4.
Please provide your organization’s comments on Regional Organization Start-Up Funding
SCE supports the CAISO effectively co-signing a loan to cover the start-up costs of the Regional Organization of the Western Energy (ROWE). SCE anticipates that as early as January 2028, the ROWE will assume governance over the regional electric markets operated by the CAISO. As such, it is appropriate for the CAISO play a role in the start-up process of the ROWE. SCE also supports the CAISO imposing a limitation on the amount of a loan it will guarantee (e.g., $8.5M). The exact limit of the guarantee should be determined in consultation with the CAISO Board, the Formation Committee/ROWE, the WEIM Governing Body and stakeholders.
SCE supports the general structure proposed by the CAISO. That is, beginning in Q2 of 2028 the CAISO will collect funds from market participants to allow repayment of the loan within a year.
While SCE generally supports the proposed structure, it recommends changing the allocation methodology that CAISO has proposed to one based on real-time participation. Real-time market participation is the sole common denominator across all entities subject to the ROWE governance structure. This will remain true regardless of whether, or when, individual entities elect to participate in the Extended Day-Ahead Market (“EDAM”), including during the initial implementation period in 2028. Allocating costs based exclusively on real-time participation therefore ensures that all participants contribute on a consistent and comparable basis, grounded in a market construct that is shared by all.
By contrast, the CAISO’s proposed allocation—based on combined Day-Ahead and real-time market participation—would disproportionately assign costs to EDAM participants. Given that the Day-Ahead Market is substantially larger than the real-time market – by an order of magnitude - and that only a subset of entities participate in both markets, this approach would effectively shift the vast majority of costs onto EDAM participants. As a result, entities that participate only in the real-time market would contribute comparatively little, despite receiving ROWE-related benefits, creating an inequitable outcome akin to a free-rider scenario for WEIM-only participants.
Allocating costs solely on the basis of real-time participation avoids this result by normalizing cost responsibility across all participants using a shared, universally applicable metric. At the same time, larger participants will continue to pay a larger share than smaller participants. This approach better aligns cost responsibility with participation, promotes fairness, and removes even the appearance of disincentives to EDAM participation during its formative stages.
In sum, while SCE supports the overall ROWE cost recovery framework proposed by the CAISO, the proposal should be improved by allocating costs based exclusively on real-time (WEIM) market participation. Doing so will ensure that costs are assessed on a common, equitable basis and would avoid unintended free-rider outcomes, while remaining fully consistent reasonable cost allocation principles.
Cost Allocation
SCE agrees that all market participants will benefit from the ROWE governance framework and, accordingly, that all market participants should contribute to its associated costs. However, SCE respectfully recommends a refinement to the cost allocation methodology proposed by the CAISO. Specifically, SCE understands the CAISO proposal is to allocate loan repayments costs based on combined participation in both the Day-Ahead Market and the Western Energy Imbalance Market (“WEIM”) real-time market. Instead, SCE recommends cost allocation solely on the basis of real-time (WEIM) market participation.