1.
Please describe your organization’s support for the draft 2027-2029 market policy roadmap. Use the text box below to provide any additional information that may be helpful in finalizing the selection of initiatives and initiative timing
Voting “support” indicates that your organization largely agrees with both the selection of market policy initiative topics and the proposed schedules for these initiatives.
Voting “oppose” indicates that your organization largely opposes the selection of market policy initiatives topics and the proposed schedules for these initiatives
Bonneville Power Administration appreciates the CAISO’s efforts to expand stakeholder discussion periods and establish more realistic, extended working group timelines in the Draft 2027–2029 Policy Roadmap. Given the breadth and complexity of upcoming market design topics, this intentional pacing allows regional entities adequate time to conduct technical review, coordinate internally, and provide thoughtful input. Bonneville values this collaborative approach, which significantly strengthens regional alignment and produces more durable market policies. Bonneville offers specific comments on several high-priority initiatives below.
Resource Adequacy
Bonneville acknowledges the limited scope of the Resource Adequacy initiative. As regional coordination deepens across the West, Bonneville recommends that CAISO also explicitly consider future alignment with Regional Organization for Western Energy (ROWE) Resource Adequacy policy as the initiative re-orients toward California Public Utilities Commission’s Unforced Capacity framework.
As regional market integration and resource adequacy coordination develop, emerging resource adequacy frameworks should appropriately recognize the diverse characteristics of the variety of resources used to meet load in the West, rather than rely exclusively on methodologies developed around thermal generation portfolios. Bonneville encourages CAISO to support ROWE’s development of a binding Resource Adequacy program as a pre-requisite to join EDAM. This program should incentivize investment in new generation while maintaining a set of minimum standards for a wide variety of concepts such as peak loads, resource accreditation, risk tolerance, and must offer requirements.
Congestion Revenue Allocation
Bonneville appreciates the proposed extension of the working group phase of Congestion Revenue Allocation Phase 2 and CAISO's commitment to additional analysis of the simultaneous feasibility test simulations. The novel complexity of integrating OATT transmission rights with Congestion Revenue Rights (CRRs) warrants careful evaluation, particularly because the underlying transmission constructs reflect different approaches to transmission service and congestion management. Further, the extended timeline offers an opportunity to standardize the congestion rent allocation methodology across the EDAM footprint.
Bonneville recommends that the working group also consider the interests of Point-to-Point (PTP) versus Network Integration Transmission Service (NT) customers. Bonneville receives a significant portion of transmission revenue from PTP sales. The development and implementation of an organized market in the west must not penalize or disincentivize equitable cost allocation for use of the transmission system. NT and PTP products have different service characteristics and contractual structures, and any congestion revenue allocation framework must account for those distinctions.
Bonneville supports additional analytical work to evaluate whether proposed allocation methodologies appropriately preserve the value associated with firm transmission service, maintain equitable treatment across transmission customer classes, and provide predictable outcomes under varying system conditions.
The extended working group schedule provides a valuable opportunity to evaluate these issues thoroughly before advancing a final design.
Price Formation Enhancements
Bonneville strongly supports CAISO’s decision to broaden the Price Formation Enhancements (PFE) initiative to develop a comprehensive scarcity pricing framework alongside balancing authority area-level market power mitigation. Establishing clear, graduated price signals that accurately reflect tightening operating margins and the true value of reserves is essential for operational reliability, efficient regional resource commitment, and long-term investment across the Western footprint. At the same time, Bonneville encourages the ISO to maintain clear momentum and focus as this expanded scope takes shape. While Bonneville appreciates that addressing scarcity pricing comprehensively requires careful technical coordination among diverse regional perspectives, the stakeholder community should mindfully avoid rehashing problem statements. Well-functioning scarcity pricing is not novel; it is a foundational, FERC-approved component of the standard organized market structure.
Bonneville also understands that the PFE reframing will allow for resumed discussions on fast-start pricing, so that all three components—market power mitigation, scarcity pricing, and fast-start pricing—will be reunited in a single track. Given the brevity of the discussion previously devoted to fast-start pricing, stakeholders may benefit from early working group discussions focused on this topic, along with how it is expected to interact with the market power mitigation and scarcity pricing components.
Bonneville emphasizes that the resulting framework should appropriately recognize the operational characteristics of flexible resources and avoid pricing or mitigation outcomes that undervalue legitimate opportunity costs and the provision of flexibility. The objective should be a transparent and durable price formation framework that supports efficient market outcomes while preserving appropriate reliability incentives.
Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Coordination
Bonneville generally supports the areas identified in the roadmap. Additionally, Bonneville requests that CAISO appropriately account for the implementation of the Washington GHG regulation zone within the final roadmap. Bonneville anticipates that additional stakeholder discussion and implementation resources will be necessary in 2027 to implement this new GHG regulation zone, particularly for balancing authority areas spanning across one or more GHG regulatory jurisdiction(s) and non-GHG regulatory areas. Bonneville also requests that the public dialogue on the net export constraint be expanded to include a broader review of the updates made to the GHG design for EDAM, including treatment of committed capacity.
Intertie Bidding
Bonneville would like Intertie Bidding included in the Draft Roadmap. CAISO noted that stakeholders have submitted proposals on this topic have been submitted in prior years, demonstrating sustained regional stakeholder interest. Efficient intertie bidding and scheduling arrangements play a critical role in facilitating regional power transfers. Market design should enable efficient use of existing transmission capability and avoid unnecessary barriers to transactions across market boundaries.
Recognizing the need to manage initiative workload, Bonneville suggests that CAISO incorporate Intertie Bidding into the EDAM Enhancements or Seams workstreams rather than treating it as an isolated standalone initiative. Intertie mechanics, including scheduling coordination across seams, market liquidity at boundary points, and alignment with bilateral OATT frameworks, fit naturally within the scope of either workstream.
Integrating this topic would provide a resource-efficient means of addressing seam dynamics, harmonizing intertie bidding capabilities across the entire EDAM footprint, and supporting robust, transparent market access on key regional transmission paths.