2021, 04:17 pm

Contact

Marcie Martin (marcie.martin@srpnet.com)

1. Please Include redlined comments in the word version of the tariff language posted on the initiative webpage and attach below.

Consistent with Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District’s (SRP’s) comments throughout this stakeholder process, we recommend changes to the revised draft tariff language as shown in the attached file.

Southern California Edison
Submitted 04/15/2021, 04:30 pm

Contact

Beverly Brereton (beverly.a.brereton@sce.com)

1. Please Include redlined comments in the word version of the tariff language posted on the initiative webpage and attach below.

All edits are reflected within the document as yellow highlighted text.

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