Comments on Large Loads Draft Final Proposal and 10/1 Meeting

Large loads

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Comment period
Oct 01, 11:30 am - Oct 15, 05:00 pm
Submitting organizations
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ACP-California
Submitted 10/15/2026, 01:46 pm

Submitted on behalf of
ACP-California

Contact

Caitlin Liotiris (ccollins@energystrat.com)

1.   Please provide your organization’s comments on section A. Transmission Service to eligible customers on Behalf of Large Loads.
a. Please provide comments on the definition of large loads. b. Please provide comments on the large load application process and interconnection study procedures. c. Please provide comments on the large load operational requirements. d. Please provide your comments on the large load service agreements. e. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

ACP-California appreciates CAISO’s efforts to coordinate with the PTOs on the interconnection processes for large loads and the efforts to coordinate new load interconnection requests with the TPP. Although we understand the CAISO does not regulate PTOs on matters of load interconnection and that PTOs are responsible for developing and implementing tariff provisions related to large- load, we continue to see an essential role for the CAISO in driving consistency across PTOs, especially if PTO self-organization is ineffective. To that end, ACP-California encourages CAISO to continue to play a coordination role with the PTOs to seek consistency in their tariffs and to consider unique elements of non-LSE PTO tariffs with respect to large load interconnection, operational requirements and transmission service.

2. Please provide your organization’s comments on section B. Cost Shifting Among Transmission Customers.
a. Please provide comments on roles and responsibilities to prevent cost shifting. b. Please provide comments on data transparency. c. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

Avoiding cost-shifting is an important principle that warrants continued time and attention from many parties and authorities (including the CAISO, PTOs and CPUC). We appreciate the additional detail that CAISO has provided on transparency regarding assignment of network upgrades and associated costs for large loads

3. Please provide your organization’s comments on section C. Co-Location Arrangements and Load with Behind-the-Meter Generation.
a. Please provide comments on terminology. b. Please provide comments on serving co-located loads. c. Please provide comments on cost allocation for co-located loads. d. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

ACP-California greatly appreciates that CAISO’s Draft Final Proposal includes some flexibility for resources to seek to remove the large load component of a co-located interconnection application by allowing the ISO and PTO to determine whether the change can be accommodated or if it requires queue re-entry. This is superior to the previous proposal to have a blanket requirement for queue re-entry and will provide needed flexibility to co-located generation resources while preserving the integrity of the cluster study process. We appreciate CAISO adding this to the Draft Final Proposal.

4. Please provide your organization’s comments on section D. Extending New Transmission Services to Eligible Customers Taking Service on Behalf of Flexible Large Loads.

ACP-California supports the CAISO’s proposal to develop a new Flexible Interim Load Interconnection (FILI) service for large loads. We also appreciate the details that CAISO has provided on the implementation of FILI. We request that additional implementation details continue to be discussed with stakeholders as the business practices for this new service are developed.

ACP-California also looks forward to engaging with CAISO in the next large load stakeholder initiative to further consider a permanent flexible interconnection service. Developing a mechanism that permits flexible interconnection service on a permanent basis will be critical to allowing cost effective large load interconnection and we hope CAISO will commit to developing the appropriate rules for a permanent solution in the upcoming stakeholder initiative.

5. Please provide your organization’s comments on section E. Interconnection Customers Serving Electrically Proximate Large Load and Co-Located Load.

ACP-California recognizes that CAISO is not including provisions for electrically proximate resources to serve large loads in this proposal. But we greatly appreciate that CAISO has indicated a willingness to explore rules for electrically proximate loads and resources in a stakeholder initiative starting next year. We look forward to participating in that stakeholder process.  

6. Please provide any additional comments on the draft final proposal or October 1 meeting discussion.

N/A

AltaGas
Submitted 10/15/2026, 04:24 pm

Submitted on behalf of
AltaGas

Contact

Susan Schneider (schneider@phoenix-co.com)

1.   Please provide your organization’s comments on section A. Transmission Service to eligible customers on Behalf of Large Loads.
a. Please provide comments on the definition of large loads. b. Please provide comments on the large load application process and interconnection study procedures. c. Please provide comments on the large load operational requirements. d. Please provide your comments on the large load service agreements. e. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

a. Please provide comments on the definition of large loads.

 

The Draft Final Proposal (Proposal), and the draft tariff language, retains the CAISO’s earlier-suggested Large Load (LL) definition of “An End User located at a single site interconnecting to the CAISO Controlled Grid, and that has a peak load of 50 MW or greater.”  AltaGas supports this definition because (unlike the FERC-proposed definition) it does not exclude large loads co-located with generation/storage, and because it uses the term “site” to describe the load location.

 

AltaGas continues to be concerned about potential conflicts between: (1) CAISO use of the word “site” (not defined in the CAISO tariff but (for generation/storage) usually refers to the general location of a facility (potentially large numbers of land parcels) using a common interconnection; and (2) the more restrictive “premises” usually used in PTO/DP tariffs.  Electric Rule 1 – common to the PG&E, SCE, and SDG&E tariffs – uses the term “premises:”

 

PREMISES:  All of the real property and apparatus employed in a single enterprise on an integral parcel of land undivided, excepting in the case of industrial, agricultural, oil field, resort enterprises, and public or quasi-public institutions, by a dedicated street, highway or public thoroughfare or railway... 

 

AltaGas described this potential conflict in its Straw Proposal comments, but the Proposal does not respond. 

 

For LL complexes, as for Generating Facilities, development may require assembly of numerous parcels, and adjustment as design, permitting, and construction commence.  It may be difficult or impossible for an operating generator to add a 50MW or more load to an existing Genereating Facility “premises,” and it is not clear whether data center or other LLs will qualify for the “industrial” category that would qualify for the “undivided” exception in the above definition. 

 

The consequences of the different definitions are not clear, but there is no reason that the physical location of these facilities need be limited to a single site or premises, as long as they share interconnection arrangements (see below).

 

b. Please provide comments on the large load application process and interconnection study procedures.

 

AltaGas’ comments concern addition of LLs to existing Generating Facilities.  As noted in our Straw Proposal comments, siting new LLs with existing Generating Facilities can:

 

  • Facilitate LL siting outside load centers, triggering fewer or no Network Upgrades, potentially relieving deliverability and other transmission constraints and thus reducing or eliminating cost-impact and cost-shifting concerns; and

 

  • Accommodate quicker LL interconnections to the grid using existing interconnection facilities and substation positions.

 

The Proposal states (at p.57):

 

If an online CAISO generator seeks to add a large load to its site, the developer would submit the large load interconnection request to the PTO pursuant to its tariff. When ready to reflect the large load, the interconnection customer could request a post-commercial operation date (COD) modification or use the Master File change process as needed to assess and capture changes currently allowed under these processes. The CAISO, PTO, and interconnection customer could likewise amend the generator interconnection agreement to reflect the large load and any configuration changes.

 

The CAISO clarified at the 10/1 meeting that the LL application to the PTO could be studied concurrently with the generation modification request to the CAISO.  A concurrent process, consistent with a PG&E recommendation in Straw Proposal comments, would likely expedite LL interconnection using shared facilities, and the final CAISO proposal (and tariff language) should confirm that potential explicitly.

 

c. Please provide comments on the large load operational requirements.

 

AltaGas has no comments at this time.

 

d. Please provide your comments on the large load service agreements.

 

The Proposal implies that, when an LL is added to a Generating Facility site, the following would take place.  The CAISO should provide clarification if this is not the case.

 

  • The CAISO, PTO, and IC would modify the existing GIA to reflect the sharing of the existing interconnection facilities to reflect the new LL (p.57).  Presumably, the related CAISO agreements would also be modified to reflect the new service configuration. 

 

  • There would be a two- or three-party load interconnection agreement for the LL, based on the interconnection application to the PTO and any resulting load studies.

 

e. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

 

AltaGas is gratified by the Proposal statement that “continued market participation of generators ;in co-location arrangements] is one of several options,” and by CAISO’s apparent willingness to consider continued RA/FCDS status for generators that may also serve co-located LLs directly under at least some circumstances. 

 

The Proposal confirms the Straw Proposal approach requiring existing generators “leaving the grid” to serve associated loads to go through the CAISO resource retirement process, to make sure that there are no adverse RA impacts (p.54).  The Proposal says any determination about continuing RA status of the existing generator will be considered in that forum.

 

However, CAISO should clarify that generators need not file retirement requests, and would retain their existing RA status (e.g., NQC List status) without the need for further review, if they would share interconnection facilities with LLs but plan to:

 

  • Otherwise operate according to existing CAISO-tariff arrangements, i.e., continue to bid into CAISO markets without serving the new LLs behind the interconnection; or

 

  • Serve those LLs behind the interconnection, but in a manner consistent with their existing RA obligations to comply with Must-Offer Obligations and follow CAISO Dispatch Instructions.  For example, generators could self-schedule to serve the co-located load directly and offer any remaining generation into CAISO markets; this configuration would have the same net grid impact as if all the generation was offered into CAISO markets and the load was served from the grid.

 

2. Please provide your organization’s comments on section B. Cost Shifting Among Transmission Customers.
a. Please provide comments on roles and responsibilities to prevent cost shifting. b. Please provide comments on data transparency. c. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

a. Please provide comments on roles and responsibilities to prevent cost shifting.

 

As noted above, AltaGas believes that encouraging LLs to co-locate with existing generators, especially outside transmission-constrained Local Capacity Areas (LCAs) should greatly reduce or eliminate the nature and extent of Network Upgrades that would otherwise be triggered by the interconnection and, therefore, greately reduce or eliminate cost-shifting concerns.

 

b. Please provide comments on data transparency.

 

AltaGas has no other comments at this time.

 

c. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

 

AltaGas has no other comments at this time.

3. Please provide your organization’s comments on section C. Co-Location Arrangements and Load with Behind-the-Meter Generation.
a. Please provide comments on terminology. b. Please provide comments on serving co-located loads. c. Please provide comments on cost allocation for co-located loads. d. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

a. Please provide comments on terminology.

 

AltaGas continues to believe that additional definitions would be helpful here, at least with examples, and need not be overly restrictive.  For example, “co-location” could encompass arrangements that include:

 

  • Generation and load sharing interconnection facilities, but where the generation does not serve the load directly.  This would be equivalent to Co-located Resource configurations, where the two Resource IDs are scheduled and scheduled separately. 

 

  • Generation and load sharing interconnection facilities, where the generation serves the load directly and may offer additional energy into CAISO markets to fulfill Must-Offer Obligations.  This would be equivalent to Hybrid Resource configurations, where scheduling and settlements are performed on a combined basis for the single Resource ID.    

 

b. Please provide comments on serving co-located loads.

 

As explained above, AltaGas believes that there are tremendous potential benefits in incenting LLs to site at locations where they would not impact the grid, and/or where they would actually provide benefits.  Potential benefits could include quicker LL interconnections with lower costs.  Thus, if the PTOs are taking the lead in processing and analyzing LL interconnection applications, as CAISO proposes, they should provide information about beneficial locations on their systems, similar to information provided by CAISO and PTOs about possible available TPD and potential storage charging constraints.

 

c. Please provide comments on cost allocation for co-located loads.

 

Again, AltaGas believes in mitigating these concerns by encouraging LL location in areas where low-cost interconnections would likely be available.

d. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

 

AltaGas has no other comments at this time.

4. Please provide your organization’s comments on section D. Extending New Transmission Services to Eligible Customers Taking Service on Behalf of Flexible Large Loads.

AltaGas favors the FILI proposal, for flexible arrangements allowing LLs to interconnect before all upgrades are complete, similar to the Limited Operation Study for resources.  However, more work may be needed to determine how and when these loads would be curtailed for different reasons, especially if they are co-located with generation resources; the same is true for the FLIP proposal for more permanent “non-firm” transmission service.

 

5. Please provide your organization’s comments on section E. Interconnection Customers Serving Electrically Proximate Large Load and Co-Located Load.

Despite FERC guidance, the CAISO does not propose CAISO does not propose to create provisions for interconnection customers to serve electrically proximate LLs.  AltaGas appreciates CAISO’s stated intent to address such situations in the future but urges inclusion of a timeline for that consideration in the final proposal.  PG&E’s presentation at the recent Transmission Planning Process indicates that PG&E alone is now studying around 3,500MW of LLs, and the market for these loads is proceeding rapidly.

6. Please provide any additional comments on the draft final proposal or October 1 meeting discussion.

 AltaGas has no additional comments at this time.

Bay Area Municipal Transmission Group (BAMx)
Submitted 10/15/2026, 04:00 pm

Submitted on behalf of
City of Santa Clara dba Silicon Valley Power and City of Palo Alto Utilities

Contact

Paulo Apolinario (papolinario@santaclaraca.gov) and Lena Perkins (Lena.Perkins@paloalto.gov)

1.   Please provide your organization’s comments on section A. Transmission Service to eligible customers on Behalf of Large Loads.
a. Please provide comments on the definition of large loads. b. Please provide comments on the large load application process and interconnection study procedures. c. Please provide comments on the large load operational requirements. d. Please provide your comments on the large load service agreements. e. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

The Bay Area Municipal Transmission Group (BAMx)[1] appreciates the opportunity to comment on the CAISO’s Large Load Enhancements Draft Final Proposal, dated September 24, 2026 (“Draft Final Proposal”)[2], and the additional information provided during the October 1, 2026, stakeholder meeting. BAMx recognizes and appreciates the changes in the draft Final Proposal that respond to its recommendations on the Large Loads Straw Proposal, including the point-of-interconnection-based definition of large load, deferral of the permanent flexible offering (FLIP), the requirement that flexibility relied upon in planning be verifiable, operational forecasts tied to the type of service, assignment of monitoring-equipment costs to the transmission customer, and the CAISO’s authority to reject deficient load interconnection study results.[3]

Distribution-Connected and CAISO-Controlled Grid-Connected (Transmission-Connected) Large Loads

The proposed definition applies to an End User whose Point(s) of Interconnection is/are to the CAISO-Controlled Grid and that has a peak load of 50 MW or greater.[4] Large loads connected at the distribution or sub-transmission level of a utility distribution company or a non-PTO system fall outside that definition, yet they can impose the same impacts on the CAISO-Controlled Grid. At the October 1 Stakeholder meeting, CAISO staff stated that where distribution-connected load triggers adverse impacts on the CAISO-Controlled Grid (the transmission system), the CAISO will consider those impacts in the Transmission Planning Process (TPP). BAMx appreciates that statement and requests that the CAISO include the concept in its November 16, 2026 Section 205 filing at FERC, including clarifying:

  1. how such loads will be identified for the TPP (e.g., CEC forecast, PTO and UDC data, or non-PTO submittals); and
  2. that operational, forecasting, and cost-causation treatment will depend on a load’s impact on the CAISO-Controlled Grid (the transmission system) rather than on its Point(s) of Interconnection, consistent with BAMx’s long-standing request for comparable treatment of loads with comparable impacts.[5]

Affected-System Coordination with Non-PTOs

The Draft Final Proposal states that the CAISO expects each PTO’s tariff to describe how affected-system issues are coordinated with non-PTO utilities, while affected-system processes for load studies will remain in the PTOs’ tariffs.[6] BAMx agrees with the Northern California Power Agency (NCPA) that the CAISO should establish minimum affected-system requirements applicable to all PTO studies, to ensure that neighboring systems and non-PTO utilities are not exposed to reliability impacts that are not identified during the initial study process. BAMx member City of Santa Clara, dba Silicon Valley Power’s (SVP) recent experience demonstrates the need for consistent, uniform study treatment.  In that example, SVP’s short-circuit duty analysis found that PG&E’s Load Cluster 2024 (LC24) and Serial interconnections overload several 230 kV and 115 kV facilities serving SVP under single-contingency (P1) conditions; such impacts were not identified in PG&E’s studies.[7] A uniform screening and coordination requirement would reduce the risk that similar impacts are only identified after an affected entity performs its own studies.

Furthermore, BAMx recognizes that CAISO has proposed “to define in its tariff any instances when CAISO would reject load interconnection study results or decline to consider or approve associated transmission solutions through the TPP.”[8] However, the CAISO’s Draft Tariff Language does not include any such instances. Consistent with the comments above, BAMx submits that CAISO should include tariff language requiring the identification and resolution of affected system issues before CAISO concurrence or approval of interconnection study results.

Monthly Out-of-Cycle Concurrence

The Draft Final Proposal introduces a monthly CAISO review of new load interconnection requests within the PTOs’ 60–90 day study timeline, with local network upgrades remaining in the PTO’s study and area network upgrades addressed in the TPP.[9] This monthly review proposal, if adopted, constitutes a significant new pathway for transmission additions between TPP cycles. To ensure that these mid-TPP cycle load interconnection requests are studied for reliability impacts as thoroughly as those reflected in the current TPP cycle, BAMx requests that the CAISO:

  1. post a periodic summary of the requests reviewed, the upgrades receiving concurrence, and whether each was classified as local or area;
  2. provide the written criteria for distinguishing local from area transmission upgrades, and whether such criteria are consistent with the generator interconnection approach, in which a constraint caused by many resources across a broad area is treated as an area constraint addressed through the TPP rather than assigned to individual projects; and
  3. clarify that it will evaluate cumulative effects across PTOs and on non-PTO systems between TPP cycles, including load-cluster requests not reflected in the CEC’s annual forecast.

For the record, the Draft Final Proposal attributes to the CPUC the recommendation for a high large-load sensitivity in the TPP that aggregates active load-cluster requests.[10] BAMx also made that recommendation in its September 2 comments,[11] and the proposed new monthly CAISO review process makes the study of a high large-load sensitivity even more critical for the reliability of the CAISO Grid.

 


[1] Consisting of the City of Palo Alto Utilities (CPAU) and the City of Santa Clara, dba Silicon Valley Power (SVP).

[2] CAISO, Large Load Enhancements Draft Final Proposal (Sep. 24, 2026).

[3]Draft Final Proposal at 14–17, 25–36, and 63–68. BAMx made these recommendations in the Comments of the Bay Area Municipal Transmission Group on the CAISO Large Loads Straw Proposal and August 19, 2026 Stakeholder Meeting (Sept. 2, 2026) (“BAMx Sept. 2 Comments”), submitted through the CAISO stakeholder commenting tool for the Large Loads initiative, Responses to Question 1 (Section A: definition, study procedures, and CAISO review of PTO study results), Question 4 (Section D: caution regarding the permanent FLIP offering and the need for enforceable curtailment), Question 6 (operational forecasting aligned with the service type), and Question 7 (assignment of monitoring and compliance costs to the causing large load).

[4]Draft Final Proposal at 14–17; CAISO, Large Loads Draft Final Proposal Stakeholder Meeting presentation (Oct. 1, 2026) (“Oct. 1 Presentation”) at 13.

[5]Comments of the Bay Area Municipal Transmission Group on the CAISO Large Load Considerations Issue Paper and February 5, 2026 Stakeholder Meeting (Feb. 25, 2026) (“BAMx Feb. 25 Comments”), available at https://stakeholdercenter.caiso.com/InitiativeDocuments/Comments-BAMx-Large-Loads-Information-Session-Feb-05-2026.pdf, Section 5 (urging that “customers with comparable impacts on the transmission system are treated in a comparable manner, regardless of whether they take service under wholesale or retail tariffs”); BAMx Sept. 2 Comments, Response to Question 1 (recommending an impact-based definition that captures load additions at existing sites and loads served through non-PTO systems).

[6]Draft Final Proposal at 12–13.

[7]Silicon Valley Power, Comments on CAISO Large Load Considerations Issue Paper (Mar. 3, 2026). BAMx first requested inclusion of non-PTO utilities in BAMx Feb. 25 Comments, Section 1, and requested mandatory affected-system coordination before CAISO concurrence in BAMx Sept. 2 Comments, Response to Question 1 (Section A) and Response to Question 9 (“Non-PTO inclusion”).

[8] Draft Final Proposal at 27.

[9]Draft Final Proposal at 21–27; Oct. 1 Presentation at 14.

[10]Draft Final Proposal at 22.

[11]BAMx Sept. 2 Comments, Response to Question 1 (Section A) (recommending a high large-load sensitivity in the TPP that aggregates active load-cluster requests, e.g., Group 1 and Group 2, so that cumulative reliability and congestion effects are assessed before energization); see also BAMx Feb. 25 Comments, Section 3 (requesting a comprehensive CAISO-level assessment of network upgrades triggered by large load interconnections).

2. Please provide your organization’s comments on section B. Cost Shifting Among Transmission Customers.
a. Please provide comments on roles and responsibilities to prevent cost shifting. b. Please provide comments on data transparency. c. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

Cost Shifting Between PTO Areas and TRR Netting

The Draft Final Proposal describes how the CAISO’s Transmission Access Charge (TAC) can be used to minimize cost shifting from one PTO to another: PTOs would net construction contributions, revenues, and other cost offsets attributable to large loads against their TRR and annual transmission revenue credits, so that only the net TRR is included in the regional high-voltage TAC.[1] BAMx appreciates this clarification and agrees that the regional TAC is the right place to test cost-shifting between PTO areas. The regional TAC is recovered from load throughout the CAISO Balancing Authority Area, including the customers of non-PTO utilities.

However, this “netting” only minimizes that shift while a contribution stays in place. Customer-funded interconnection facilities are generally refunded over time, and network upgrades are generally not funded upfront by customers at all. Once a contribution is refunded, or where none is collected in the first instance, the full cost of a large-load-driven high-voltage upgrade enters the PTO’s TRR and is recovered through the regional TAC, including from customers in other PTO areas and from non-PTO utilities that neither caused nor benefit from the upgrade. BAMx proposed aligning reimbursement with the demonstrated durability of the load;[2] the Draft Final Proposal defers that issue to the PTO tariffs.[3] To demonstrate that the TAC mechanism works as the CAISO has described, BAMx requests that the CAISO:

  1. provide a worked example tracing a large-load-driven high-voltage network upgrade through any customer contribution, refund, PTO TRR, and regional TAC, and confirm whether the netting offset survives reimbursement; and
  2. report annually the large-load-driven costs entering the regional high-voltage TAC versus each PTO’s low-voltage TAC.

BAMx notes that the FERC’s June 18, 2026 Show Cause Order addresses cost-shifting among transmission customers generally, not only between PTOs, including whether retail and wholesale customers with comparable impacts receive comparable cost treatment.[4]

 


[1]Draft Final Proposal at 42–45; Oct. 1 Presentation at 18–19, 23.

[2]BAMx Sept. 2 Comments, Response to Question 2 (Section B) (explaining that upfront payments reimbursed through the PTO’s TRR are interim financing, and recommending a longer reimbursement period tied to demonstrated load durability).

[3]Draft Final Proposal at 43–44.

[4]Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., et al., 195 FERC ¶ 61,214 (2026), Docket No. EL26-71-000 (“Show Cause Order”), Section III.B; BAMx Feb. 25 Comments, Section 2 (recommending that the CAISO restart the TAC Structure Enhancements initiative, see CAISO, TAC Structure Enhancements Draft Final Proposal (2018)) and Section 5 (comparable treatment of wholesale and retail large loads).

3. Please provide your organization’s comments on section C. Co-Location Arrangements and Load with Behind-the-Meter Generation.
a. Please provide comments on terminology. b. Please provide comments on serving co-located loads. c. Please provide comments on cost allocation for co-located loads. d. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

BAMx has no comments at this time.

4. Please provide your organization’s comments on section D. Extending New Transmission Services to Eligible Customers Taking Service on Behalf of Flexible Large Loads.

Flexible Interim Load Interconnection (FILI) and Firm-Customer Protection

BAMx supports the CAISO’s proposed FILI mechanism. FILI allows a large load to energize before the network upgrades required to maintain CAISO Grid reliability are completed, subject to curtailment through a Remedial Action Scheme (RAS), PTO operator curtailment, or operation to a defined schedule, including curtailment following the first contingency of an N-1-1 sequence.[1] BAMx appreciates the CAISO’s clarification at the October 1 meeting, in discussing Slide 21, that FILI is not intended to be a market mechanism or a new market product; it is solely an interconnection arrangement that allows a large load to connect on an interim basis until the network upgrades needed for reliable firm service are in place. BAMx also supports the CAISO’s statement that it will not enable a RAS option that cannot be reliably operated or that has significant market implications.[2] That framing is consistent with BAMx’s earlier support for flexible interconnection as an interim bridge, with appropriate guardrails.[3] Because FILI is an interim interconnection arrangement, BAMx requests that the CAISO tariff language confirm three points that follow directly from that purpose:

  1. FILI load will be curtailed before any firm load, including non-PTO firm load, is exposed to curtailment or reduced reliability;
  2. the curtailment assumption used to establish FILI eligibility will be represented consistently in the TPP and operating studies, so that transmission margin is not counted both as available to the FILI load and as protecting firm customers; and
  3. each FILI arrangement will end when the associated network upgrades enter service, with a backstop if any such upgrade is delayed.

 


[1]Draft Final Proposal at 63–67; Oct. 1 Presentation at 21.

[2]Oct. 1 Presentation at 21.

[3]BAMx Feb. 25 Comments, Section 4 (supporting exploration of non-firm service while ensuring that “existing firm transmission service customers are not adversely affected” and that non-firm service is not “relied upon as a substitute for necessary long-term transmission upgrades”); BAMx Sept. 2 Comments, Response to Question 4 (Section D).

5. Please provide your organization’s comments on section E. Interconnection Customers Serving Electrically Proximate Large Load and Co-Located Load.

BAMx has no comments at this time.

6. Please provide any additional comments on the draft final proposal or October 1 meeting discussion.

BAMx has no comments at this time.

California Community Choice Association
Submitted 10/15/2026, 02:53 pm

Contact

Shawn-Dai Linderman (shawndai@cal-cca.org)

1.   Please provide your organization’s comments on section A. Transmission Service to eligible customers on Behalf of Large Loads.
a. Please provide comments on the definition of large loads. b. Please provide comments on the large load application process and interconnection study procedures. c. Please provide comments on the large load operational requirements. d. Please provide your comments on the large load service agreements. e. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

The California Community Choice Association (CalCCA) appreciates the opportunity to comment on the?California Independent System Operator’s?(CAISO) Large Load Enhancements Draft Final Proposal (Draft Final Proposal). As default generation providers of new large loads, California’s community choice aggregators (CCAs) are committed to enhancing the ability of California to serve new large loads without negative impacts to existing customers.  

The Draft Final Proposal provides a response to the June 18, 2026, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Order to Show Cause (FERC Order) to the CAISO and the California Participating Transmission Operators (PTOs). CalCCA offers the following feedback in addition to its September 2, 2026, comments on the CAISO Large Loads Considerations Straw Proposal.[1] CalCCA appreciates the proposed changes to the Straw Proposal but recommends that the CAISO:

  • Finalize implementation details of its proposed reporting requirements for Scheduling Coordinators (SCs) in the Business Practice Manual (BPM) rather than including detailed requirements in the CAISO tariff by:
    • Identifying the problem the gathering of each data point is proposed to address and mapping each of the requested elements to the technical requirements proposed by the CAISO;
    • Identifying the most efficient process for delivering information to the CAISO while protecting the primary relationship between the LSE and its customer;
    • Ensuring any compliance penalty falls only on those who are functionally in control of operating consistent with the forecast provided to the CAISO; and
    • Defining the specific data points and who provides the data points in the BPM, rather than in the tariff.

Each of these recommendations are discussed in more detail below.

First, CAISO should identify the problem any data gathering is proposed to address and map those to the proposed technical requirements. The Draft Final Proposal directs that SCs provide to the CAISO customer specific data including, but not limited to, individual customer forecasts, real time forecast information including material changes in operations, and events impacting consumption.[2] CalCCA acknowledges that for a 50 MW large load some of the data points requested can be operationally significant for the CAISO. CalCCA, however, reiterates its request that before adopting new requirements, the CAISO identify the problem the data gathering is proposed to address and map each of the requested elements to the technical requirements proposed by the CAISO. This could occur in the proposed working group the CAISO proposes to establish to develop new language for the BPM.[3] CalCCA recommends that the tariff incorporate its proposed changes and provide placeholder language for SC reporting while the CAISO completes the related BPM development.

Second, the CAISO should address the process of SCs delivering information to the CAISO while protecting the relationship between the LSE and its customer. The Draft Final Proposal’s Data Reporting Requirements, and associated tariff language, reflect a major departure from current SC data requirements. Different LSEs have different approaches to scheduling their load. In some cases, the LSE and the SC are one in the same, in others the LSE may contract with a third-party SC. An LSE handling scheduling in-house may have a direct relationship with the customer. However, for LSEs using a third-party SC, there is typically no relationship between the SC and the customer. In these cases, information would potentially flow from customer to LSE, then LSE to SC, and then SC to CAISO. The implementation working group should identify the most efficient process for delivering information to the CAISO while protecting the primary relationship between the LSE and its customer.

Loads do not generally provide the requested data points to their SCs or even to their LSEs. While having the requirement enshrined in the tariff would give SCs grounds to request additional data from the customer, sharing this additional data may create new concerns. Certain data points requested in the Draft Final Proposal, in particular those relating to facility operations, may be commercially sensitive.  While it is true that there may be protections that can be adopted to protect customer information, like non-disclosure agreements (NDAs), data could pass through multiple hands on its way to the CAISO creating data handling requirements and risk for multiple parties. NDAs may not adequately address market sensitive data being provided to SCs who are providing services to a broad range of LSEs.

Third, penalties should only fall on those functionally in control of operating consistent with the forecast provided to the CAISO. The CAISO should therefore consider how compliance with the new requirements will be enforced. The SC or LSE should not be subject to penalties to the extent that the facility’s actual operations vary from the data points provided by that facility to its SC and then to the CAISO. The facility operations are outside of the control of the SC and LSE, and any penalty should fall only on those who are functionally in control of operating consistent with the forecast provided to the CAISO.

Given these foundational concerns with the proposed data reporting requirements, additional process is required before implementation. The CAISO should convene the implementation working group to ensure that CAISO has access to the required data points without creating new inefficiencies or unnecessary liability concerns. CalCCA’s comments on the Draft Tariff language outline proposed changes that highlight the need for additional reporting while providing the flexibility to define the specific data points and who provides the data points in the BPM development process.

 

 


[1]            CalCCA Comments on Large Loads Straw Proposal (Sept. 2, 2026), https://stakeholdercenter.caiso.com/Comments/AllComments/43a11ec9-fe21-4255-bb1c-336ad3703845#org-42e07ef8-97f6-4e58-9b59-e8ae20e0f70a

[2]            Draft Final Proposal, at 38-39.

[3]            Draft Final Proposal, at 32.

2. Please provide your organization’s comments on section B. Cost Shifting Among Transmission Customers.
a. Please provide comments on roles and responsibilities to prevent cost shifting. b. Please provide comments on data transparency. c. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

CalCCA has no comments at this time.

3. Please provide your organization’s comments on section C. Co-Location Arrangements and Load with Behind-the-Meter Generation.
a. Please provide comments on terminology. b. Please provide comments on serving co-located loads. c. Please provide comments on cost allocation for co-located loads. d. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

CalCCA has no comments at this time.

4. Please provide your organization’s comments on section D. Extending New Transmission Services to Eligible Customers Taking Service on Behalf of Flexible Large Loads.

CalCCA has no comments at this time.

5. Please provide your organization’s comments on section E. Interconnection Customers Serving Electrically Proximate Large Load and Co-Located Load.

CalCCA has no comments at this time.

6. Please provide any additional comments on the draft final proposal or October 1 meeting discussion.

CalCCA has no comments at this time.

California Large Energy Consumers Association
Submitted 10/15/2026, 01:54 pm

Contact

Coleman Nickum (coleman.nickum@harper.energy)

1.   Please provide your organization’s comments on section A. Transmission Service to eligible customers on Behalf of Large Loads.
a. Please provide comments on the definition of large loads. b. Please provide comments on the large load application process and interconnection study procedures. c. Please provide comments on the large load operational requirements. d. Please provide your comments on the large load service agreements. e. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

Please see the attachment.

2. Please provide your organization’s comments on section B. Cost Shifting Among Transmission Customers.
a. Please provide comments on roles and responsibilities to prevent cost shifting. b. Please provide comments on data transparency. c. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

Please see the attachment.

3. Please provide your organization’s comments on section C. Co-Location Arrangements and Load with Behind-the-Meter Generation.
a. Please provide comments on terminology. b. Please provide comments on serving co-located loads. c. Please provide comments on cost allocation for co-located loads. d. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

Please see the attachment.

4. Please provide your organization’s comments on section D. Extending New Transmission Services to Eligible Customers Taking Service on Behalf of Flexible Large Loads.

Please see the attachment.

5. Please provide your organization’s comments on section E. Interconnection Customers Serving Electrically Proximate Large Load and Co-Located Load.

Please see the attachment.

6. Please provide any additional comments on the draft final proposal or October 1 meeting discussion.

Please see the attachment.

California Public Utilities Commission
Submitted 10/16/2026, 03:24 pm

Submitted on behalf of
California Public Utilities Commission

Contact

Philip Voris (philip.voris@cpuc.ca.gov)

1.   Please provide your organization’s comments on section A. Transmission Service to eligible customers on Behalf of Large Loads.
a. Please provide comments on the definition of large loads. b. Please provide comments on the large load application process and interconnection study procedures. c. Please provide comments on the large load operational requirements. d. Please provide your comments on the large load service agreements. e. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

Providing transmission service to eligible customers requires a reliable and effective study process at the state level. CAISO characterizes the state’s current study process as being administered by CAISO’s PTOs under CAISO’s oversight. This current piecemeal study process approach can impose unnecessary delays on the broader industry, which depends on timely study results to advance project development.

A more effective pathway would strengthen, not replace, the existing study process by enabling the Affected System study mechanism already provided for within CAISO’s Tariff. This would require CAISO to prepare and share base cases with entities neighboring the CAISO-controlled grid, and to actively engage and participate with those Affected System study efforts. The Affected System study approach would increase transparency and better support the grid expansion necessary to meet California’s increasing demand for electric service.

The Affected System study process is similarly well-suited for the administration of Electro Magnetic Transient (EMT) studies. CAISO does not need to be the sole entity involved in EMT analysis within the state, but it should play a central role in assembling and disseminating EMT data and should participate meaningfully in EMT studies conducted in California.

Overall, CAISO’s active involvement is essential to meeting these expanding study needs and to ensuring that California’s grid continues to develop in a timely, coordinated, and reliable manner.

2. Please provide your organization’s comments on section B. Cost Shifting Among Transmission Customers.
a. Please provide comments on roles and responsibilities to prevent cost shifting. b. Please provide comments on data transparency. c. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

 

  1. Select Requirements of the Order to Show Cause

The FERC Order to Show Cause in Docket EL26-71 identifies several concerns related to cost shifting and transparency over the span of paragraphs 64 through 83. They include:

  1. “transparency regarding the assignment of network upgrades, and their associated costs, that are needed to provide transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads; and
  2. a pro forma cost recovery agreement between CAISO, the relevant transmission owner, and the Eligible Customer taking transmission service on behalf of large loads that help ensure that Eligible Customers bear the risk and are ultimately responsible for costs incurred to provide transmission service, including the cost of network upgrades.” (OSC, P64)

FERC articulates a need to “ensure that the rates charged for jurisdictional transmission service—as well as any practice directly affecting such rates—are just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential”. (OSC, P66) It highlights “the risk that costs may be unfairly shifted to other transmission customers, which may result in those costs then being passed through to residential customers, among others,” (OSC, P77) specifically noting “concerns about the impact that large load additions can have on retail ratepayers, particularly the concern that other retail ratepayers may be forced to subsidize network upgrades needed to add large loads to the transmission system.” (OSC, P67) FERC presciently articulates the need “to understand which transmission costs are caused by which transmission customers” (OSC, P67) as a critical informational role CAISO can fill in this process.  FERC seeks to ensure that Eligible Customers bear the risk and are ultimately responsible for costs incurred to provide transmission service, including the cost of network upgrades” (OSC, P75) and proposes “minimum contribution” and “financial security” requirements to support this end (OSC, P75 and 81, respectively).

  1. CAISO Large Loads Proposal

In its Final Proposal CAISO has articulated a narrow role for itself in addressing the cost shifting protections and transparency requirements for which it and the PTOs appear to be held jointly responsible by the FERC.  The CAISO’s latest proposal includes:

  • Deference to PTOs to lead prevention of inter-wholesaler cost shifts using a TAC-based balancing mechanism;
  • Deference to PTO tariffs, and retail rate design, to provide protections against FERC jurisdictional cost, driven by large loads and associated applications, resulting in cost shifts to retail ratepayers;
  • Deference to PTOs to address credit and minimum contribution requirements;
  • Reliance on inter-PTO coordination to meet consistency requirements;
  • Reliance on TAC to compensate for cost shifts;
  • Reliance on voluntary PTO data provision, subject to confidentiality limitations, to inform provision of unit-cost-based information on CAISO’s website, and meet transparency requirements;
  • No revisions to its existing frameworks regarding how netting rules for behind the meter generation (BTMG) for 50+ MW data center customers should be changed in its TAC mechanism.
  1. CPUC Recommendations

In keeping with the goal of not duplicating prior comments, this section is limited to cost issues conclusively resolved by neither the CAISO proposal nor California law.

  1. Minimum Contributions and Credit Requirements

CPUC Staff propose the following.

  • Upstream (CAISO) tariff revisions. It is unrealistic to expect CPUC retail rate design to offer the necessary level of ratepayer protections with respect to FERC jurisdictional assets. An upstream, FERC jurisdictional solution is required, consistent with cost causation principles. TO recovery of costs attributable to large loads should be via agreement between load, CAISO, and TO, such that the implicated costs only reach the TO’s transmission revenue requirement in accordance with the appropriate cost recovery responsibility, potentially none depending on the costs.
  • Direct Assignment of Costs.  Compared to other approaches such as rate class-based allocation, direct assignment of costs to causers and beneficiaries of transmission assets at the pre-transmission revenue requirement level protects retail ratepayers from risks unique to large loads in ways that, if not addressed upstream at the FERC level, may be difficult to provide in retail rate design.  Direct assignment ensures full long-term recovery is correlated with cost causation, ensuring that beneficiaries pay and that loads are incentivized to site in a least-cost manner rather than the piecemeal manner encouraged when the costs of grid expansion are socialized.  Further, full recovery via assignment incentivizes loads to site efficiently, to stick around, and to offer redress for the reliability impacts of such load interconnections.  In contrast, financing based on per-MW proxy values as described in P82 of the Order, one approach available to PTOs to operate in the framework that the CAISO proposes,  results in an eventual cost shift to ratepayers and offers comparatively meager incentives to site loads in a grid-efficient manner or maintain service over the long-term.
  • Risk Mitigation via Credit Requirements and Cost Caps.  Staff are concerned that for any credit support, such as that which the FERC Order requires (OSC, P82), to function necessitates that there be an alignment between the actual project cost and the amount of the credit support.  Staff acknowledge that the cost estimates upon which a credit support would be based are typically a PTO matter, however, Staff can foresee a role in CAISO being an active participant in ensuring that cost estimates of local transmission caused by large load customers are accurate and aligned with credit supports.  One mechanism that Staff can recommend to achieve this end is the use of binding cost caps[1].
  1. Local Transmission Planning and Concurrence Projects

CPUC Staff recommend that the CAISO and the PTOs follow FERC’s directives related to cost transparency and causation included in the Order to Show Cause. Regarding local transmission planning, which per CAISO’s tariff is included as part of the Transmission Planning Process for projects below 200 kV that expand capacity of the grid, FERC specifically noted, “CAISO must provide clear, timely, and detailed information regarding the extent to which accommodating transmission service for Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads necessitates network upgrades, as well as the costs of those network upgrades.” (OSC, P73, emphasis added). FERC is “concerned that without sufficient transparency regarding the network upgrades, and their associated costs, needed to provide transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads, stakeholders may lack information and visibility regarding the costs driven by large load additions.” (OSC, P73). 

While FERC is concerned about transparency of costs and cost-causation related to local transmission planning, CPUC Staff believe that concurrence projects, which bypass analysis and approval in the TPP, mark a step in the opposite direction of where FERC is directing the CAISO and PTOs to go.  Staff recommend that the CAISO and PTOs avoid the use concurrences, which offer PTO means to obtain CAISO’s imprimatur for projects that have not gone through the full TPP approval process, and which are not subject to sufficient review and study. The concurrence process appears to result in piecemeal expansion of the grid, a concern for which FERC’s position has been summarized above, and which was a problematic outcome of FERC Order 1000, prompting FERC Docket RM21-17 and resulting in FERC Order 1920.  Until now, because of the TPP’s inclusion of both regional and local projects that expand the transmission grid, the CAISO avoided much of the piecemeal transmission development that plagued other parts of the country.  Staff request that the CAISO not adopt a concurrence approach that takes the CAISO backwards with respect to piecemeal transmission investment.

Staff are open to the possibility of replacing the concurrence mechanism with one that requires more substantial review of grid impacts – as is required of TPP-approved projects – to remedy the above identified deficiencies. However, Staff consider concurrence projects inherently load-driven reliability costs appropriately borne in full by the precipitating load(s).

  1. Speculative Requests

PU Code Section 945.3(a)(2) will be modified via Senate Bill 886 (2006) as of Jan 1, 2027, to require reporting of duplicative large load interconnection requests.  CPUC supports this approach agnostic of whether PTO or CAISO is lead aggregator, provided that the information be made available to State agencies in a timely and detailed manner, not subject to obfuscation of applicant, cost data, or load amount.

  1. Transparency

Staff propose that CAISO post a matrix of reliable, vetted, forecasted costs attributable to particular types of transmission assets and given loads, on its website. Specifically, it is important to quantify how a load's ability (or lack thereof) to curtail or shift demand impacts regional congestion costs, avoids localized price spikes, and lowers ancillary service procurement needs. This will allow the CPUC to ensure that the revenue allocation and rate design of its jurisdictional retail rate schedules can be designed accordingly. Absent this information, elements of retail rate design become reliant on imprecise and possibly inaccurate proxy values for any related cost allocation.

  1. Consistency, Clarity, Joint Responsibility

CPUC Staff recommend that CAISO include as many of FERC’s requirements as possible in its own tariff and processes.  Doing so would result in a consistent flow through to PTOs, eliminating much of the need for PTOs to engage in a collective action exercise and greater assurance that FERC’s directives are met, avoiding a more heavy-handed approach as proposed in Docket RM26-4’s ANOPR.

 


[1] Binding cost caps have been used previously in the CAISO territory by independent TOs such as LS Power.

3. Please provide your organization’s comments on section C. Co-Location Arrangements and Load with Behind-the-Meter Generation.
a. Please provide comments on terminology. b. Please provide comments on serving co-located loads. c. Please provide comments on cost allocation for co-located loads. d. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

The CPUC supports the CAISO’s approach and its proposed limits to co-located generation with an eligible load. Identifying a generation facility as either being dedicated to serving the load of an eligible customer or being a wholesale market participant is an appropriate delineation and will add clarity to the increased volume of studies described in item 1, above. 

4. Please provide your organization’s comments on section D. Extending New Transmission Services to Eligible Customers Taking Service on Behalf of Flexible Large Loads.

The Order to Show Cause states to CAISO (in this section, FERC narrowly focuses on CAISO’s responsibility, not the PTOs (OSC, P104, footnote 222)) that new transmission services should be available for flexible large loads (defined in the OSC as “a subset of large loads that are not co-located with generation, but are willing/able to limit energy withdrawals from the transmission system under certain conditions” (OSC, P103, footnote 218)), and charges for service should be aligned with the benefits of the service. (OSC, P104)

Below is a summary of CAISO’s proposal:

  • The CAISO proposes to create a new Flexible Interim Load Interconnection (FILI) service option that will enable large loads and co-located loads to limit their energy withdrawals or injections until their network upgrades are placed into service.
  • The new FILI interconnection service proposed does not specify it is limited to flexible large loads as defined in the OSC.
  • The new FILI interconnection service proposed defers any transmission service changes and implementation details to PTOs – it remains to be seen to what extent there will be consistency among PTOs in the definition of flexible large loads, or in whether charges for service will be aligned with the benefits of that service, but CAISO does plan to convene working groups with PTOs and other interested stakeholders to “maximize consistency and clarify roles and responsibilities”.
  • CAISO indicates the permanent flexible interconnection offering, which was proposed in the Straw Proposal in response to the OSC’s requirements for “permanent non-firm transmission service”, will not be advanced at this stage, but instead commits to further exploration. CAISO does not state how the FILI, on its own, or in conjunction with PTO transmission service changes, provides comparable service to that described in the PJM Co-Location Order.
  • Control technologies and/or protection systems to limit energy withdrawals are discussed in section A.4, and appear to address the requirements, but defer almost entirely to PTOs for determination as to what satisfies requirements, and to how controls would be managed.
  • The new FILI interconnection service proposal suggests load curtailment would be triggered upon transmission overload under N-1-1, and is not intended to address supply constraints.
  • CAISO staff clarified in the October 1 presentation that FILI service is not a model for CAISO market participation, which the CPUC interprets to mean the curtailable portion of a FILI agreement is not eligible to participate in a market-integrated Demand Response program, though clarification would be appropriate.

 

Below are CPUC Staff responses to CAISO’s proposal:

  • CPUC Staff appreciates the additional clarification included in this proposal for the FILI service, and agrees with the general intent of the proposal.
  • Concerns remain for whether consistency of PTO tariffs and implementation will be achieved, given at least one PTO’s apparent reticence to change its tariffs (as well as citing FERC as only identifying deficiency with CAISO tariffs, rather than any PTOs tariffs). CPUC Staff recommends that CAISO work with the PTOs to develop standard non-firm transmission service tariffs for large loads and adopt consistent implementation steps as part of FILI across the PTOs.
  • Concerns also remain for the extent to which the issue of compensation for flexible services remains unaddressed in CAISO’s proposal, as that was also a requirement of FERC’s OSC. CPUC Staff recommends no compensation for curtailment events as part of the large loads’ non-firm service tariff.
  • CAISO’s FILI proposal does not explicitly exclude Demand Response program participation for Flexible Interim Load interconnection service level (for the portion of the load considered flexible), despite its proposal stating the FILI is not intended to address supply constraints. In fact, CAISO’s draft tariff language explicitly allows participation of Large Loads in all elements of CAISO Market Demand Response programs. Section 4.19 states “Large Loads are eligible to provide, without limitation, Demand Response Energy, Curtailable Demand, Resource Adequacy Capacity, and Ancillary Services consistent with their participation model and subject to the requirements of the CAISO Tariff.’ CPUC Staff recommends the proposal be clarified to exclude participation of any interim flexible load level (dependent upon site-specific conditions), from any other compensated grid services to ensure no double counting or double payment occurs for the same grid services. Adjustments to draft tariff language in Section 4.19 and Section 25.7.2 should reflect this. Further, CPUC Staff seeks clarification as to which party of the FILI agreement bears the responsibility to ensure there is no double-counting of capacity between any voluntary Demand Response program participation and the flexible service level.
  • CPUC Staff agrees with CAISO that development of a permanent load flexibility service may not be possible or prudent in the very near term, but agrees with CAISO that exploration of that offering will be important both for large load stakeholders, as well as compliance with FERC’s OSC.
  • CPUC Staff cautions the FILI proposal does not currently provide adequate clarity as to curtailment priority relative to other resources and service offerings. Staff notes that the PJM Co-Location Order referenced by FERC in the OSC addresses curtailment priority in some depth (EL25-49-002, P553), and expects FERC will require further clarity. In creating a non-firm transmission service tariff, CPUC Staff recommends the curtailment of flexible large loads prior to calling upon market integrated or demand side demand response loads, and/or when the large load is causing significant congestion, price separation, or grid reliability issues.

CPUC Staff reiterates the importance of our comment to the Straw Proposal that CAISO model market impacts of flexible vs. non-flexible large loads, to enable CPUC staff to assess LMP upward shifts, congestion cost increases, and/or local ancillary service procurement costs driven by non-flexible data center demands. Retail rate design, class revenue allocation and compliance penalty design require this detailed market impact information.

5. Please provide your organization’s comments on section E. Interconnection Customers Serving Electrically Proximate Large Load and Co-Located Load.

CAISO proposes continued exploration of the potential tradeoffs of allowing generation to serve electrically proximate large loads. The CPUC supports CAISO’s plan for future consideration of this topic and agrees with CAISO’s stated intent to prioritize the more common configurations involving stand-alone load and generation, as well as co-located load and generation.  Any exploration of this topic must include consideration of California statutory requirements related to definitions of electrical corporations and limitations on direct access.

The CPUC expects that this exploration will be a lower priority relative to the urgent need to increase the volume and timeliness of state reliability studies—particularly those conducted through the Affected System study process—and to support the development of a statewide approach to Electro Magnetic Transient (EMT) studies. Strengthening these study capabilities is foundational to enabling all forms of load and resource development, including the potential future use of electrically proximate large loads.

6. Please provide any additional comments on the draft final proposal or October 1 meeting discussion.

Because operational forecasting depends on the same visibility and control capabilities addressed through technical requirements, these two topics are addressed sequentially in the additional comments below.

Operational Forecasting Requirements:

The CPUC recognizes that large loads can introduce significant operational risks. While their steady-state behavior may be predictable, sudden changes in output or consumption can create disturbances capable of cascading across an interconnection. Given these potential system-wide consequences, the CPUC agrees with NCPA and other stakeholders (CAISO Final Draft, page 38) who have raised questions about which entity should hold responsibility for operational forecasting.

CAISO notes that the Scheduling Coordinator for the relevant LSE will incorporate the large load in its Bids, Scheduled Demand, and Meter Data. However, because operational forecasting for large loads carries substantial reliability and contingency implications, the CPUC supports assigning this responsibility to an entity with a clear reliability mandate.-

Stakeholders and PTOs have also indicated that the software and process changes needed to support these new operational forecasting requirements may not be ready by 2027, and CAISO has acknowledged that achieving full automation may extend to 2030 (pages 30-33, 39). These timelines further underscore the importance of clearly identifying a responsible forecasting entity early in the process.

Technical Requirements:

The CPUC supports CAISO’s proposal to leverage the Large Load Technical Requirements Working Group’s (LLTRWG’s) technical expertise and knowledge of industry standards to develop the technical requirements that will be incorporated into CAISO’s tariff. The proposed division of responsibilities is appropriate, with CAISO addressing systemwide operational needs and the PTOs managing PMUs and site-specific control and protection systems. 

CAISO issued the Large Load Technical Requirements Straw Proposal (LLTRSP) on June 15, 2026, followed by the Draft Tariff Language Large Loads Order to Show Cause on September 24, 2026.  While the draft tariff requires PTOs to provide CAISO with technical information on large loads and to determine related electric demand (CAISO draft tariff Section 25.7.1, pages 7 – 8), it does not incorporate or reference several of the technical requirements identified in the LLTRSP. These include frequency ride-through, voltage ride-through, post-fault active power recovery (PFAPR), ramp-rate limitations, monitoring and telemetry, modeling data requirements, and commissioning activities such as data verification and model validation.

Additional technical requirements such as frequency-related criteria, power quality, and protection requirements remain under consideration within the working groups. CAISO will continue to rely on PTO collaboration during implementation for remote disconnect capabilities, load reduction actions, and site-specific protection functions.

Ultimately, the technical requirements that are incorporated into CAISO’s tariff must support the expanded study activity needed to provide deeper insight into system vulnerabilities and effective mitigation measures. The CPUC therefore recommends additional technical requirements that can increase study throughput. These include automation capabilities that allow Affected System studies to be performed in parallel with CAISO’s annual studies, as well as software tools capable of entering, managing, and producing state-wide transient data necessary for focused EMT studies. The CPUC also encourages ongoing collaboration among statewide entities, including CAISO and CAISO PTOs, to define consistent processes for managing EMT data and producing the study inputs needed to enable EMT analyses anywhere in the state.

California Solar & Storage Association
Submitted 10/14/2026, 09:16 pm

Contact

Kevin Luo (kevin@calssa.org)

1.   Please provide your organization’s comments on section A. Transmission Service to eligible customers on Behalf of Large Loads.
a. Please provide comments on the definition of large loads. b. Please provide comments on the large load application process and interconnection study procedures. c. Please provide comments on the large load operational requirements. d. Please provide your comments on the large load service agreements. e. Please provide any other comments on this topic.
2. Please provide your organization’s comments on section B. Cost Shifting Among Transmission Customers.
a. Please provide comments on roles and responsibilities to prevent cost shifting. b. Please provide comments on data transparency. c. Please provide any other comments on this topic.
3. Please provide your organization’s comments on section C. Co-Location Arrangements and Load with Behind-the-Meter Generation.
a. Please provide comments on terminology. b. Please provide comments on serving co-located loads. c. Please provide comments on cost allocation for co-located loads. d. Please provide any other comments on this topic.
4. Please provide your organization’s comments on section D. Extending New Transmission Services to Eligible Customers Taking Service on Behalf of Flexible Large Loads.

One of the Order’s primary goals is for CAISO to develop options that allow large loads to leverage flexibility to interconnect to the transmission system. Establishing FILI and committing to FLIP in a future initiative are important steps in the right direction, but it is critical to acknowledge that the cost of curtailment is extremely high for many large loads, particularly data centers. Curtailment disrupts model training workloads and resuming such workloads from where they left off can be costly and impractical. Similarly, there will be customers using AI models in production workflows that cannot tolerate slowdowns. Data centers will do everything within reason to avoid curtailment, and there are two ways to do this.

First, data centers may deploy onsite generation, including battery storage, that can provide power when utilities require curtailment in grid consumption. FILI should enable this approach. Second, data centers may purchase flexibility from other nearby customers, aggregated through virtual power plants (VPPs), that clear sufficient capacity during peak hours to allow the data center to continue operating as normal. These other customers with more flexibility would free up grid capacity by alleviating transmission constraints, serving as either temporary capacity for speed-to-power or permanent capacity. PG&E supported this pathway in their most recent round of comments,[1] and stakeholders are actively working to use this approach on specific sites. However, CAISO’s draft proposal does not mention the VPP option and does not establish plans to address it.

Critically, the most economical and common solution is likely to be a combination of these two approaches. Large loads have high power needs and will need as much capacity as they can obtain. Flexible interconnection that is limited to curtailment by the large load customer will not be able to leverage the full load reduction capacity that is available to data centers in their particular pocket of the grid, and it is unlikely to be a scalable success on its own.

This idea is beginning to take off across the country. A study conducted in Texas earlier this year demonstrated that aggregations of customer-sited resources could alleviate enough transmission constraints in a development hotspot to unlock 100 MW of firm capacity for large loads.[2] Moreover, the study showed that this could be done cost-competitively. CA is the market with the most potential, possessing over 300,000 customer batteries totaling 3.5 GW of flexible capacity.[3] Many of these resources demonstrated the ability to reduce load on the grid at scale via the CEC’s Demand Side Grid Support (DSGS) program, which grew to 1 GW of load reduction capacity.[4] With that program now set to sunset after this year, there is substantial DER capacity that is available to respond to load reduction signals at the specific times and locations needed to aid flexible interconnection of large loads. 

The VPP option is also unique in its potential to enable load growth while reducing rates. By obviating the need for transmission network upgrades, or reducing the upgrade size needed, the VPP option saves significant grid expansion costs that would otherwise lead to an increase in consumer energy bills. Minimizing transmission upgrades needed to interconnect large loads will maximize the downward pressure that these loads put on rates by increasing utility energy sales while keeping utility investments more static. Additionally, by serving as a speed-to-power solution, VPPs allow large loads to come online many years earlier, spreading energy costs across more kilowatt-hours earlier than would otherwise occur.

It is CALSSA’s understanding that the PTOs are already allowed to implement the VPP option on a case-by-case basis, assuming that proper communication occurs with CAISO. Although no formal tariff is technically needed, CAISO should expect this to be a valuable and frequently used option, and it is difficult for industry to invest in approaches without the certainty and clarity offered by tariffs or formal requirements. The VPP option deserves a more formally recognized tariff like the one being driven by CAISO for FILI/FLIP. Additionally, CAISO should plan to address how FILI/FLIP and VPP can be combined for the same large load.

Ultimately, stakeholders need to work out clear rules for how VPPs will be integrated into interconnection studies for large load customers. CALSSA forecasts that addressing transmission constraints will be the most common application, although distribution constraints may be relevant too. PTOs are required to collaborate with CAISO regarding the transmission system. Therefore, it would be reasonable for CAISO to serve as the convenor and venue for this collaboration. Since CAISO is responsible for much of the transmission system, CAISO brings valuable expertise and experience.

This would also allow the development of a VPP interconnection tariff to dovetail with the development of FILI/FLIP, which would be the most appropriate way for this tariff to be developed. Ultimately, from a transmission planning perspective, there is no difference in a large load reducing demand on-site or reducing demand with other DERs on the same section of the transmission system. CAISO’s proposal for FILI/FLIP options already contemplates customized curtailment schedules tailored to for individual large loads; these same curtailment schedules would also dictate a VPP aggregated in the large load’s grid pocket.

Since the particular subject is connected to interconnection rules rather than rates, the solution should be driven by CAISO rather than the CPUC. The CPUC is currently focused on ratemaking for large loads in its Advanced Rate Design proceeding, specifically on cost allocation of the infrastructure that needs to be built to serve large loads rather than ways to avoid building that infrastructure itself. Solutions that are connected to and informed by interconnection studies are better taken up in the ongoing interconnection discussion active with CAISO.

CAISO may choose to address the VPP option in either the large load stakeholder initiative, successor initiatives to this instant large load initiative, or the DDEMI initiative. DDEMI’s primary purpose is to allow behind-the-meter resources to participate in wholesale markets and consequently is focused on energy markets as opposed to transmission interconnection studies. CALSSA would support dedicated consideration within the large load initiative or an additional track in DDEMI that does not delay the primary purpose regarding wholesale market participation.


[1] PG&E comments on Large Loads Straw Proposal meeting on 8/19/2026, answer to question 4b.

[2] Piq Energy and Base Power. Flexibility without Curtailment: Aggregate DER Dispatch to Support Additional Firm Large Load Service. September 1, 2026

[3] California Distributed Generation Statistics (DGStats).

[4] UC Santa Barbara. The Demand Side Grid Support (DSGS) Program: Participation Rates Across California. https://www.2035initiative.com/dsgs-participation-report.

5. Please provide your organization’s comments on section E. Interconnection Customers Serving Electrically Proximate Large Load and Co-Located Load.

CAISO proposes to defer consideration of generators serving electrically proximate large loads to a future stakeholder initiative, reasoning that standalone and co-located arrangements are currently more common and that it will focus on proximate arrangements once the others are underway. Put simply, the Commission defined an “electrically proximate large load” as a large load close enough to a generator such that the impact is as if they were located at the same substation or no more than two substations away. Although not a perfect fit, there are similarities between the VPP option and the proximate large load avenue. Both approaches leverage “nearby” generators to address interconnection constraints, although they may differ in how “nearby” is defined.

In its response to the Order, MISO recently proposed a fast track interconnection study process for generators that are sited nearby to large loads, specifically within the same local resource zone (essentially same state boundaries). Loads above 200 MW would qualify for a 120 day process allowing load and generation to be studied together for the purposes of network upgrades and other relevant constraints.[1] Although not the same as “electrically proximate large load” or the VPP option, CAISO should consider placing a similar emphasis on generation that is sited nearby and ensuring that there is a clear study process.

If CAISO wishes to consider the VPP option along with electrically proximate large loads or co-located loads, rather than with FILI/FLIP, the CAISO should make this clear.


[1] https://www.utilitydive.com/news/miso-large-load-generation-study-lars-ferc/832114.

6. Please provide any additional comments on the draft final proposal or October 1 meeting discussion.

Constellation
Submitted 10/15/2026, 03:17 pm

Contact

Chris Devon (chris.devon@constellation.com)

1.   Please provide your organization’s comments on section A. Transmission Service to eligible customers on Behalf of Large Loads.
a. Please provide comments on the definition of large loads. b. Please provide comments on the large load application process and interconnection study procedures. c. Please provide comments on the large load operational requirements. d. Please provide your comments on the large load service agreements. e. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

Executive Summary

Constellation generally supports the direction of CAISO’s Draft Final Proposal and appreciates the progress made toward clarifying processes for accommodating Large Loads and co-located generation. The proposal establishes a useful framework for interconnection studies, operational requirements, flexible load service, and continued wholesale participation. However, further clarification is needed to provide a workable and durable pathway for existing generation serving co-located load, especially with respect to its ability to retain wholesale market participation.

CAISO should expressly confirm in its tariff that serving co-located load does not result in default retirement of a generating resource from the CAISO market or a generating resource relinquishing its existing interconnection rights, absent the resource’s clear intent to withdraw from the market. Specifically, where a resource remains technically capable of, and is willing to continue to provide wholesale services to support grid reliability, the resource should not be required to forego that capability merely because it adds co-located load. The final framework should provide a clear, study-based process for determining the extent to which a resource may retain Interconnection Service, deliverability, energy and ancillary-service participation, and applicable QC, NQC, and RA eligibility.

CAISO should also recognize enforceable load flexibility when evaluating co-located configurations. Where verifiable load reductions allow generation to remain available for CAISO dispatch, the applicable studies and operating arrangements should recognize that capability. Constellation supports FILI as an interim option and encourages CAISO to continue development of a durable flexible-service framework.

Finally, the proposal and tariff should provide clearer treatment of arrangements in which the Eligible Customer, Large Load, LSE, retail provider, UDC/PTO, and Scheduling Coordinator are different entities. The final framework should clearly allocate responsibilities while preserving permissible third-party scheduling and retail arrangements.

Constellation encourages CAISO to resolve these issues in the final proposal and tariff to preserve existing generation value, provide predictable pathways for continued wholesale participation, and support reliable and flexible integration of Large Loads.

 

a. Definition of Large Loads

Constellation continues to generally support CAISO’s proposed 50 MW definition for Large Loads directly interconnected to the CAISO Controlled Grid. Constellation appreciates CAISO’s additional discussion of phased projects and multiple facilities at a common site. However, Constellation continues to encourage CAISO to provide objective guidance addressing phased projects, expansions, multiple loads sharing common interconnection facilities, and similar configurations. Predictable standards would be preferable to exclusive reliance on case-by-case determinations.

The October 1 discussion also identified a related issue concerning the relationship between the proposed definition and the Commission’s framing of transmission service provided by an “Eligible Customer” on behalf of a Large Load. Stakeholders expressed differing views regarding which transmission-connected retail arrangements fall within the proposed framework. Constellation encourages CAISO to ensure that the final tariff language clearly identifies the loads and transmission-service arrangements within scope.

 

b. Large Load Application Process and Interconnection Study Procedures

Constellation supports CAISO’s proposed improvements to CAISO-Participating Transmission Owner (PTO) coordination, the 60-to-90-day study expectation, and CAISO’s proposed monthly review of new Large Load interconnections.

Constellation continues to recommend a transparent framework identifying:

  1. CAISO and PTO responsibilities.
  2. Study milestones and timelines.
  3. Study assumptions and methodologies.
  4. Procedures for communicating material changes.
  5. Data-sharing responsibilities.
  6. Coordination between generation and load studies.
  7. Access to material study results, subject to appropriate confidentiality protections.

CAISO has indicated that several implementation details will be developed through PTO tariff filings and subsequent working groups. In its Draft Final Proposal, CAISO also stated its expectation that the PTOs will “organize themselves to develop sufficiently consistent and complementary tariff provisions that align with the CAISO’s processes.”[1] While Constellation understands that CAISO does not regulate PTO tariffs, we s request that CAISO establish sufficient minimum tariff standards that encourages coordination among PTOs to ensure customers receive consistent treatment across the CAISO footprint.

 

c. Large Load Operational Requirements

Constellation generally supports enhanced forecasting, telemetry, communications, operating-limit, and operational data requirements where necessary to support reliability.

Constellation also supports CAISO’s general reliance on existing LSE and Scheduling Coordinator structures rather than requiring each Large Load to establish a separate CAISO scheduling relationship. Draft Tariff Section 25.7.3.1 appropriately recognizes that, where permitted by the applicable Local Regulatory Authority (LRA), a Large Load may participate through its own Scheduling Coordinator under specified market models.

 

Third-Party Scheduling Coordinator and Eligible Customer Clarification

The October 1 stakeholder discussion demonstrated that additional clarification is needed for Large Loads served through direct-access or other third-party arrangements.

Constellation asked whether the proposal encompasses loads served through direct access or similar third party SC arrangements and which entity would have scheduling and forecasting responsibilities. CAISO explained that the proposal identifies several potentially responsible parties but indicated that, in practice, the Scheduling Coordinator representing the load-serving entity would submit the relevant information.

PTO representatives also raised a separate question concerning which entity legally constitutes the “Eligible Customer” taking transmission service on behalf of the Large Load.

Constellation requests that CAISO clarify in its draft tariff language:

  1. Which entity is the “Eligible Customer” for purposes of the Large Load framework when retail supply is provided through direct access or another third-party retail arrangement.
  2. Whether the Eligible Customer, LSE, UDC, MSS, Energy Service Provider, and Scheduling Coordinator may be different entities.
  3. Which entity is responsible for scheduling, forecasting, telemetry, operating communications, and compliance with Large Load operational requirements in those circumstances.
  4. Whether an otherwise eligible third-party Scheduling Coordinator may continue to perform applicable scheduling and market functions for large load customers.
  5. How these responsibilities interact with PTO obligations associated with the physical interconnection and provision of transmission service.

The objective should not be to alter state retail service arrangements. The objective should be to ensure that CAISO’s tariff clearly assigns FERC-jurisdictional responsibilities without unintentionally restricting existing lawful third party service and scheduling arrangements.

Constellation recommends that CAISO implement these clarifications directly in Tariff Sections 25.7, 25.7.3, and 25.7.3.1 by recognizing that the Eligible Customer, LSE, retail provider, UDC or MSS, and Scheduling Coordinator may be different entities and clearly assigning responsibility for each applicable tariff obligation (also see our comments on the draft tariff language for our suggested redlines).

 

d. Large Load Service Agreements

Constellation supports standardized agreements identifying operational limitations, curtailment mechanisms, data requirements, cost responsibility, and the responsibilities of CAISO, the PTO, the Eligible Customer, and other responsible parties.

The agreements should accommodate circumstances in which the entity taking transmission service, the retail supplier, the Scheduling Coordinator, and the Large Load are not the same entity.

This clarification would also help resolve the Eligible Customer issue identified during the October 1 discussion.

 

 


[1] Final Proposal, pg.13

2. Please provide your organization’s comments on section B. Cost Shifting Among Transmission Customers.
a. Please provide comments on roles and responsibilities to prevent cost shifting. b. Please provide comments on data transparency. c. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

a. Roles and Responsibilities

Constellation continues to support assigning cost responsibility consistent with cost causation and protections against shifting project-specific costs to other transmission customers.

Constellation supports CAISO’s efforts to coordinate consistent PTO provisions governing cost recovery and financial protections. CAISO should coordinate with the PTOs to ensure that the PTO filings address financial security, customer-specific upgrades, projects that fail to materialize, and revenue credits and avoid duplicative recovery.

 

b. Data Transparency

Constellation supports CAISO’s proposed transparency improvements, including information regarding aggregate Large Load additions, network upgrades required to accommodate Large Loads, and associated estimated costs.

3. Please provide your organization’s comments on section C. Co-Location Arrangements and Load with Behind-the-Meter Generation.
a. Please provide comments on terminology. b. Please provide comments on serving co-located loads. c. Please provide comments on cost allocation for co-located loads. d. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

b. Serving Co-Located Loads

This remains Constellation’s principal area of concern. Constellation appreciates the improvements made from the Straw Proposal. CAISO now expressly recognizes continued wholesale market participation by an existing generator serving a co-located load as one available option. Existing resources may use the PTO load interconnection process together with the post-COD modification, Master File, and GIA-amendment processes as appropriate.

The draft tariff further provides that:

  1. Co-located generation and load may be studied based on their net impact.
  2. Applicable Interconnection Customers may use all rights and services available under the RIS.
  3. Combined operation may be reflected in the GIA.
  4. Interconnection Service Capacity may be requested below Generating Facility Capacity to account for co-located load.

These changes substantially advance Constellation’s recommendation for a project-specific, study-based framework.

Constellation recommends that CAISO expressly establish this pathway in Tariff Section 25.7.6. An existing generator should be permitted to serve co-located load while retaining all or a portion of its Interconnection Service and wholesale market participation to the extent supported by applicable studies, operating limitations, and CAISO market requirements.

The October 1 discussion provided another useful clarification. CAISO stated that a generator that continues to satisfy its must-offer obligations and responds to dispatch would not have its QC or NQC affected solely because it also serves onsite load, subject to case-by-case review.

CAISO needs to include that clarification in the tariff language explicitly (also see our comments on the draft tariff language for our suggested redlines).

 

Sections 25.1 and 25.5.1

The principal unresolved tariff issue remains the interaction between Sections 25.1 and 25.5.1.

Section 25.5.1 expressly permits CAISO review of adding co-located load as a post-COD modification, but states that the modification will be denied if CAISO determines Section 25.1 applies.  Section 25.1 establishes the circumstances in which a new or modified Generating Unit is subject to CAISO’s interconnection requirements. For an existing Generating Unit, Section 25.1 can be triggered where a modification increases the total capability of the power plant or, even without an increase in capability, changes the plant’s electrical characteristics such that re-energization may violate Applicable Reliability Criteria.

The concern is that Section 25.5.1 does not explain when adding co-located load would produce either of those results or if a determination that Section 25.1 applies should automatically cause the requested post-COD modification to be denied rather than proceed through the appropriate study or interconnection process.

Constellation requests clarification that:

  1. Adding or serving co-located load does not automatically trigger termination of existing Interconnection Service or wholesale participation rights.
  2. Any limitation on retained Interconnection Service should result from the applicable reliability, electrical, or operational impacts of the requested configuration.
  3. Where Section 25.1 applies, CAISO should remove the provision stating that the modification will ‘therefore be denied.’ CAISO should instead provide the technical basis for its determination and identify the applicable study, modification, or interconnection pathway available to the customer.

 

Retirement Scenario 3

Constellation also requests confirmation that Retirement Scenario 3 applies where a participating generator intends to terminate CAISO wholesale market participation while continuing to serve load.

Serving co-located load should not itself trigger Scenario 3 where the generator continues wholesale participation and satisfies applicable CAISO requirements.

Constellation recommends that CAISO memorialize this distinction expressly in Tariff Section 25.7.6 rather than rely solely on explanatory language in the DFP.

This interpretation is consistent with CAISO’s statements in the DFP and its October 1 clarification regarding generators that continue satisfying must-offer and dispatch obligations.

 

Flexible Participation and RA

Constellation recognizes that CAISO is not proposing broader changes to current RA eligibility criteria in this initiative. CAISO instead identifies DDEMI as the venue for potential enhancements involving demand response, price-responsive load, and other market mechanisms.

Constellation does not request that CAISO modify substantive RA eligibility rules in this initiative. CAISO should, however, clarify that serving co-located load does not, by itself, alter a resource’s QC, NQC, Deliverability Status, or other wholesale market eligibility. Any resulting treatment should be determined under otherwise applicable CAISO and LRA requirements based on the resource’s retained Interconnection Service, availability, performance, and compliance with applicable market obligations.

 

Constellation supports preserving RA eligibility issues for the appropriate market initiatives, provided that the present filing does not prejudge or foreclose:

  1. Continued energy and ancillary-service participation by associated generation.
  2. RA eligibility where the resource satisfies applicable requirements.
  3. Recognition of verified load reductions that make generation available for CAISO dispatch.
  4. Market participation by flexible Large Loads through permissible demand response, Participating Load, NGR, or future DDEMI constructs.

 

Even where a particular configuration does not retain some or all deliverability or RA eligibility, the generator should retain Interconnection Service and eligibility to participate in the energy and ancillary service markets to the extent technically capable and compliant with applicable CAISO requirements.

CAISO should also consider measurable and enforceable load flexibility when determining the associated generator’s retained Interconnection Service Capacity and wholesale operating capability. Where load reduction makes generation available for CAISO dispatch, the applicable study and operating agreement should recognize that capability.

4. Please provide your organization’s comments on section D. Extending New Transmission Services to Eligible Customers Taking Service on Behalf of Flexible Large Loads.

Constellation continues to support FILI as an option to accelerate interconnection where a Large Load can reliably limit withdrawals before completion of network upgrades.

The October 1 discussion reinforces the need for additional clarity. CAISO suggested that FILI would address transmission not RA issues and would not be dispatched through the market.. CAISO also indicated that FILI may resemble conditional-firm service, but acknowledged uncertainty regarding whether predefined conditions are sufficiently workable and whether a non-firm construct may ultimately prove more appropriate.

Constellation recommends further clarification regarding:

  1. Curtailment triggers.
  2. Operating limits.
  3. Scheduling treatment.
  4. Deployment priorities.
  5. Integration of curtailment assumptions into planning and operations.
  6. Market and price formation implications.
  7. Application to co-located load and existing generation.
  8. Responsibilities of LSEs and third party Scheduling Coordinators where applicable.

Constellation also encourages CAISO to commit to the development of a permanent flexible service. FILI addresses interim flexibility until transmission upgrades enter service, but it does not resolve the longer-term need identified by FERC for a durable load flexibility framework. Deferring a permanent FLIP option therefore leaves unresolved a central issue raised in the Section 206 proceeding. Without a permanent pathway, large loads may ultimately face the same binary choice between obtaining full firm transmission service and accepting curtailment without a defined, durable service framework. This presents compliance risk if CAISO’s Section 205 filing addresses only the interim condition without adequately resolving the underlying concern identified by FERC. CAISO should either include a permanent flexible service option in its filing or establish a clear path for implementing one and explain how that approach fully addresses the concerns underlying FERC’s Section 206 show cause order.

At minimum, the applicable FILI agreement should identify the authorized withdrawal level, curtailment triggers, response time, duration and restoration requirements, responsible parties, verification requirements, and conditions for transition to firm service.

5. Please provide your organization’s comments on section E. Interconnection Customers Serving Electrically Proximate Large Load and Co-Located Load.

No comments.

6. Please provide any additional comments on the draft final proposal or October 1 meeting discussion.

Constellation appreciates CAISO’s updated Draft Final Proposal.

Constellation recommends that CAISO focus on five remaining issues:

  1. Clarify Sections 25.1 and 25.5.1 and preserve existing-generator rights where supported by studies and operating requirements.
  2. Confirm that Retirement Scenario 3 turns on termination of wholesale participation rather than the presence of co-located load.
  3. Clarify “Eligible Customer,” LSE, PTO, UDC/MSS, and third-party Scheduling Coordinator responsibilities, particularly for Direct Access and other lawful third party service arrangements.
  4. Provide specific clarification that serving onsite load does not itself reduce QC or NQC where the generator continues satisfying applicable must-offer and dispatch requirements, subject to applicable RA rules and project-specific review.
  5. Provide a stronger Section 206 explanation for substantive matters deferred to later proceedings, particularly permanent flexible service and electrically proximate arrangements.

CAISO appropriately may use BPM development and implementation working groups for technical implementation details. Those processes should not substitute for tariff provisions establishing material rights, service eligibility, study standards, transmission-service arrangements, and the ability of existing generation to retain wholesale participation

The third-party SC issue deserves particular attention because the October 1 discussion exposed genuine ambiguity rather than simply an implementation detail. The final tariff should make clear who qualifies as the Eligible Customer, who schedules and forecasts the load, and how those roles operate where the retail provider, transmission customer, physical interconnecting utility, and Scheduling Coordinator are different entities.

Founder | Persistence Analytics Group LLC
Submitted 10/09/2026, 09:09 am

Contact

Neil P Osnato (neil@persistenceanalyticsgroup.com)

1.   Please provide your organization’s comments on section A. Transmission Service to eligible customers on Behalf of Large Loads.
a. Please provide comments on the definition of large loads. b. Please provide comments on the large load application process and interconnection study procedures. c. Please provide comments on the large load operational requirements. d. Please provide your comments on the large load service agreements. e. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

Persistence Analytics Group LLC (“PAG”) principally comments on the operational requirements and the treatment of information supporting Large Load service.

PAG does not propose a different numerical definition of “Large Load” and does not seek to alter CAISO’s underlying interconnection-study methodology.

PAG recommends that information supplied for a Large Load identify the state that the information is sufficient to establish and remain current when CAISO or a Participating TO relies upon it for a consequential operational or planning decision.

The draft tariff already contemplates information concerning load type, expected operating profile, MW capacity, minimum and maximum operating levels, curtailment and ramping capability, and behind-the-meter generation characteristics. PAG recommends that materially changed information be updated and that the record identify the date as of which the information is current.

A technically valid submission can establish the state represented by that submission without necessarily establishing that the same load has reached a later state such as executable, energized, persistent, or demonstrated flexible capability.

For operational purposes, PAG recommends preserving the distinction between:

Represented Load
→ Evidenced Operating State
→ Energized Load
→ Demonstrated Operating Capability
→ Material Change
→ Revalidation

PAG also recommends that service agreements involving curtailable or flexible capability identify any applicable testing or validation requirements and the material changes to that capability or curtailment mechanism that must be reported.

These additions would not create a new approval layer or displace CAISO or Participating TO technical judgment. They would clarify what proposition has been evidenced and when an earlier determination may require targeted revalidation.

2. Please provide your organization’s comments on section B. Cost Shifting Among Transmission Customers.
a. Please provide comments on roles and responsibilities to prevent cost shifting. b. Please provide comments on data transparency. c. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

PAG does not propose a particular cost-allocation methodology.

PAG’s narrower comment concerns data transparency underlying decisions that may shift or allocate costs among transmission customers.

Where projected Large Load information affects infrastructure commitments, network upgrades, cost allocation, or other consequential planning decisions, the record should distinguish the represented project state from later realized conditions.

In particular, CAISO should be able to identify:

the source of the material representation;

the effective date or project state to which it applies;

the most recent material update;

whether a material change has occurred; and

the decision that relied upon the information.

Financial allocation answers who bears a cost if an assumption proves incorrect.

A separate question is whether the underlying load, timing, operating, or infrastructure assumption was sufficiently evidenced when the cost-related decision was made and whether continued reliance remains justified after material change.

PAG therefore supports transparency that permits projected, current, and actual Large Load states to be distinguished rather than treating a historical representation as permanently current.

3. Please provide your organization’s comments on section C. Co-Location Arrangements and Load with Behind-the-Meter Generation.
a. Please provide comments on terminology. b. Please provide comments on serving co-located loads. c. Please provide comments on cost allocation for co-located loads. d. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

PAG does not propose changes to CAISO’s substantive cost-allocation or co-location methodology.

PAG recommends, however, that a material change in behind-the-meter generation, storage, operating configuration, net withdrawal profile, or other co-located dependency be treated as a potential revalidation event where the earlier configuration was material to a CAISO or Participating TO determination.

A co-located configuration can be validly studied at one point in time while later changes alter the conditions supporting the original determination.

The appropriate principle is:

Validated Configuration
→ Decision Reliance
→ Material Change
→ Targeted Revalidation

Revalidation need not mean restarting an entire interconnection process. It should be limited to the proposition affected by the changed condition.

This is particularly relevant where CAISO and Participating TOs study the combined presence of Generating Units and co-located Large Loads and memorialize the combined operation in the interconnection agreement.

4. Please provide your organization’s comments on section D. Extending New Transmission Services to Eligible Customers Taking Service on Behalf of Flexible Large Loads.

PAG supports CAISO’s development of Flexible Interim Load Interconnection (“FILI”) and recommends that the tariff preserve a clear distinction between represented flexibility and demonstrated operational capability.

A useful progression is:

Represented Flexibility
→ Technical Capability
→ Commissioned Capability
→ Tested or Demonstrated Capability
→ CAISO Reliance
→ Actual Performance
→ Material Change
→ Revalidation

A representation that a Large Load can curtail establishes one evidentiary state.

A functioning technical mechanism establishes another.

Testing the mechanism under defined conditions establishes another.

Demonstrated performance when curtailment is actually required establishes another.

Where CAISO or a Participating TO begins relying upon flexible-load capability for operational or planning purposes, PAG recommends that the applicable FILI agreement identify any required testing or validation of the curtailment capability and specify material changes to the capability or curtailment mechanism that must be reported.

The evidentiary requirement should match the consequence of the decision relying upon the capability.

PAG is not suggesting that each state requires a separate approval process. The purpose is to ensure that represented capability is not silently treated as demonstrated capability and that a later material change does not leave CAISO relying indefinitely on an earlier operating determination.

5. Please provide your organization’s comments on section E. Interconnection Customers Serving Electrically Proximate Large Load and Co-Located Load.

PAG recommends that CAISO preserve the evidentiary state of the load and generation configuration used in any determination involving an electrically proximate or co-located Large Load.

Where the determination depends on a particular load level, generation configuration, operating relationship, control capability, or other material dependency, a subsequent material change to that dependency should prompt targeted review of the proposition affected.

The principle is straightforward:

A prior determination need not have been incorrect for continued reliance upon it to become stale.

PAG therefore recommends that CAISO distinguish ordinary administrative updates from changes capable of altering the assumptions supporting a prior interconnection or operating determination.

This is particularly relevant because the draft tariff already contemplates the addition or removal of co-located load and expressly addresses whether such a change constitutes a Material Modification.

6. Please provide any additional comments on the draft final proposal or October 1 meeting discussion.

PAG appreciates CAISO’s work to improve visibility, operational coordination, and flexibility for Large Loads.

Across the Draft Final Proposal and draft tariff language, PAG recommends one overarching principle:

The evidentiary maturity of a represented Large Load state should match the consequence of the decision for which CAISO or a Participating TO relies upon it.

PAG’s recommendations are intended to preserve the relationship among:

Representation
→ Evidence
→ Dependency
→ Decision Reliance
→ Material Change
→ Revalidation

They are not intended to create a new approval regime, displace engineering or reliability judgment, or prescribe a proprietary scoring methodology.

PAG’s proposed tracked tariff revisions are included in the attached document and focus narrowly on information currency, flexible-load capability validation, material-change reporting, and revalidation.

Google, LLC
Submitted 10/15/2026, 02:46 pm

Contact

David Matusiak (dmatusiak@google.com)

1.   Please provide your organization’s comments on section A. Transmission Service to eligible customers on Behalf of Large Loads.
a. Please provide comments on the definition of large loads. b. Please provide comments on the large load application process and interconnection study procedures. c. Please provide comments on the large load operational requirements. d. Please provide your comments on the large load service agreements. e. Please provide any other comments on this topic.
2. Please provide your organization’s comments on section B. Cost Shifting Among Transmission Customers.
a. Please provide comments on roles and responsibilities to prevent cost shifting. b. Please provide comments on data transparency. c. Please provide any other comments on this topic.
3. Please provide your organization’s comments on section C. Co-Location Arrangements and Load with Behind-the-Meter Generation.
a. Please provide comments on terminology. b. Please provide comments on serving co-located loads. c. Please provide comments on cost allocation for co-located loads. d. Please provide any other comments on this topic.
4. Please provide your organization’s comments on section D. Extending New Transmission Services to Eligible Customers Taking Service on Behalf of Flexible Large Loads.
5. Please provide your organization’s comments on section E. Interconnection Customers Serving Electrically Proximate Large Load and Co-Located Load.
6. Please provide any additional comments on the draft final proposal or October 1 meeting discussion.

LS Power
Submitted 10/15/2026, 02:58 pm

Contact

Joanne Bradley (JBradley@lspower.com)

1.   Please provide your organization’s comments on section A. Transmission Service to eligible customers on Behalf of Large Loads.
a. Please provide comments on the definition of large loads. b. Please provide comments on the large load application process and interconnection study procedures. c. Please provide comments on the large load operational requirements. d. Please provide your comments on the large load service agreements. e. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

LS Power Grid California (LSPGC) and DesertLink (together, LS Power) appreciate the opportunity to comment on CAISO’s Large Loads Draft Final Proposal. As non-load-serving Participating Transmission Owners (PTOs), we ask CAISO to account for the distinct roles and responsibilities of load serving PTOs, affected PTOs and non-load serving PTOs, as applicable, throughout CAISO’s proposed framework. While CAISO recognizes the need for PTO coordination in its Draft Final Proposal, it leaves all reference to different PTO roles to be addressed in PTO tariff filings, which may lead to gaps in the application, study, and interconnection processes. There are several aspects of the CAISO portion of the processes that should explicitly identify interactions between PTOs, affected PTOs, and non-load serving PTOs to ensure uniformity and transparency.

CAISO’s proposed concurrence process should ensure that non-load serving PTOs and affected PTOs are included in the process, and upgrades to all PTO facilities have been considered. Although the PTO tariffs will likely require coordination with affected PTOs and non-load serving PTOs, this requirement should be documented as part of CAISO’s concurrence process as well to ensure all impacted parties have been considered. Including a requirement of coordination with affected PTOs and non-load serving PTOs would eliminate potential process gaps that would lead to delays in interconnecting large loads. Additionally, LS Power supports a monthly concurrence process alongside a transmission planning process (TPP) concurrence to ensure requested interconnections are not delayed.

For each required operational data element, CAISO should specify which entity obtains, validates, submits, and updates each element, even after energization. For example, a non-load-serving PTO should receive the information needed to operate its facilities, while customer-specific information held by a UDC, LSE, or scheduling coordinator should be provided to CAISO by the entity with access to that information. If the requirements are left with the PTO, then CAISO should require these other entities to provide the information a PTO needs in order to meet its obligations.

 

2. Please provide your organization’s comments on section B. Cost Shifting Among Transmission Customers.
a. Please provide comments on roles and responsibilities to prevent cost shifting. b. Please provide comments on data transparency. c. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

We support CAISO’s proposal to publicly post aggregate amounts of proposed large load additions, planned network upgrades and upgrade costs. The draft tariff language proposes that this data be posted as part of the TPP. Given the move to a two-year TPP cycle for compliance with FERC Order No. 1920, this data would only be updated every two years, leaving long gaps between updates. Publicly posting data every two years does not provide the transparency required by this process. Accordingly, CAISO should update the publicly posted information after monthly concurrence decisions and when material changes are made to planned upgrades. 

3. Please provide your organization’s comments on section C. Co-Location Arrangements and Load with Behind-the-Meter Generation.
a. Please provide comments on terminology. b. Please provide comments on serving co-located loads. c. Please provide comments on cost allocation for co-located loads. d. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

LS Power has no comments at this time.

4. Please provide your organization’s comments on section D. Extending New Transmission Services to Eligible Customers Taking Service on Behalf of Flexible Large Loads.

LS Power supports Flexible Interim Load Interconnection (FILI) where enforceable limits protect reliability until network upgrades are complete. CAISO should clarify the role of the applicable UDC in curtailment. When a large load connects to a non-load-serving PTO’s facilities, that PTO can only disconnect the load at the interconnection, whereas the UDC can flexibly curtail the load. As such, when there is a non-load serving PTO involved with the interconnection, it will likely be the UDC, not the PTO, that is responsible for the curtailment. Therefore, before FILI service begins, the applicable agreement and operating procedures should identify (1) all PTOs and the applicable UDC that is on point for the controls and curtailment triggers, (2) who directs and implements load reductions, (3) who verifies performance, and (4) what happens if curtailment fails. Additionally, non-load serving PTOs and affected PTOs should participate in the review of schemes or operating limits that involve their facilities. In addition to appropriately defining the operational roles of the relevant entities, this additional clarity will ensure that wholesale vs. retail jurisdictional lines are respected, consistent with FERC’s recent order on PJM’s Interim Resource Adequacy Service[1].

 

 


[1] PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 197 FERC ¶ 61,019, P 81 (Oct. 9, 2026).

5. Please provide your organization’s comments on section E. Interconnection Customers Serving Electrically Proximate Large Load and Co-Located Load.

 LS Power has no comments at this time.

6. Please provide any additional comments on the draft final proposal or October 1 meeting discussion.

LS Power renews its request that CAISO place foundational large-load technical requirements with systemwide impacts in the CAISO Planning Standards. Related tariff provisions can make these requirements enforceable, while PTO tariffs and handbooks can address site-specific equipment and procedures. CAISO should identify where the requirements will reside, so they are applied consistently across PTOs.

Microsoft
Submitted 10/15/2026, 10:21 am

Submitted on behalf of
Microsoft

Contact

Lindsey Schlekeway (lschlekeway@gridwell.com)

1.   Please provide your organization’s comments on section A. Transmission Service to eligible customers on Behalf of Large Loads.
a. Please provide comments on the definition of large loads. b. Please provide comments on the large load application process and interconnection study procedures. c. Please provide comments on the large load operational requirements. d. Please provide your comments on the large load service agreements. e. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

Microsoft appreciates CAISO's efforts to establish greater consistency in large-load interconnection studies, including the proposed monthly review of transmission additions or upgrades to accommodate large loads within the 60–90-day study timeline. While these improvements are a positive step, Microsoft encourages CAISO and the Participating Transmission Owners (PTOs) to provide greater clarity regarding the overall interconnection process, including application completeness determinations, study milestones, CAISO concurrence, identification of required network upgrades, and anticipated energization dates. Microsoft also recommends establishing transparent procedures for communicating study delays, changes in assumptions, and revised project schedules.

To further support these improvements, Microsoft reiterates its recommendation that CAISO and the PTOs develop a consolidated process flow that clearly identifies each entity's responsibilities, required customer submissions, study milestones, decision points, and anticipated timelines. Making this information available before implementation would provide stakeholders with a comprehensive understanding of the interconnection process, help identify potential delays or duplicative requirements, and provide large-load customers with greater certainty when making investment and development decisions.

Microsoft also supports the development of clearly defined and technically justified operational requirements necessary to maintain system reliability. Microsoft appreciates the additional detail provided in the Draft Final Proposal but encourages CAISO to further clarify the anticipated implementation timeline for these requirements, including when compliance will be expected. While further defining the implementation of operational requirements, Microsoft recommends that already operational customer projects or customer projects in advanced stages of permitting, design or construction be exempt from new compliance obligations absent a demonstrated, facility-specific reliability need, particularly where the facility has not previously been shown to impact reliability of the Bulk Electric System. Additionally, Microsoft recommends that the tariff include an explicit process to request a waiver or extension where compliance cannot reasonably be achieved on the prescribed timeline despite commercially reasonable efforts, and that any remedial action directives, mitigations plans, or compliance timelines be developed with customer input and reflect actual implementation constraints.  Microsoft recommends continued coordination with the PTOs and ongoing NERC standards development to ensure consistent implementation and avoid duplicative or conflicting obligations. Data reporting and telemetry requirements should also be coordinated across the relevant entities to minimize duplicative submissions and protect commercially sensitive customer information.

2. Please provide your organization’s comments on section B. Cost Shifting Among Transmission Customers.
a. Please provide comments on roles and responsibilities to prevent cost shifting. b. Please provide comments on data transparency. c. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

Microsoft supports the principle that large-load customers should be responsible for network upgrade costs reasonably attributable to their interconnection requests while ensuring that other customers are protected from inappropriate cost shifting. Microsoft encourages CAISO to work with the PTOs to establish transparent and consistent cost allocation principles, including clear identification, documentation and justification of directly assigned facilities, treatment of shared network upgrades, and safeguards against duplicative cost recovery or financial security requirements. Customers should receive sufficient information to understand the basis for cost assignments and any subsequent changes to those costs, and the customer should be allowed to participate in CAISO’s/PTO’s formula rate process to challenge any unjustified, direct assigned costs.

Microsoft appreciates CAISO’s proposed enhancements to transparency regarding network upgrades and associated costs, including the public reporting of aggregate large load additions, required network upgrades, and estimated costs. To further improve transparency and provide greater certainty for large-load customers, Microsoft recommends establishing procedures to communicate material changes to project costs or timelines as early as practicable. Timely access to this information is critical for customers to evaluate project feasibility, manage development risks, and make informed investment decisions.

3. Please provide your organization’s comments on section C. Co-Location Arrangements and Load with Behind-the-Meter Generation.
a. Please provide comments on terminology. b. Please provide comments on serving co-located loads. c. Please provide comments on cost allocation for co-located loads. d. Please provide any other comments on this topic.
4. Please provide your organization’s comments on section D. Extending New Transmission Services to Eligible Customers Taking Service on Behalf of Flexible Large Loads.

Microsoft appreciates CAISO's decision to prioritize the Flexible Interim Load Interconnection (FILI) option while deferring development of a permanent flexible service offering to a future initiative. Microsoft supports advancing FILI as a voluntary mechanism that may provide customers with earlier access to service while necessary network upgrades are completed. To ensure the offering is commercially workable, Microsoft recommends further clarification of curtailment conditions, operational responsibilities, required control technologies, cost responsibility, and the process for transitioning to firm service. Microsoft also encourages CAISO and the PTOs to establish clear expectations regarding the completion of network upgrades and the corresponding transition to firm service.

5. Please provide your organization’s comments on section E. Interconnection Customers Serving Electrically Proximate Large Load and Co-Located Load.
6. Please provide any additional comments on the draft final proposal or October 1 meeting discussion.

Microsoft encourages CAISO and the Participating Transmission Owners (PTOs) to consider conducting a proactive assessment to identify locations on the CAISO controlled grid where new large loads could interconnect without requiring significant network upgrades. During the Draft Final Proposal stakeholder workshop, a stakeholder suggested identifying locations with available transmission capacity that could accommodate additional load and potentially provide system benefits. Microsoft supports further exploration of this concept, as providing developers with information about favorable interconnection locations could improve siting decisions, reduce interconnection costs, minimize the need for network upgrades, and facilitate more efficient large-load development. Microsoft recommends that CAISO and the PTOs evaluate the feasibility of incorporating such an assessment into existing transmission planning processes and making the resulting information available to prospective large-load customers.

NextEra Energy Resources
Submitted 10/15/2026, 10:44 am

Contact

Jasmie Guan, NextEra (jasmie.guan@nexteraenergy.com)

1.   Please provide your organization’s comments on section A. Transmission Service to eligible customers on Behalf of Large Loads.
a. Please provide comments on the definition of large loads. b. Please provide comments on the large load application process and interconnection study procedures. c. Please provide comments on the large load operational requirements. d. Please provide your comments on the large load service agreements. e. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

NextEra Energy Resources, LLC, (“NextEra Energy Resources”), appreciates the opportunity to provide comments on CAISO’s Large Load Enhancements Draft Final Proposal (“Draft Final Proposal”). NextEra Energy Resources reiterates that implementation of the large load interconnection framework should not adversely affect the timelines and progress made in CAISO’s generator interconnection and transmission planning activities. NextEra Energy Resources appreciates CAISO acknowledging this concern in the Draft Final Proposal and otherwise has no comments on this section at this time.

2. Please provide your organization’s comments on section B. Cost Shifting Among Transmission Customers.
a. Please provide comments on roles and responsibilities to prevent cost shifting. b. Please provide comments on data transparency. c. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

 NextEra Energy Resources has no comments at this time.

3. Please provide your organization’s comments on section C. Co-Location Arrangements and Load with Behind-the-Meter Generation.
a. Please provide comments on terminology. b. Please provide comments on serving co-located loads. c. Please provide comments on cost allocation for co-located loads. d. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

NextEra Energy Resources appreciates CAISO’s reconsideration of the proposed treatment of co-located generation and load. In response to recommendations from NextEra Energy Resources and ACP-California, CAISO revised the Draft Final Proposal to provide greater flexibility for generation interconnection customers to add or remove co-located large load assumptions without automatically requiring withdrawal of the associated generation interconnection request.

NextEra Energy Resources strongly supports this revision. The revised approach appropriately preserves generation queue positions and development flexibility while allowing CAISO and the applicable Participating Transmission Owner (PTO) to evaluate whether a proposed change constitutes a Material Modification.

NextEra Energy Resources also encourages CAISO to provide additional clarity regarding the coordination and sequencing of load and generation studies for co-located arrangements. While large load studies are expected to be completed within 60–90 days, the associated generation interconnection study process is considerably longer. CAISO and the PTOs should ensure that differences in study timelines do not result in duplicative or inconsistent network upgrade requirements and should clarify whether either the load or generation component may proceed to energization independently while the other remains under study.

4. Please provide your organization’s comments on section D. Extending New Transmission Services to Eligible Customers Taking Service on Behalf of Flexible Large Loads.

NextEra Energy Resources continues to support flexible load interconnection options on both an interim and permanent basis. NextEra Energy Resources supports CAISO moving forward with Flexible Interim Load Interconnection (“FILI”) service while continuing to consider a permanent flexible interconnection option in a future initiative. CAISO similarly recognizes the value of both options but proposes advancing only FILI in this initiative.

Regarding FILI, NextEra Energy Resources believes additional implementation details are necessary, particularly regarding eligibility, curtailment triggers and obligations, and the expected timeline for curtailment notices. These details are important to provide developers sufficient certainty to evaluate FILI as a viable interconnection option. CAISO should provide this additional clarity through the implementation process and stakeholder working groups contemplated in the Draft Final Proposal.

NextEra Energy Resources also urges CAISO to commit to a timeline for initiating consideration of a permanent flexible load interconnection option. Permanent flexibility could provide longer term benefits by allowing loads capable of limiting their transmission usage to reduce or avoid unnecessary network upgrades. While CAISO commits to further exploring a permanent offering in a future initiative, the Draft Final Proposal does not identify when that work will begin.

5. Please provide your organization’s comments on section E. Interconnection Customers Serving Electrically Proximate Large Load and Co-Located Load.

NextEra Energy Resources appreciates CAISO’s recognition that electrically proximate large load arrangements warrant further consideration. While NextEra Energy Resources would have preferred CAISO to advance a proposal in this initiative, NextEra Energy Resources recognizes the time constraints associated with responding to FERC’s Order to Show Cause.

Given the potential for electrically proximate arrangements to reduce transmission impacts and accelerate service to large loads, NextEra Energy Resources supports CAISO considering this issue in a future stakeholder initiative. However, CAISO should provide stakeholders greater certainty by committing to a timeframe for initiating this work.

6. Please provide any additional comments on the draft final proposal or October 1 meeting discussion.

 NextEra Energy Resources has no comments at this time.

Northern California Power Agency
Submitted 10/15/2026, 04:08 pm

Contact

Michael Whitney (mike.whitney@ncpa.com)

1.   Please provide your organization’s comments on section A. Transmission Service to eligible customers on Behalf of Large Loads.
a. Please provide comments on the definition of large loads. b. Please provide comments on the large load application process and interconnection study procedures. c. Please provide comments on the large load operational requirements. d. Please provide your comments on the large load service agreements. e. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

NCPA appreciates CAISO’s consideration of stakeholder comments on the Straw Proposal and the additional detail provided in the Draft Final Proposal. In particular, NCPA supports CAISO’s recognition of the need for consistent minimum standards, its proposed transparency enhancements, and its effort to prevent large-load-related contributions and other offsets from being recovered again through the regional Transmission Access Charge (TAC). The comments below focus on issues that remain unresolved or require further clarification before implementation.

Application and interconnection study procedures

NCPA remains concerned that the Draft Final Proposal relies on each PTO’s tariff to address affected system studies and coordination with non-PTO utilities. Encouraging PTOs to develop consistent and complementary provisions is not equivalent to establishing an enforceable, common affected-system process. Inconsistent assumptions, base cases, criteria, or study scopes could leave neighboring systems and non-PTO utilities exposed to reliability impacts that are not identified during the initial study process.

NCPA therefore continues to request that CAISO establish minimum affected system requirements applicable to all PTO studies. At a minimum, those requirements should provide for: (1) early screening for impacts on neighboring PTO and non-PTO systems; (2) timely notice to potentially affected entities; (3) access to relevant assumptions, models, methods, and results subject to appropriate confidentiality protections; (4) a meaningful opportunity for affected entities to participate and identify additional study needs; (5) resolution of identified reliability impacts before CAISO concurrence or TPP approval; and (6) use of consistent study assumptions and criteria across PTOs.

As described in NCPA’s prior comments, a recent PG&E study process demonstrated the need for consistent study treatment. The study did not evaluate short-circuit duty impacts on facilities serving NCPA Member Silicon Valley Power; those impacts were identified through SVP’s own affected-system short-circuit analysis. A uniform screening and coordination requirement would reduce the risk that similar impacts are identified only after an affected entity performs its own analysis.

NCPA recognizes that CAISO has proposed “to define in its tariff any instances when CAISO would reject load interconnection study results or decline to consider or approve associated transmission solutions through the TPP.” However, the Draft Tariff Language does not include any such language. Consistent with NCPA’s comments above, CAISO should include tariff language requiring the identification and resolution of affected system issues, including cost allocation issues, before CAISO concurrence or TPP approval of interconnection study results.

LSE Scheduling Coordinator Requirements

The Draft Final Proposal continues to assign the LSE’s Scheduling Coordinator responsibility for collecting and submitting individual-large-load day-ahead and rolling seven-day forecasts, real-time forecast updates, telemetry, outage and derate information, and other operational changes. This substantially expands the Scheduling Coordinator’s responsibilities beyond scheduling aggregate demand within the LSE service area.

NCPA continues to oppose CAISO’s proposal to require Scheduling Coordinators to provide ongoing operational data for large load customers. These obligations should instead rest with the PTO, which will have the direct interconnection agreement and the contractual authority to obtain and validate information from the large-load customer, or, in the alternative, with the large-load customer through an appropriate direct reporting arrangement. The Draft Final Proposal already assigns the PTO responsibility for providing extensive information and for reporting material changes after energization. Further, under NERC’s proposed computational load standards (which have received industry approval in the first round of balloting), large load customers meeting NERC’s registration criteria are already expected to be capable of responding to operational data requests. See Proposed Standard CLO-002 R7. Requiring the LSE Scheduling Coordinator to collect and report this information creates an unnecessary additional link in the communication chain and unnecessarily increases operational complexity.

If CAISO nevertheless retains these requirements of an LSE Scheduling Coordinator, the tariff should be updated to specify the following:

  • The PTO or large-load customer must be required to provide the necessary information to the LSE and its Scheduling Coordinator within timelines that allow the Scheduling Coordinator to satisfy CAISO requirements. If the PTO or large load customer does not provide the necessary information to the LSE and its SC within those timelines, the LSE and its SC should not be held responsible for any tariff violation or penalty that may result.
  • Terms such as “material change” must be defined through objective thresholds, taking into account the size and operating characteristics of the load.
  • The tariff must distinguish information reasonably available to the Scheduling Coordinator from information controlled by the large-load customer or PTO. Scheduling Coordinators should not be required to provide information that is not reasonably available to them.
  • An LSE or Scheduling Coordinator should not be responsible for the underlying accuracy or completeness of customer-originated information. Scheduling Coordinators do not have the capability to validate large load customer data.

NCPA has proposed corresponding revisions to the Draft Tariff Language.

In addition, CAISO should provide sufficient time for stakeholder review, implementation, and testing before any new reporting obligation becomes effective. For example, the CAISO will need to work with stakeholders to assess whether any contractual or software or vendor changes will be necessary and to determine an appropriate time for implementation and testing of any systems changes.

Large-load interconnection service agreements

NCPA supports development of pro forma agreements that clearly identify the rights and responsibilities of the PTO, large-load customer, and CAISO. If the CAISO maintains the requirement for LSE or Scheduling Coordinator to submit customer-specific operational data, the pro forma agreement should require the customer and PTO to provide that information to the LSE or Scheduling Coordinator within timelines that allow the SC to satisfy CAISO requirements. The pro forma agreements also should identify responsibility for data accuracy, updates, communications failures, telemetry and control equipment, and costs arising from large-load-specific requirements.

2. Please provide your organization’s comments on section B. Cost Shifting Among Transmission Customers.
a. Please provide comments on roles and responsibilities to prevent cost shifting. b. Please provide comments on data transparency. c. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

NCPA appreciates CAISO’s express recognition that large loads should bear equitable risk and responsibility for costs incurred to interconnect, including network upgrade costs attributed to those loads. NCPA also supports CAISO’s proposal that construction contributions, revenues, financial securities, minimum demand charges, exit fees, and similar offsets associated with large-load-driven network upgrades be reflected in PTO transmission revenue requirements and annual transmission revenue credits so that those amounts are not also recovered through the regional high-voltage TAC.

A uniform cost allocation framework remains necessary

The proposed treatment of cost offsets operates only after the applicable PTO determines what costs, contributions, or financial protections will be assigned to the large load. It does not resolve the upstream cost assignment question: what portion of the costs driven by an individual large load must be funded by that customer?

NCPA remains concerned that materially different PTO tariff provisions could produce inconsistent cost assignments for similarly situated large loads and could permit customer-specific high voltage upgrade costs to be regionalized through TAC.  

NCPA therefore reiterates its request that CAISO establish minimum cost allocation requirements applicable across PTO tariffs. At a minimum, those requirements should provide that facilities constructed primarily to interconnect or serve an individual large load are directly assigned to that customer, absent clear evidence demonstrating broader, material system benefits supporting a different allocation. CAISO should review PTO cost assignment determinations to ensure they comply with such minimum standards before costs are incorporated into the transmission revenue requirement and TAC. The results of cost allocation determinations should also be disclosed on CAISO’s website along with the upgrade cost estimates, as discussed below.

Protection if expected load does not materialize

PTO tariff provisions and interconnection service agreements should protect other transmission customers if a large load is delayed, is built at a smaller scale, operates below forecast levels, or ceases operations before customer-funded facilities are fully recovered. Financial security, minimum-demand obligations, exit fees, and other protections should be durable, enforceable, and sized to the costs that otherwise could shift to other customers. Amounts recovered through those mechanisms should reduce the applicable PTO transmission revenue requirement or otherwise flow back to the customers that would bear the associated transmission costs.

Data transparency should disclose actual TAC exposure

NCPA supports CAISO’s proposal to publish aggregate large load additions by transmission pricing zone, identify planned network upgrades associated with large load service requests, and publish estimated upgrade costs. Those disclosures will improve visibility, but they will not fully allow stakeholders to evaluate cost shifting unless CAISO also identifies how each upgrade is funded.

For each large-load-associated network upgrade, CAISO should publish on its website, subject to appropriate confidentiality protections: (1) estimated total cost; (2) the cause of the upgrade and whether it is classified as local, area, or otherwise; (3) the amount directly funded by the large-load customer; (4) applicable contributions, revenues, credits, minimum-demand charges, exit fees, or other offsets; and (5) the amount expected to be recovered through regional TAC, local TAC, WAC, or another broadly allocated rate. CAISO should update the information as project scope, schedule, cost responsibility, and cost estimates change.

CAISO should memorialize these disclosure requirements in its tariff and should provide stakeholders an opportunity to review the planned reporting fields and format before implementation.

3. Please provide your organization’s comments on section C. Co-Location Arrangements and Load with Behind-the-Meter Generation.
a. Please provide comments on terminology. b. Please provide comments on serving co-located loads. c. Please provide comments on cost allocation for co-located loads. d. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

NCPA appreciates CAISO’s effort to clarify the treatment of co-located load and generation and its proposal to separately meter co-located large loads for regulation and black start charges. NCPA does not oppose the proposed framework for studying co-located arrangements, but the same cost-causation safeguards applicable to stand-alone large loads should apply to co-located configurations.

In particular, studies should determine the extent of transmission system utilization that may arise when co-located generation is unavailable or curtailed. When that utilization requires customer-specific interconnection facilities, monitoring, telemetry, control systems, protection systems, and upgrades, the costs of those facilities should not be shifted to other transmission customers.

NCPA further requests that CAISO’s public reporting identify co-located large-load upgrades and disclose the allocation of their costs using the same funding and TAC-exposure fields requested above.

4. Please provide your organization’s comments on section D. Extending New Transmission Services to Eligible Customers Taking Service on Behalf of Flexible Large Loads.

NCPA supports continued development of the Flexible Interim Load Interconnection (FILI) option as a means to allow earlier energization where enforceable operating limitations can protect reliability. NCPA agrees with CAISO that FILI will require effective performance, monitoring, communications, and control capabilities and coordination among CAISO, the PTO, and the customer.

FILI, however, should not create incremental costs or reliability risks for customers that did not request or benefit from the large-load interconnection. The FILI agreement to be executed by the PTO, CAISO, and the FILI customer should clearly provide that the FILI customer is responsible for customer-specific study, telemetry, communications, control, protection, remedial action scheme, implementation, and administration costs. The customer should also provide financial security for the associated network upgrades and for costs that could otherwise be stranded if the load does not materialize or does not transition to firm service as expected.

Because CAISO does not propose a temporal or capacity cap, each FILI agreement should identify the expected network-upgrade completion date, interim operating limit, curtailment triggers, responsible operating entity, verification requirements, consequences for non-performance, cost responsibility, and process for transition to firm service. CAISO should also commit to periodically reviewing FILI implementation to ensure that FILI is not allowed to become an indefinite substitute for necessary transmission upgrades or shift costs to other transmission customers.

Finally, FILI-related schedules, forecasts, and curtailment information should be submitted by the entity with direct operational knowledge and contractual authority over the large load (i.e., the PTO or the FILI customer). NCPA’s concerns regarding assignment of customer-specific reporting obligations to the LSE Scheduling Coordinator apply equally to FILI service.

5. Please provide your organization’s comments on section E. Interconnection Customers Serving Electrically Proximate Large Load and Co-Located Load.

NCPA has no additional comments on electrically proximate large loads at this time. NCPA supports further consideration of this topic in a future stakeholder initiative.

6. Please provide any additional comments on the draft final proposal or October 1 meeting discussion.

The allocation of responsibility for affected-system coordination and allocation of large-load-driven network costs are substantive policy matters and should not be deferred primarily to individual PTO filings.  NCPA also requests that stakeholders have a meaningful opportunity to review and provide feedback on the relevant PTO tariff provisions and pro forma agreements before CAISO’s and PTOs’ FERC filings. The effectiveness of CAISO’s framework will depend on whether the PTO provisions are genuinely consistent and collectively prevent reliability gaps and cost shifting. Review after materially different approaches have already been filed would be far less effective than coordinated stakeholder review during development.

Pacific Gas and Electric Company
Submitted 10/15/2026, 03:45 pm

Contact

Amy Barr (amy.barr@pge.com)

1.   Please provide your organization’s comments on section A. Transmission Service to eligible customers on Behalf of Large Loads.
a. Please provide comments on the definition of large loads. b. Please provide comments on the large load application process and interconnection study procedures. c. Please provide comments on the large load operational requirements. d. Please provide your comments on the large load service agreements. e. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

Pacific Gas and Electric Company (“PG&E”) respectfully submits these comments on the California Independent System Operator Corporation’s (“CAISO”) Large Load Enhancements Draft Final Proposal issued September 17, 2026 (“LLE Proposal”). PG&E submits these comments as both a Participating Transmission Owner (“PTO”) named as a respondent in the June 18, 2026 Order to Show Cause[1] issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC” or “Commission”) and a Utility Distribution Company (“UDC”) that serves as the primary interface for Large Loads seeking to interconnect within its PTO Service Territory.[2]

PG&E continues to generally support the LLE Proposal and to commend the CAISO for advancing a framework that responds to the Commission’s directives while maintaining the established division of responsibilities between the CAISO and the PTOs. PG&E recognizes the urgent need for solutions that enable Large Load interconnection while maintaining grid affordability and reliability. However, CAISO’s proposed definition of “Large Load” remains problematic.  The CAISO’s final proposed definition fails to address the substantive concerns raised by PG&E in its comments on CAISO’s prior Straw Proposal.  In doing so, CAISO proposes a final definition that is fundamentally inconsistent with the Order to Show Cause  and will result in few, if any, large loads in the CAISO region meeting the definition. If the CAISO proposed definition is left unchanged, it could result in rejection by FERC and could result in FERC imposing a new definition that does not reflect the unique characteristics of the CAISO region, making it unworkable and causing significant disruption to the CAISO markets.  

In Section I.A. of the LLE Proposal, the CAISO responds to the first set of concerns in the OSC—the definition of Large Load, the application process, study procedures, operational requirements, and Large Load service agreements. The LLE Proposal adopts a structure under which PTOs directly interact with Large Loads (i.e., End Users), as if such Large Load customers were “interconnection customers” of the PTO. This structure is fundamentally flawed and inconsistent with the actual intent and requirements of the OSC. CAISO’s proposed structure is founded on the erroneous view that Large Load customers today directly interconnect to the CAISO system and enter interconnection agreements with PTOs. It also assumes that the relationship between PTOs and End Use customers is the focus of the OSC. The OSC, however, is carefully and specifically directed at three entities—the CAISO, the PTOs in the CAISO, and Eligible Customers who provide transmission service to End Use Load, including Large Loads, in the CAISO Balancing Authority Area (“BAA”). All three entities are unquestionably regulated by FERC. And the OSC’s purpose is to require that CAISO and the PTOs have proper procedures in place for transmission service taken by Eligible Customers to serve Large Loads to ensure that service is safe and reliable and protects other customers from cost shifts. Thus, CAISO should clarify that any reference to “Large Load interconnections” in the LLE Proposal is referencing interconnections of Eligible Customers, who in CAISO are referred to as MSS and UDCs, providing interconnection and transmission service to a Large Load.[3]

Before addressing the CAISO’s specific topics, in light of the discussion above, PG&E emphasizes the importance of distinguishing among the various types of entities involved in providing transmission service in the long-standing CAISO structure, which the CAISO clearly does not want to alter.[4] The primary entities relevant to the OSC and thus to the CAISO’s LLE Proposal, aside from the CAISO, should be PTOs and the two sets of “Eligible Customers” in the CAISO BAA that are responsible for obtaining and paying the CAISO for in-BAA transmission service—UDCs and Metered Subsystems (“MSS”). UDCs/MSSs are responsible for interconnecting and providing transmission service to their retail customers, including Large Load retail customers in the BAA.[5]

According to the LLE Proposal, “[t]he CAISO tariff does not use Eligible Customer, and introducing it here could require other changes to the CAISO tariff.”[6] PG&E recognizes that CAISO has not traditionally used the term Eligible Customer in the same manner that the OSC uses the term.[7] PG&E thus has no objection to the CAISO using an alternate term for Eligible Customer (e.g., “UDC/MSS” or “TAC Customer”) in the CAISO Tariff, but it is crucial that CAISO ensure that its proposed definition of Large Load customers actually captures the intent and purpose of the OSC.

a. Please provide comments on the definition of Large Loads.

Background

The scope of the definition of Large Load is fundamental to whether CAISO will satisfy the requirements of the OSC and assist FERC in achieving its goals. If the definition remains limited, the result will be a set of CAISO Large Load enhancements that are inapplicable in scope. Indeed, as discussed below, if the current proposed definition is adopted, there are not and will never be Large Loads in a UDC Service Area. Thus, the CAISO definition is inconsistent with the objectives of the OSC and California state law.  PG&E is also concerned the definition is unreasonable and will be rejected by FERC, will result in legal disputes, or both.

The CAISO proposed definition, which the CAISO portrays as non-final,[8] reads: “An End User located at a single site whose Point(s) of Interconnection is/are to the CAISO-Controlled Grid, and that has a peak load of 50 MW or greater.” There are two primary flaws in this definition. First, Large Loads, i.e., End Users, do not connect directly to the CAISO Controlled Grid at a Point of Interconnection but rather connect to intervening facilities that connect to Points of Withdrawal (Points of Delivery) at the CAISO Controlled Grid. Second, the CAISO interprets its definition to exclude Large Loads connected to a UDC’s or MSS’s local distribution facilities, which renders the LLE Proposal an incomplete approach to addressing FERC’s concerns.[9]

Although the CAISO claims to address PG&E’s point that Large Loads do not connect directly to the CAISO Controlled Grid, it demonstrates that PG&E is correct by redefining Interconnection Facilities in Appendix A to describe the intervening facilities. Nonetheless, the CAISO claims that PG&E’s definition “creates additional ambiguity because it seems to include intervening assets that may be first connected to the distribution system.” To be clear, PG&E’s proposed definition of Large Load would include Large Load connected to the CAISO Controlled Grid via intervening assets for the simple reason that such intervening assets always exist between the Large Load-owned facilities and the CAISO Controlled Grid. The OSC recognizes this fact by focusing on regulating “transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of Large Loads” rather than the interconnection of Large Loads directly to the transmission system.[10]

The CAISO’s concern with clarifying the fact that the Large Load connections are in fact “indirect” appears to be directly related to the second flaw in the definition. The CAISO believes it problematic that PG&E’s proposal would include within the scope of Large Load distribution-connected and non-PTO connected loads within the CAISO BAA. The CAISO argues that if such Large Loads cause network upgrades, they should be considered in the CAISO transmission planning process but not subject to the OSC.[11] This approach is unworkable. The focus of the OSC is addressing the lack of process and procedure in the CAISO and TO Tariffs for studying and providing transmission service for Eligible Customers on behalf of Large Loads.[12] Eligible Customers take transmission service on behalf of Large Loads even if the loads are attached to UDC distribution facilities. The OSC recognizes that states have jurisdiction over sales to end users and FERC has jurisdiction over transmission service taken by Eligible Customers to serve those end use customers. The transmission service taken by Eligible Customers on behalf of Large Loads plainly affects FERC-jurisdictional transmission and transmission rates. Under the CAISO’s interpretation, the CAISO would not be allowed to engage in transmission planning to serve the vast majority of (distribution connected) load in its BAA.

The OSC Does Not Focus On The Interconnection Of Large Load to FERC-Jurisdictional Transmission Facilities

A root cause of the CAISO’s refusal to acknowledge PG&E’s argument and the proper scope of the OSC requirements is CAISO’s flawed belief that the OSC is focused on and limited to the direct interconnections of Large Loads to transmission facilities. The CAISO claims that the OSC is premised on FERC’s duty to remedy the potential for undue discrimination in transmission access by regulating interconnections to the transmission system, not the distribution system, which the CAISO claims is left to the states. The CAISO states that the “CAISO may not assert substantial rules on distribution-connected loads for the same reason that FERC has not asserted rules on them: distribution-connected retail customers are not jurisdictional to FERC under the Federal Power Act.”[13] This is simply not true. The OSC requires CAISO and the PTOs to address PTOs interconnecting Eligible Customers so that they can take transmission service for Large Loads.

CAISO also relies on a flawed analysis that the intervening facilities between a Large Load and the CAISO Controlled Grid are FERC-jurisdictional “Interconnection Facilities,” and can be treated the same as FERC-jurisdictional transmission facilities in the generation interconnection context. Indeed, for the CAISO to make its Large Load definition workable, it had to alter the definition of both “Point of Interconnection (‘POI’)” and “Interconnection Facilities.” The CAISO Tariff-defined term POI currently relates only to Generating Facilities.[14] The CAISO seeks to supplement this definition by adding that “[f]or a Large Load, the Point of Interconnection is the point at which the Large Load Interconnection Facilities connect to the CAISO Controlled Grid.”[15] Then, as already noted, the CAISO redefines “Interconnection Facilities” to include “all facilities and equipment between the … Large Load and the Point of Interconnection” and to exclude Distribution Upgrades. The CAISO facially is trying to turn “intervening facilities” into FERC-jurisdictional Interconnection Facilities to support its jurisdictional interpretation.

By using the newly defined term Interconnection Facilities, the CAISO is equating state/local-jurisdictional facilities between a Large Load and the CAISO Controlled Grid with the FERC-jurisdictional facilities between a Generator and the CAISO Controlled Grid. California Public Utilities Code § 399.2(d) defines “electric distribution grid” as “those facilities owned or operated by an electrical corporation that are not under the control of the [CAISO] and that are used to transmit, deliver, or furnish electricity for light, heat, or power.” The intervening facilities between a Large Load and the CAISO Controlled Grid are used only for retail transmission service. Therefore, if the CAISO is concerned that it has no jurisdiction with regard to Large Loads connected to distribution facilities, that same exact problem exists as to all Large Loads.  For this reason, FERC’s assertion of jurisdiction in the OSC does not rest on Large Loads connecting directly to CAISO-controlled FERC-jurisdictional facilities, which they do not. Rather, FERC jurisdiction rests on the transmission service that the Eligible Customer is going to purchase at a Point of Withdrawal.

The OSC Rests Jurisdiction on Transmission Service Taken by Eligible Customers

The CAISO admits on page 58 that “transmission service will [] continue to be assumed through an interconnection request.” PG&E agrees with this notion that when a new retail Load seeks to interconnect or a load-serving distribution company seeks to expand its existing interconnection service in order to serve new retail Load, the customer is effectively requesting a bundled transmission/interconnection product. A request for a Load to interconnect, whether a retail load or wholesale load, is effectively a request for transmission service in CAISO. Separating the services for study purposes would lead to absurd results. Load interconnections are not studied by assuming the Load is not withdrawing power. And, given that the CAISO must ensure there are sufficient transmission facilities to serve all distribution-connected load within the CAISO BAA taking transmission service, it only makes sense that the nature of the facilities that the Load is interconnected to is irrelevant.

In the CAISO structure, UDCs/MSSs are the Eligible Customers for transmission service. Thus, any definition of Large Load must capture the “on behalf of” portion of FERC’s framing of jurisdiction in the OSC. Throughout the OSC, FERC states that it preliminarily finds the CAISO and TO Tariffs appear to be unjust and unreasonable because they lack clarity for “the provision of transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads.”[16] FERC’s deliberate use of this phrase, and its focus on the Eligible Customer, reflects a jurisdictional reality: FERC’s intent to apply the OSC’s requirements (study processes, reliability oversight, and cost recovery) to all Large Load customers for whom the Eligible Customer takes transmission service. There is no question that FERC has jurisdiction over transmission service taken by Eligible Customers to serve load, including retail load. By anchoring its requirements to the Eligible Customer’s transmission service, FERC ensures its reach is legally sound while still enabling it to indirectly place requirements on Large Loads, as discussed immediately below.

The OSC makes its intended reach explicit. FERC clarifies that the phrase “provision of transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads” encompasses situations where an Eligible Customer requests a new or modified point of delivery to serve a Large Load, where a Large Load seeks a new or modified delivery point as an unbundled retail transmission service customer, or where Large Loads are otherwise included in an Eligible Customer’s reported load growth and that Eligible Customer is taking network transmission service.[17] This broad articulation makes clear that FERC intends its requirements to capture all Large Loads receiving transmission service through an Eligible Customer.

CAISO’s interpretation is too narrow and ignores FERC’s clear statement that “[t]he Commission has jurisdiction over the study process for transmission service to both Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads and unbundled retail transmission service to end-use large load customers where, pursuant to state law or a public utility’s voluntary offer of such service, the large load is an Eligible Customer under the transmission provider and/or transmission owner tariffs.”[18] As noted above, the focus of the OSC is on “the provision of transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads.” Thus, to FERC, where the Large Load initially connects is irrelevant if it is ultimately connected to the transmission system and receiving transmission service from an Eligible Customer. For example, in Paragraph 45 of the OSC, FERC states that it has “the authority to ensure that tariffs include provisions that clearly and consistently address study process for the provision of transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads.” The breadth of this authority—and the absence of any limiting language restricting coverage to loads that directly interconnect to the transmission system—indicates that FERC intends these requirements to apply comprehensively to all large loads regardless of where they ultimately connect.

We believe FERC will reject CAISO’s definition as too narrow because, rather than focusing on the transmission service the Eligible Customer takes to serve the large load, it focuses on how the Large Load customer physically connects to the CAISO Controlled Grid—missing the purpose and intent of the OSC. PG&E’s previous suggested revisions to the CAISO’s initial proposal were intended to make this relationship more explicit.  PG&E modifies the proposed definition to make the scope and reach of the OSC’s requirements crystal clear.

PG&E’s Proposal Reflects the OSC

PG&E’s modified suggested definition of Large Load is: “An End User located at a single site behind one or more Point(s) of Withdrawal from the CAISO Controlled Grid and that has a peak load of 50 MW or greater.”[19]  This definition uses the term “behind the Point of Withdrawal” which focuses on load deliverability rather than relying on the generator framework and trying to rewrite that process to apply to Large Load. Crucially, Point(s) of Withdrawal, when used in the transmission service context, is limited to the CAISO BAA.[20]  PG&E also proposes to modify the definition of Point(s) of Withdrawal for clarification.  Specifically, PG&E proposes to modify the definition as follows:

Point(s) within the ISO Balancing Authority Area, or for purposes of scheduling and operating the Day Ahead Market only, the EDAM Area where Energy and Ancillary Services are made available to a receiving party under this ISO Tariff, for purposes of scheduling and operating the Real-Time Market only, the EIM Area where Energy and Ancillary Services are made available to a receiving party under this ISO Tariff, or for purposes of the definition of Large Load only, the point(s) where a non-transmission facility that is used to withdraw Energy from the ISO Controlled Grid to serve an End User connects to the ISO Controlled Grid.”

PG&E’s view is supported by NERC’s proposed definition. In 2025, NERC defined Large Load as follows: “Any commercial or industrial individual load facility or aggregation of load facilities at a single site behind one or more point(s) of interconnection that can pose reliability risks to the [Bulk Power System] due to its demand, operational characteristics, or other factors. Examples include, but are not limited to, data centers, cryptocurrency mining facilities, hydrogen electrolyzers, manufacturing facilities, and arc furnaces.” NERC does not indicate that “behind one or more point(s) of interconnection” means the Large Load must be directly connected to the transmission system.

Other RTO and ISO definitions that have been filed or proposed to stakeholders are more consistent with PG&E’s interpretation and approach, explicitly recognizing that Large Load does not have to be interconnected to the transmission system directly and instead using the terms “Behind” or “Through” to appropriately capture the effects of any Large Load on the transmission system. MISO refers to large load “located at a single substation behind one or more Point(s) of Withdrawal from the Transmission System” where Point of Withdrawal is “[t]he point(s) where a non-transmission facility that is used to withdraw Energy from the Transmission System to serve Load connects to the Transmission System.” ISO-NE’s definition proposal includes large load that “connects to the transmission system either directly or through a system primarily designed to serve the customer.” SPP refers to a large load “connected through one or more shared Points of Interconnection (POIs) or delivery points.” NYISO’s proposal refers to large load “behind one or more POIs.” None of these definitions facially excludes distribution-connected Load and none requires that the Large Load directly connect to the Transmission System.

Although several of these definitions employ “point of interconnection” terminology that may appear superficially similar to CAISO’s proposal, they are in fact materially different, and it would be a mistake to treat CAISO’s proposal as aligned with all of the other RTOs. CAISO proposes to define a Large Load as “[a]n End User located at a single site whose Point(s) of Interconnection is/are to the CAISO-Controlled Grid, and that has a peak load of 50 MW or greater.”  Unlike the other RTO formulations, CAISO’s definition does not use key qualifiers such as “Behind” or “Through” the point of interconnection, nor does it use “delivery point.”  Instead, it keys the definition to an End User whose own Point(s) of Interconnection are directly to the CAISO-Controlled Grid. The distinction is not merely one of capitalization or drafting style. SPP captures load “connected through one or more shared Points of Interconnection (POIs) or delivery points;” NYISO captures load “behind one or more POIs;” and PJM captures end-use customer load “behind one or more points of interconnection.” CAISO's language, by contrast, reaches only an End User whose point of interconnection is at the CAISO-Controlled Grid—i.e., load that is directly interconnected. As a result, CAISO's proposal is narrower than each of the other definitions and risks excluding large loads that are served through dedicated downstream or other non-transmission facilities but that nonetheless rely on, and materially affect, the transmission system.  In sum, CAISO’s proposed definition of large load is too narrow and will result in a definition that fails to meet the requirements of the OSC and produces a null set.

b. Please provide comments on the large load application process and interconnection study procedures.

See PG&E’s September 2, 2026 Comments regarding roles and responsibilities of the PTOs and the CAISO.

Application Process

PG&E continues to generally support the proposed updates to CAISO’s application process but identifies a few areas of needed clarification. The CAISO continues to propose that the PTOs accept applications and notes that it is proposing enhanced and ongoing coordination with the PTOs on the Load and resource interconnection processes and expects the PTOs to align their Load application processes with the CAISO’s resource interconnection process.[21] This statement is unclear as to whether the CAISO is expecting the CAISO Cluster Window for new Resources to be aligned with applications from Eligible Customers for Large Load and/or how the FERC 90-day timeline would apply. PG&E agrees with CAISO that certain Eligible Customer for Large Load applications are going to prove that the Large Load is electrically dependent and will need to be studied in a Cluster for results to be meaningful.  

The CAISO suggests that the PTOs develop a consistent application process.[22]  PG&E expects each PTO’s application processes to be relatively similar, but given the abbreviated time frame to prepare filings, is not expecting uniformity. PG&E is still developing its proposed application process to respond to the requirements of the OSC. PG&E anticipates developing a separate application process for Eligible Customers seeking an interconnection to serve Large Load (as properly defined by PG&E). PG&E anticipates that the process will largely follow the application process under its existing Section 10 of its Transmission Owner Tariff (“TO Tariff”). Thus, PG&E anticipates the process will require submission of a standardized interconnection application that provides the technical information PG&E and CAISO need to understand the characteristics of the Large Load, together with documentation demonstrating that the project is not speculative and can move forward. PG&E anticipates reviewing each application for completeness within a defined timeframe and will process applications on a rolling basis consistent with the requirements of the OSC. Like CAISO, PG&E also intends to evaluate applications to determine whether Large Loads are electrically independent or electrically dependent.

Study Process

PG&E generally supports the CAISO proposal to coordinate with the PTOs on Eligible Customer for Large Load interconnections through Section 24 (Comprehensive Transmission Planning Process (“TPP”)) of the CAISO Tariff. The CAISO indicates that it does not propose changing the allocation of rights and responsibilities for studying Large Load interconnection requests from the framework in place today: the PTOs will continue to manage the bulk of the study responsibilities.[23] The CAISO encourages the PTOs to align their Large Load interconnection study procedures among themselves and with the CAISO resource interconnection standards and TPP for enhanced clarity and consistency for customers.

Historically, as noted by the CAISO, the PTOs submit certain types of upgrades for the CAISO’s concurrence in the TPP. This concurrence process for Load interconnections considers the transmission component of the Load interconnection (i.e., the network upgrades). The CAISO reviews and provides concurrence that the Load interconnection and potential network upgrades to interconnect the load meet the transmission reliability requirements and are consistent with the long-term transmission plans in the area.

The CAISO suggests that the PTOs develop a consistent study process.[24] Again, at this time, PG&E is uncertain of the degree of consistency that will exist across PTO filings. As noted above, PG&E continues to develop its process for studying requests by Eligible Customers seeking to interconnect Large Loads. However, it anticipates that any process developed will follow closely the existing study process for interconnection of loads under Section 10 of the TO Tariff. Like CAISO, PG&E anticipates treating electrically dependent and electrically independent Large Loads differently. PG&E anticipates a study process for both types of load that identifies the facilities and upgrades needed to serve the large load, accounts for the load characteristics provided in the interconnection applications, relies on existing transmission planning studies to the extent reasonably practicable, and evaluates alternative transmission technologies as potential solutions before selecting traditional network upgrades.

c. Please provide comments on the large load operational requirements.

See PG&E’s September 2, 2026 Comments regarding large load operational requirements.

The LLE Proposal summarizes the work of the Large Load Technical Requirements Working Group to develop consistent technical requirements for the reliable interconnection and operation of large data center loads. PG&E understands that certain requirements will be imposed through the CAISO Tariff, presumably on PTOs, although the level of granularity of information the PTO is expected to provide to the CAISO, and which entities the CAISO expects the PTOs to directly interact with, remain somewhat unclear. For example, the CAISO Tariff will “establish ramp-rate requirements,” but are those ramp rate requirements applied to individual Large Loads or to Eligible Customers for all their load? Similarly, “frequency and voltage ride-through requirements” would seemingly apply to Large Loads directly and it is unclear whether the CAISO is requiring the PTO in turn to impose such requirements directly on a Large Load, even if the PTO is not also the Eligible Customer and may not be in a position to establish a contract directly with the Large Load.

Separately, the CAISO proposes that a set of requirements be addressed through the TO Tariffs include the installation of phasor measurement units, requirements for control technologies and/or protection systems, when necessary, to limit Large Load withdrawals from the transmission system. Again, it remains unclear who actually imposes the requirements on whom, such that the Large Load customer installs what is necessary.

The CAISO expects that static information about Large Loads will come from the PTOs near the end of the interconnection process (similar to the new resource implementation process for generators) while day-ahead and real-time information will come from the (load-serving entity) Scheduling Coordinator responsible for the Large Load’s demand.[25] PG&E does not object to the extensive list of static information required, but the CAISO does not address how PTOs will collect such information if the PTO does not have a direct relationship with the Large Load customer. Once again, the fallacy that the PTO is directly interconnecting with the retail customer appears to be the basis for the requirement; i.e., the CAISO clearly believes that the CAISO and a PTO can directly impose requirements on such retail load. PG&E assumes that it can require instead that the listed information be provided by the Eligible Customer at the conclusion of the PTO process and that the Eligible Customer will need to update the PTO, as needed, who will update the CAISO. That said, where the Eligible Customer and PTO are one and the same entity, direct communication between the Large Load and the PTO may be more efficient.

PG&E understands that there will be an upcoming working group to develop requirements for Scheduling Coordinators in relation to Large Load.  This will require many systems to be developed, which currently do not exist.  PG&E is committed to cooperating in that upcoming process, including properly determining the scope of responsibilities for Scheduling Coordinators. 

d. Please provide your comments on the large load service agreements.

See PG&E’s September 2, 2026 Comments regarding “Large Load Agreement(s).” As already noted, any pro forma TO Tariff agreements largely will likely focus on the PTO/Eligible Customer relationship, although in some circumstances, for efficiency reasons, or with the agreement of all the parties, the Large Load customer would be a party to some such agreements.

Again, meeting the CAISO’s expectations as to consistency among PTOs is a valid goal, but initial conformity may not be achievable. PG&E continues to develop the necessary service agreement that will govern requests for interconnection by Eligible Customers interconnecting Large Load. PG&E anticipates that it will develop a separate pro forma agreement to govern such service requests and that such an agreement will need to be executed by each Eligible Customer seeking interconnection service for Large Load customers. PG&E also anticipates that its pro forma agreement will include attachments that address the necessary cost recovery requirements of the OSC and flexible interconnection service requirements of the OSC.

e. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

None.

 


[1] California Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., et al., 195 FERC ¶ 61,214 (2026) (“OSC”).

[2] Capitalized terms not otherwise defined in these comments have the meaning assigned to them in the California Independent System Operator Corporation Fifth Replacement FERC Electric Tariff.

[3] PG&E recognizes that CAISO does not prefer use of the term Eligible Customer in this context.  The use of the term Eligible Customer in the OSC reflects the fact that Eligible Customer is a defined term in Order No. 888 and the pro forma Open Access Transmission Tariff.  PG&E does not object to use of different language that CAISO believes is more appropriate for the CAISO region, such as UDC and MSS, but the language must address what the OSC refers to as Eligible Customers taking transmission service to serve Large Loads.

[4] The CAISO repeatedly refers to maintaining existing roles and responsibilities. See e.g., LLE Proposal at 10 (“the CAISO does not propose significant changes to the roles and responsibilities associated with large load interconnection applications or studies”); id. at 12 (“the CAISO reiterates that the PTOs are much more familiar with the current load interconnection processes and responsibilities than the CAISO and are therefore in a better position to negotiate a process that clarifies roles and responsibilities”); id. at 25, 28.

[5] Scheduling Coordinators for Load outside the CAISO BAA may purchase wheeling transmission service for Eligible Customers, but Load situated outside the CAISO BAA is irrelevant to the LLE Proposal and the OSC. The OSC did not mandate that the CAISO and PTOs address situations in which Large Loads located in non-CAISO BAAs impact the CAISO Controlled Grid or require its expansion. The CAISO and PTOs can address that issue in the future.

[6] LLE Proposal at 16. A word search shows the term appearing 32 times in the CAISO Tariff.

[7] Generally, the term is used in the CAISO Tariff to describe the entity that a Scheduling Coordinator is representing for market/scheduling purposes.

[8] LLE Proposal at 16.

[9] See e.g., OSC at P 39 (“we use the phrase ‘the provision of transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads’ to encompass the provision of new, modified or additional transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads.”).

[10] Id.

[11] LLE Proposal at 13.

[12] OSC at P 3.

[13] LLE Proposal at 15.

[14] POI is currently defined in relevant part: “The point, as set forth in Appendix A to the Large Generator Interconnection Agreement or Attachment 3 to the Small Generator Interconnection Agreement, where the Interconnection Facilities connect to the CAISO Controlled Grid. For Generating Facilities connected to the Distribution System, the Point of Interconnection is the point at which the Generating Facility connects to the CAISO Controlled Grid.”

[15] At least in this definition, the CAISO admits there are intervening facilities between the Large Load and the CAISO Controlled Grid.

[16] See, e.g., OSC at P 38 (emphasis added).

[17] Id. at P 39.

[18] Id. at P 43.

[19] While PG&E proposes a 50 MW threshold for the definition, it also recognizes, based on its experience, that this threshold may be too high in practice and continues to evaluate it.

[20] In other contexts, a Point of Withdrawal can be outside the CAISO BAA. Point(s) of Withdrawal are “Point(s) within the CAISO Balancing Authority Area, or for purposes of scheduling and operating the Day-Ahead Market only, the EDAM Area where Energy and Ancillary Services are made available to a receiving party under this CAISO Tariff, or, for purposes of scheduling and operating the Real-Time Market only, the EIM Area where Energy and Ancillary Services are made available to a receiving party under this CAISO Tariff.” This Large Load process has nothing to do with scheduling and operating in energy or ancillary service markets.

[21] LLE Proposal at 19.

[22] Id.

[23] LLE Proposal at 25.

[24] Id. at 20.

[25] LLE Proposal at 37.

2. Please provide your organization’s comments on section B. Cost Shifting Among Transmission Customers.
a. Please provide comments on roles and responsibilities to prevent cost shifting. b. Please provide comments on data transparency. c. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

a. Please provide comments on roles and responsibilities to prevent cost shifting.

PG&E continues to support the CAISO’s proposal regarding roles and responsibilities for preventing cost shifting. See PG&E’s September 2, 2026 Comments regarding “roles and responsibilities to prevent cost shifting.”

The OSC directs CAISO and the PTOs to ensure protections are in place “if the Eligible Customer ultimately takes less transmission service than anticipated because the large load does not materialize as planned or is not developed at all.”[1] Cost shifting proposals should be focused on mitigating the risk that load does not materialize, rather than addressing ratemaking issues which will be assessed in other proceedings, such as the Order Instituting Rulemaking Regarding Advanced Electric Rate Design (Rulemaking 26-04-009) pending before the California Public Utilities Commission.  Similarly, the CAISO need not adjust its current mechanism in evaluating reliability projects driven by load growth and evolving grid conditions.

b. Please provide comments on data transparency.

See PG&E’s September 2, 2026 Comments regarding “data transparency.”

In meeting the OSC’s data transparency requirements, the CAISO proposes to clarify in the TPP that where network upgrades are needed to accommodate both general load growth and Large Load interconnections, Large Load growth already has been incorporated into the CEC, CPUC, and CAISO forecasting and planning processes, as detailed in the CAISO’s Informational Report on Resource Sufficiency. Attempting to isolate network upgrades caused by new Large Load from other loads in the TPP is difficult and could result in over- or under-allocation of costs.

 


[1] OSC at P 80. 

3. Please provide your organization’s comments on section C. Co-Location Arrangements and Load with Behind-the-Meter Generation.
a. Please provide comments on terminology. b. Please provide comments on serving co-located loads. c. Please provide comments on cost allocation for co-located loads. d. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

a. Please provide comments on terminology.

Although CAISO may choose not to define co-located load, defining “Co-Located Large Load” may be necessary for specificity in the TO Tariffs.

b. Please provide comments on serving co-located loads.

See PG&E’s September 2, 2026 Comments “on serving co-located loads.”

c. Please provide comments on cost allocation for co-located loads.

See PG&E’s September 2, 2026 Comments on “cost allocation for co-located loads.”

d. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

PG&E has no objection to the CAISO largely preserving the status quo as to the TAC (and most ancillary services), i.e., charging on a net MWh of Load (TAC) or net MWh of Demand (Ancillary Services) basis, and assessing Black Start and Regulation service charges on a gross MWh of Demand basis.  That said, if a UDC is assessed any existing CAISO charges based on Balancing Authority Area Gross Load (i.e., gross MWh), the CAISO must clarify whether gross MWh Load data should be gathered for that charge as well, and if not, why not. That is, the “gross MWh Load” concept is not new for the CAISO.  ”Balancing Authority Area Gross Load” has been used for various charge types and would include the Load of co-located Large Load customers served by their co-located generator.

The CAISO accurately states that it has not proposed “to assess transmission access charges based on gross load figures that included load served onsite by its own behind-the-meter generation.”[1] As to the CAISO’s behind-the-meter generation discussion, PG&E wants to reinforce that the CAISO is describing its charges to Eligible Customers. Loads with behind-the-meter generation continue to have retail accounts with Eligible Customers if they want to be served when their generator is off-line. Certain retail accounts are required by the CPUC (and perhaps Local Regulatory Authorities) to take Standby Service. PG&E’s TO Tariff includes Standby Service transmission rates. Just as nothing has changed as to how the TAC is allocated to Gross Load, PG&E understands that, for the IOUs, it remains the CPUC’s role to determine which retail customers must purchase Standby Service.

 


[1] ELL Proposal at 62.

4. Please provide your organization’s comments on section D. Extending New Transmission Services to Eligible Customers Taking Service on Behalf of Flexible Large Loads.

PG&E strongly supports the CAISO proposal to create a new interim flexible interconnection service option that will enable Large Loads to limit their energy withdrawals or injections until their network upgrades are placed into service. The CAISO notes that “PTOs will play a key role in defining and implementing this interconnection service offering.”[1] PG&E agrees that, as to the interconnection process for the Eligible Customer, the PTO will play a large role, but the CAISO again needs to distinguish the physical connection process from operations, particularly as a PTO may not be the Eligible Customer for a Large Load seeking the service in question.

PG&E agrees that it is the PTO’s role to identify facilities, communications equipment, remedial action scheme (RAS), system protecting equipment, etc. to ensure that a retail customer taking Flexible Interim Large Load Interconnection (“FILLI”)[2] service can abide by operating and curtailment instructions, whether transmitted through the Eligible Customer, the PTO, a Scheduling Coordinator, or the CAISO. However, further detail is necessary to ensure that roles are clearly delineated for what entity is responsible for directing curtailment and under what conditions.

The CAISO seems to be contemplating, however, that post-construction, an agreement between a PTO and a Large Load would address operations.[3] The Eligible Customer (if different than the PTO) also must be a party to this agreement. The CAISO has recognized Scheduling Coordinators will also play a vital communications role and this role should not be understated, as it is the Scheduling Coordinator that must abide by operational and curtailment instructions in many cases.

PG&E thus supports the CAISO proposal for convening working groups with the PTOs and Large Load customers, but these working groups must also include Eligible Customers and Scheduling Coordinators to maximize consistency and clarify roles and responsibilities.[4] However, PG&E is concerned that the draft CAISO Tariff language (Section 25.7) suggests that all such decisions regarding these matters already have been made.

PG&E agrees with the CAISO’s decision not to advance the permanent flexible interconnection offering, FLIP, at this time.

PG&E supports the CAISO decision not to create new forms of transmission services,[5] because a Scheduling Coordinator for a load serving entity has the flexibility to decide when it needs to withdraw power for a Large Load. The consumption patterns of flexible loads are already accounted for in load forecasts. That said, FILLI is a non-firm service in the sense that the service remains curtailable under all operating conditions, unless a FILLI Service Agreement provides for customer-specific limitations on those curtailment rights. NERC defines Firm Transmission Service as “[t]he highest quality (priority) service offered to customers under a filed rate schedule that anticipates no planned interruption.” NERC defines Non-Firm Transmission service as “[t]ransmission service that is reserved on an as-available basis and is subject to curtailment or interruption.” These concepts apply, albeit in the interconnection context, given that the interconnection service for load subsumes transmission service, as discussed above. That is, “FILLI Large Load,” will be curtailed first, to the extent possible, , and an unexpected event warrants curtailment. Any agreement with a Large Load and its Eligible Customer (and any other parties) must be clear with regard to this policy.

 


[1] LLE Proposal at 66.

[2] Although the CAISO refers to this service as “Flexible Interim Load Interconnection (FILI),” for the reasons noted in earlier comments, PG&E prefers to refer to FILLI to limit the applicability to the Large Load customers at issue in the OSC.

[3] LLE Proposal at 67.

[4] LLE Proposal at 68.

[5] LLE Proposal at 67.

5. Please provide your organization’s comments on section E. Interconnection Customers Serving Electrically Proximate Large Load and Co-Located Load.

The CAISO proposes to consider provisions for (generator) Interconnection Customers to serve electrically proximate Large Loads in a future stakeholder initiative. PG&E generally supports the CAISO’s positions on Electrically Proximate Large Load. PG&E is concerned that all stakeholders have a common understanding that electrically proximate load, by definition, is not the same as co-located load. Electrically Proximate Large Load is delivered energy over wires owned by a PTO, not generator-owned wires. Given this fact, Electrically Proximate Large Load is Gross Load for purposes of the Eligible Customer’s TAC bill. PG&E would not support the CAISO offering a “proximity discount” to Eligible Customers by altering the Gross Load concept (i.e., proximate Gross Load and non-proximate Gross Load).

6. Please provide any additional comments on the draft final proposal or October 1 meeting discussion.

The October 1 meeting involved a discussion about Eligible Customers and the topics of: 1) who can sell energy directly to Large Loads in IOU service areas; and 2) who can submit an application for PTOs’ Large Load application provisions. The California Legislature and CPUC determine who can sell energy directly to Large Loads; the CPUC adopts regulations for those authorized to sell power to retail loads, and the types of regulation to which such load-serving entities (“LSEs”) are subject varies. In contrast, the entities who can submit applications for service under the TO Tariffs for Large Loads are the MSS or UDC taking transmission service on behalf of such Large Loads. In the IOU setting, these latter entities (the Eligible Customers) do not include Direct Access providers and Community Choice Aggregators. The three CPUC-regulated IOUs in the CAISO BAA are all UDCs, and they purchase transmission service from CAISO for all Gross Load in their service areas. In the IOU context, the OSC could be accurately edited to replace the words “Eligible Customers taking transmission service on behalf of large loads” with “UDCs.”

Power Applications and Research Systems, Inc.
Submitted 10/06/2026, 11:40 am

Contact

Eddie Dehdashti (contact@parsenergy.com)

1.   Please provide your organization’s comments on section A. Transmission Service to eligible customers on Behalf of Large Loads.
a. Please provide comments on the definition of large loads. b. Please provide comments on the large load application process and interconnection study procedures. c. Please provide comments on the large load operational requirements. d. Please provide your comments on the large load service agreements. e. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

PARS Energy appreciates the opportunity to provide comments on large loads draft proposal. Overall the draft proposal is well-written and concise and addresses the main issues on hand.

a. Definition of Large Load- PARS Energy suggests a more precise definition of what is considered to be large load. 50 MWs peak in practice means that large loads can be considerably less than 50 MWs.  See diagram below:

 image(116).png

PARS Energy suggests a definition such as say 50 MWs with say +/- 20 % allowable maximum deviations. To assess the impacts, the interconnection process will then study loads between 40-60 MWs. In addition, this variation can then be used to schedule re-training of AI loads. 

As shown in the slide above for data centers, maximum ramp rates also needs to be defined. Data Center ramp rated variations are very fast and  typical ancillary services such as regulation which respond iin miutes track a load which responds betwen 10-90% in seconds. 

b. Application process. The data center application process description is clearly states that both CAISO and the utilities will be involved in the studies. However, it is not clear whether two separate interconnection requests will be needed or the CAISO and which entity will be the point of contact. Also, will CAISO have a separate Queue for large loads. What about a Heat Map for the large loads and data centers.

2. Please provide your organization’s comments on section B. Cost Shifting Among Transmission Customers.
a. Please provide comments on roles and responsibilities to prevent cost shifting. b. Please provide comments on data transparency. c. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

a.  Roles and responsibilities to prevent cost shifting-. There is a national concern over shifting data center costs to other customer groups. PARS Energy supports a separate accounting system for large loads and data centers and appreciates CAISO's plans to track and assign system reinforcement costs and added operational costs to large loads. What is not clear is how these costs can be allocated  among different large loads and how CAISO plans to define transmission zones. 

b. Data transparency- PARS Energy supports transparency of data for all large loads and suggests that an independent auditor examines all incurred costs in both interconnection and operation to ensure allocation follows the cost-causation principles.

3. Please provide your organization’s comments on section C. Co-Location Arrangements and Load with Behind-the-Meter Generation.
a. Please provide comments on terminology. b. Please provide comments on serving co-located loads. c. Please provide comments on cost allocation for co-located loads. d. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

a. Comments on terminology. PARS Energy suggests that CAISO futher define the co-located data centers by configuration. All data centers do not all have the same configuration.Table below show a few examples:

image(117).png.  

It is suggested that CAISO recognize and clearly define each configuration and how the interconnection process will treat each configuration.

b. Serving co-located loads- PARS Energy suggests that CAISO prioritize the interconnection of co-located loads with configurations that have minimal impacts on the grid reliability. Serving the native load should always have precedance over large loads.

c. Cost allocation for co-located loads- It is suggested that cost allocation be defined per configuration and based on cost-causation principles.

4. Please provide your organization’s comments on section D. Extending New Transmission Services to Eligible Customers Taking Service on Behalf of Flexible Large Loads.

PARS Energy supports the concept. However, the challenges will be in the implementation and montoring of the provider and the flexible load. Would like to see this concept develop with more details.  

5. Please provide your organization’s comments on section E. Interconnection Customers Serving Electrically Proximate Large Load and Co-Located Load.

Interconnection Customers Serving Electrically Proximate Large Load and Co-Located Load.PARS Energy in general supports section 5. However, It is suggested that CAISO clearly define the meaning of proximate. Is it physical proximity, electrical proximity or a combination of both? Is it within a CAISO defined zone or new zones to be defined. PARS Energy feels this concept will have a higher chance of implementation in the Merchant zones where deliverability is not an issue.

6. Please provide any additional comments on the draft final proposal or October 1 meeting discussion.

General Comments:

1.  Computational Load Definition- PARS Energy suggest that CAISO separate the meanings of large loads from computational AI loads. Not every large load is a data center or computational load.

 2. Permitting- Public opposition is becoming a formidable force in permitting data centers. Data center impacts such as water usage, audible noise, vibrations etc. should not be under estimated. PARS Energy suggest that large developers of computational data centers (hyper scalers) be required to provide proof from their County that their proposed plant will not face unsurmountable barriers in permitting. Studying the interconnection of data centers that may not be permitted is a complete waste of the CAISO and the developer resources. 

3. LLTRWG - PARS Energy suggests that CAISO's Large Load Technical Requirements Working Group (LLTRWG) allow market participants to be included in in the development of standard for large loads and data centers. 

 

Public Advocates Office at the California Public Utilities Commission
Submitted 10/15/2026, 04:38 pm

Submitted on behalf of
Public Advocates Office at the California Public Utilities Commission

Contact

Sanya (sanya.kwatra@cpuc.ca.gov)

1.   Please provide your organization’s comments on section A. Transmission Service to eligible customers on Behalf of Large Loads.
a. Please provide comments on the definition of large loads. b. Please provide comments on the large load application process and interconnection study procedures. c. Please provide comments on the large load operational requirements. d. Please provide your comments on the large load service agreements. e. Please provide any other comments on this topic.
    1. Please provide comments on the definition of large loads.

CAISO should remove or reduce the Megawatt (MW) threshold from the definition of large loads.

In response to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) concern[1] that the California Independent System Operator (CAISO) does not define large loads, CAISO suggests the definition of “[a]n End User located at a single site whose Point(s) of Interconnection is/are to the CAISO-controlled Grid, and that has a peak load of 50 MW or greater.”[2]  CAISO states that it removed FERC’s suggestion to include a voltage condition of 69 kV from its proposed definition because the interconnection at the “CAISO Controlled Grid” effectively describes that the load is transmission-connected.[3]  Similarly, interconnecting to the CAISO Controlled Grid eliminates the need for a MW size threshold because customers interconnecting to the transmission system are large enough to pose unique challenges to the interconnected system.    Therefore, a MW size threshold is unnecessary to define a large load and should be excluded from the definition.  Large loads should be simply defined as “an End User located at a single site whose Point(s) of Interconnection is/are to the CAISO-controlled grid.”

If CAISO continues to use a MW threshold in its large-load definition, it should be reduced from 50 MW to 20 MW.  PG&E submitted multiple large loads to the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) and CAISO that would not fall under CAISO’s large-load definition because their requested loads, in some cases, are narrowly below the 50 MW cutoff (e.g., 49 MW).[4]  The large loads under 50 MW contribute to over $1 billion in interconnection and capacity upgrade costs.[5]  These loads are clearly large enough to impact transmission planning and create additional network upgrade costs but would not fall under CAISO’s proposed definition for large loads.  If CAISO must include a MW limit in its definition of large loads to address FERC’s concern, then CAISO should lower the MW threshold to 20 MW to capture most large loads that are creating network upgrade costs.

    1. Please provide comments on the large load application process and interconnection study procedures.

CAISO should require PTOs to demonstrate large loads’ completion of readiness requirements to avoid approving network upgrades for speculative large loads. 

To deter speculative load, CAISO should refrain from studying and approving network upgrades for large loads until the large load completes readiness requirements.  Readiness requirements include proof of site control, executed interconnection agreements, procurement of long-lead-time materials, and financial commitments.[6]  In response to FERC’s identification that CAISO’s tariff fails to “deter speculative or duplicative requests for transmission service,”[7] CAISO proposed that the responsibility to deter and account for speculation is more appropriately held by the Participating Transmission Operators (PTO) and the California Energy Commission (CEC).[8]  CAISO should not defer responsibility onto the PTOs to account for speculative large loads.  Instead, CAISO should seek confirmation from the PTOs that projects demonstrated completion of readiness requirements prior to CAISO studying associated network upgrades.[9]    CAISO’s Large Load Proposal specifies that CAISO will hold monthly meetings with its PTOs.  CAISO should require proof of readiness requirements in these meetings.  As supported by the FERC Order, Regional Transmission Operators (RTO) and Independent System Operators (ISO) can and should take a meaningful role in avoiding the inclusion of network upgrades for speculative large loads by only approving upgrades for large loads that complete readiness requirements.

CAISO should refrain from using its concurrence process for approving costly network upgrades for large-load interconnection projects.

CAISO’s continued reliance on the concurrence process allows speculative large loads to deviate from the Transmission Planning Process’s (TPP) more formalized demand forecast and CPUC resource portfolios.[10]  The concurrence process allows for a high degree of uncertainty that is unsuitable for approval of costly transmission projects for large-load customers.  In the 2025-2026 Transmission Plan, CAISO concurred with nearly $2 billion in network upgrades to interconnect 11 large loads.[11]  In the 2026-2027 Transmission Planning Process, PG&E proposed over $2.5 billion in network upgrades for CAISO concurrence to interconnect 13 large loads.[12]  CAISO should refrain from using its concurrence process for approving transmission projects for large-load interconnections.  Instead, CAISO should assess the impact of large loads on the transmission system through a high large-load growth sensitivity scenario.  CAISO should study projects proposed by PTOs as an additional sensitivity case in that year’s TPP reliability modeling scenarios or hold approval until the load can be sufficiently studied in a future TPP study year.  CAISO’s TPP process is an annual process, so the transmission upgrades associated with large loads that have not met the completion of readiness requirements will not be impacted if they need to be addressed in the following year’s TPP cycle.  This will provide greater transparency to stakeholders regarding the study process for network upgrades driven by large loads.  CAISO should not approve network upgrades until the large -load growth is sufficiently studied through an additional sensitivity scenario.

CAISO justifies its review and concurrence process by citing FERC’s direction for PTOs to study large loads on a 60–90-day timeline.[13]  However, CAISO conflates FERC’s requirement to study with CAISO’s plan to “study and approve” these large loads.[14]  There is no FERC requirement that CAISO approve large loads and their network upgrades on such an accelerated schedule.  CAISO proposes to implement a new monthly process to review out-of-cycle transmission additions or upgrades to accommodate large loads on a monthly basis “to fit within the 60–90-day process for PTO load interconnection studies.”[15]  FERC’s direction is to ensure the large load receives a report from PTOs that details the results of studies and necessary network upgrades.[16]  The PTOs can study the large load and create a report without having CAISO provide concurrence or approval for network upgrades.  If CAISO needs to review the network upgrades to accommodate large loads, it can do so without approving the projects to be built.[17]  CAISO does not need to use the concurrence process or implement a monthly review process for large loads to comply with FERC’s direction to study large loads on a 60–90-day timeline.    


[1] FERC, Order Instituting Proceeding Under Section 206 of the Federal Power Act (FERC Order), June 18, 2026, ¶ 48. (“We then consider whether CAISO’s Tariff and/or the TO Tariffs are unjust and unreasonable without certain elements. First, we consider whether CAISO’s Tariff and/or the TO Tariffs lack sufficiently clear and consistent tariff provisions establishing an appropriate definition of large load, as a separate category of load.”)

[2] CAISO, Large Load Enhancements Draft Final Proposal (Large Load Proposal), September 24, 2026, at 16-17.

[3] Large Load Proposal at 13-17.

[4] See Advice Letter (AL) 7667-E and AL 7853-E.  CAISO, 2025-2026 Transmission Plan, May 19, 2026 (2025-2026 Transmission Plan), at 92-94.  PG&E, PG&E’s 2026 Request Window Proposals, September 24, 2026 (PG&E 2026 Request Window Proposals), at slide 98.

[5] 2025-2026 Transmission Plan at 92-94; PG&E 2026 Request Window Proposals at 98-108.

[6] FERC, Order Instituting Proceeding Under Section 206 of the Federal Power Act (FERC Order), June 18, 2026, ¶ 55.

[7] FERC Order ¶ 49.

[8] Large Load Proposal at 28-29.

[9] Large Load Proposal at 28.

[10] Large Load Proposal at 16.

[11] CAISO, 2025-2026 Transmission Plan, May 19, 2026, at 92-94.  

[12] PG&E, PG&E’s 2026 Request Window Proposals, September 24, 2026 (PG&E 2026 Request Presentation), at slides 87-108, available at https://stakeholdercenter.caiso.com/InitiativeDocuments/Presentation-PGandE-2026-2027-Transmission-Planning-Process-Sep-24-2026.pdf. 

[13] Large Load Proposal at 28.

[14] Large Load Proposal at 18.  Emphasis added.

[15] Large Load Proposal at 28.

[16] FERC Order 62. (“Finally, based on the record, it appears reasonable that such study processes, culminating in a report to the Eligible Customer with the results of the studies, including any Direct Assignment Facilities and network upgrades necessary to accommodate the transmission service request as well as a non-binding good-faith estimate of the cost and the time to construct such facilities, should take no more than 60-90 days calendar days to complete.”)

[17] Utilities treat CAISO concurrence the same as CAISO approval. Cal Advocates, Comments on Draft 2025-2026 Transmission Plan, April 29, 2026, available at https://stakeholdercenter.caiso.com/Comments/AllComments/e00ad194-05b0-4a66-887a-9c2d2aecc53d#org-e14f7e93-d028-40ca-83dc-c0ce7c288b2c (citing Reporter’s Transcript, Evidentiary Hearing, A.24-11-007, April 15, 2026 at 523, lines 9-10).

2. Please provide your organization’s comments on section B. Cost Shifting Among Transmission Customers.
a. Please provide comments on roles and responsibilities to prevent cost shifting. b. Please provide comments on data transparency. c. Please provide any other comments on this topic.
  1. Please provide comments on roles and responsibilities to prevent cost shifting.

CAISO should not rely exclusively on the PTOs to prevent cost shifting.

The FERC Order requires CAISO to address any cost-shifting risk caused by the process of evaluating the transmission facilities needed to serve large loads.[1]  Specifically, FERC is concerned that “cost shifting may occur through the recovery of the [PTOs’] transmission revenue requirement through the Transmission Access Charge (TAC).”[2]  CAISO does not address FERC’s requirement and instead suggests that the PTOs should be responsible to develop cost allocation proposals to protect against cost-shifting.[3]  CAISO also urges the PTOs to exclude from the revenue requirement contributions from large loads associated with network upgrade costs directly attributed to them.[4]  It is not reasonable for CAISO to assume that PTOs will develop sufficient proposals and exclude the appropriate costs from the revenue requirement.  Additionally, if the PTOs refund payments from large loads, the costs will be incorporated into the PTOs’ revenue requirements and be paid for by all TAC ratepayers.  To address FERC’s concern regarding cost-shifting, CAISO should assess which high-voltage transmission costs are associated with large loads and specify that those costs should not be allowed to be passed on to TAC ratepayers.  CAISO should not rely on the current TAC process and hypothetical PTO proposals to respond to the FERC Order without first ensuring it addressed any cost-shifting risk caused by the process of evaluating large-load transmission facilities.

  1. Please provide comments on data transparency.

CAISO’s transparency requirements should include information identifying the portions of upgrades attributable to large-load customer types (e.g., electric vehicle charging and data centers) and general load growth.

The FERC Order states that transparency measures related to network upgrades for large loads appear necessary for public utility commissions and other state regulators “to understand which transmission costs are caused by which transmission customers” and to “protect residential and small commercial customers.”[5]  CAISO proposes to clarify the network upgrades in the TPP that were needed to accommodate large-load interconnections and general load growth.[6]  CAISO also proposes to post the aggregate amounts of large-load additions, the planned network upgrades to accommodate large loads, and cost estimates of the network upgrades.[7]  CAISO should include network upgrades solely driven by large loads and network upgrades that address large-load interconnections and general load growth in its postings. 

CAISO’s proposal is not sufficient to address the FERC Order, because it does not clarify the full cost impact of large loads on the grid.  It is important for the TPP to specify which network upgrades are needed to accommodate large-load interconnections.  In addition, CAISO should specify the portion of each network upgrade attributable to large-load additions.[8]  This information provides greater transparency into large-load cost causation and allow state regulators to evaluate whether associated costs are appropriately allocated rather than disproportionately borne by existing ratepayers.  At a minimum, CAISO should disclose the total load growth associated with large loads in the area of the network upgrade. 

Additionally, FERC finds that the demand growth in the United States is driven “most notably by data centers.”[9]  Specifically, “the size and speed with which data centers can be connected to the grid present unique challenges for demand forecasting and system planning.”[10]  CAISO should clarify which large-load customer types are driving which network upgrades to ensure cost-shifting is not occurring between large-load customer types.  To accomplish this, CAISO needs to distinguish between the types of large loads in its postings of aggregated large-load additions.  Differentiating the loads will provide transparency into the different demand characteristics driving transmission planning needs and facilitate evaluation of cost causation and potential cost shifting.


[1] FERC Order ¶ 67, 83.

[2] FERC Order ¶ 83.

[3] Large Load Proposal at 44.

[4] Large Load Proposal at 44.

[5] FERC Order at ¶ 68.

[6] Large Load Proposal at 48.

[7] Large Load Proposal at 48.

[8] FERC Order at ¶ 68 (FERC directs CAISO to “give public utility commissions and other state regulators the information necessary to allow them to understand which transmission costs are caused by which transmission customers, so that they can sub-allocate these costs to the appropriate retail customers.”) (italics added).

[9] FERC Order at ¶ 6.

[10] FERC Order at ¶ 6.

3. Please provide your organization’s comments on section C. Co-Location Arrangements and Load with Behind-the-Meter Generation.
a. Please provide comments on terminology. b. Please provide comments on serving co-located loads. c. Please provide comments on cost allocation for co-located loads. d. Please provide any other comments on this topic.
4. Please provide your organization’s comments on section D. Extending New Transmission Services to Eligible Customers Taking Service on Behalf of Flexible Large Loads.

CAISO should demonstrate how flexible large-load interconnection service will provide measurable cost savings to existing ratepayers.

FERC recognized that flexible large loads may reduce or avoid the need for network upgrades when their operational characteristics are incorporated into transmission planning.[1]  However, CAISO's proposed Flexible Interim Load Interconnection (FILI) service would allow large loads to interconnect before the required network upgrades are completed, after which customers would transition to firm service.[2], [3]  If the same network upgrades must ultimately be constructed, CAISO should clarify whether and how FILI would provide measurable cost savings to existing ratepayers.  Specifically, CAISO should: (1) identify whether FILI would reduce, defer, or avoid transmission investments, and (2) quantify the anticipated ratepayer benefits, rather than treating accelerated large-load interconnection as a ratepayer benefit in itself.

CAISO should clarify how FILI will be implemented in transmission planning and ensure that costs associated with flexible service are assigned to the large-load customer.

CAISO should clarify how FILI arrangements will be incorporated into PTO agreements, utility advice letters, and the TPP, including how binding and enforceable requirements for large-load customers to curtail consumption under specified system conditions will be reflected in transmission studies and evaluated as an alternative to network upgrades.  CAISO should also establish transparent cost responsibility requirements for FILI-related studies, protection and control equipment, communications, and other operational requirements to ensure that these costs are borne by the large-load customers necessitating them rather than by existing ratepayers.  FERC has identified the need for greater cost transparency and protections against cost shifting associated with large-load interconnections.[4]

CAISO should establish a timeline for developing permanent flexible large-load interconnection service.

CAISO proposes to advance FILI while deferring its Flexible Load Interconnection Permanent (FLIP) offering to a future stakeholder initiative.[5]  Unlike FILI, a permanent flexible service offering could allow large loads to limit transmission usage on an ongoing basis, potentially avoiding network upgrades altogether.  FERC specifically raised concerns regarding the availability of interim and permanent transmission service options for flexible large loads.[6] CAISO should establish a timeline for developing FLIP or a comparable permanent offering and clarify how permanent flexibility would be evaluated in the TPP as an alternative to transmission investments.


[1] FERC, Order Instituting Proceeding Under Section 206 of the Federal Power Act, 195 FERC ¶ 61,214 (2026) (FERC Order), ¶¶ 59, 103–104.

[2] CAISO, Large Load Enhancements Draft Final Proposal, September 24, 2026 (Large Load Proposal), at 66–67.

[3] Firm service refers to electric service provided without the additional load curtailment restrictions associated with Flexible Interim Load Interconnection (FILI) service, subject to applicable reliability requirements and emergency operating procedures.

[4] FERC Order ¶¶ 65–66, 76–83.

[5] Large Load Proposal at 63–64, 68.

[6] FERC Order ¶ 105.

5. Please provide your organization’s comments on section E. Interconnection Customers Serving Electrically Proximate Large Load and Co-Located Load.
6. Please provide any additional comments on the draft final proposal or October 1 meeting discussion.

CAISO should not pass the responsibility onto the PTOs to address the deficiencies in the CAISO Tariff identified by FERC.

CAISO’s proposal shifts the burden to the PTOs to address the deficiencies identified by FERC, including the development of application and study processes, pro forma agreements, cost allocation proposals, and implementation details related to flexible service.[1]  CAISO should not assume that the PTOs will sufficiently address these deficiencies.  For example, San Diego Gas & Electric Company (SDG&E) argued that CAISO should not indicate all PTOs will add flexible load interconnection service provisions to their tariffs because the FERC Order did not identify deficiencies in the PTO tariffs.[2]  There may be a disconnect between CAISO’s expectations of PTOs and the PTOs plans to update their tariffs.  CAISO should address the deficiencies identified by FERC to the extent that it can in CAISO’s Large Load Proposal by adopting the recommendations provided in these comments.


[1] Large Load Proposal at 20, 25, 64.

[2] SDG&E, Comments on Large Loads Straw Proposal Meeting on 8/19/2026, September 2, 2026, available at https://stakeholdercenter.caiso.com/Comments/AllComments/43a11ec9-fe21-4255-bb1c-336ad3703845#org-2eaaaad4-679d-439c-b5ad-85532deedf1e.

Six Cities
Submitted 10/15/2026, 02:00 pm

Submitted on behalf of
Cities of Anaheim, Azusa, Banning, Colton, Pasadena, and Riverside, California

Contact

Nick Barber (nbarber@thompsoncoburn.com)

1.   Please provide your organization’s comments on section A. Transmission Service to eligible customers on Behalf of Large Loads.
a. Please provide comments on the definition of large loads. b. Please provide comments on the large load application process and interconnection study procedures. c. Please provide comments on the large load operational requirements. d. Please provide your comments on the large load service agreements. e. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

In general, the Six Cities do not oppose the CAISO’s proposal to define Large Loads (for the purposes of its tariff) as an “End User located at a single site whose Point(s) of Interconnection is/are to the CAISO-Controlled Grid, and that has a peak load of 50 MW or greater,” but support the CAISO’s proposal to eventually align this definition with terminology under development by NERC for computational loads. 

In terms of the interconnection study procedures, it is critical that both the interconnection study processes for Large Loads and the CAISO’s Transmission Planning Process use inputs, assumptions, and projections regarding Large Loads that are as accurate as possible and minimize opportunities for inclusion of speculative or uncertain Large Load development.  The Six Cities support continued reliance on the California Energy Commission forecasts for planning purposes and encourage the CAISO to work with the FERC-jurisdictional Participating Transmission Owners (“PTOs”) to ensure that the assumptions being used to enable interconnection and transmission service to Large Loads under the PTO tariffs are based on sound data.  Transmission customers should not bear the costs of stranded or underused transmission facilities resulting from speculative or uncertain Large Loads. 

An important element of the Large Load study process will be evaluation of impacts to neighboring systems.  While addressing affected system impacts due to the interconnection of Large Loads may in part be a function of individual PTO coordination processes under PTO tariffs, the Six Cities request that the CAISO, as part of its concurrence process for the interconnection of Large Loads, require that appropriate coordination with and notice to neighboring systems have taken place.  Neighboring systems should have an adequate opportunity to assess the impacts of Large Load interconnections and require mitigation if appropriate. 

Finally, because key elements of the CAISO’s Draft Final Proposal are contingent on development of corresponding or related provisions of the PTO tariffs, the Six Cities request that the CAISO work with the FERC-jurisdictional CAISO PTOs to provide enhanced transparency regarding their respective tariff development processes.  This could occur through a combination of stakeholder meetings and/or posting of proposed tariff provisions regarding which stakeholders may provide input. 

2. Please provide your organization’s comments on section B. Cost Shifting Among Transmission Customers.
a. Please provide comments on roles and responsibilities to prevent cost shifting. b. Please provide comments on data transparency. c. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

At a high level, the Six Cities support direct assignment of incremental transmission upgrade costs to Large Loads when those costs are caused by those loads and are not otherwise necessary or required but for the interconnection of and service to those loads and/or do not function as networked facilities that are capable of use by or provide benefits to other transmission customers.  The Draft Final Proposal discusses development of pro forma cost recovery mechanisms and an agreement that would be applicable to interconnections involving the FERC-jurisdictional CAISO PTOs.  While this proposal has merit, it is critical that CAISO stakeholders have the opportunity to participate in the development of these items.  The Six Cities therefore reiterate their request that the CAISO work with the jurisdictional PTOs to provide a stakeholder process to develop these parts of their tariffs. 

With respect to the CAISO’s proposal to conduct a future stakeholder processes to align any revised cost allocation policies with the Transmission Owner (“TO”) Tariffs of non-jurisdictional PTOs, the Six Cities request that the CAISO and PTOs coordinate with the Six Cities, which are non-jurisdictional PTOs in the CAISO, in developing applicable policies.  While the Six Cities pledge their cooperation in evaluating conforming revisions to their TO Tariffs to reflect cost recovery policies of general applicability within the CAISO, the Six Cities’ transmission Entitlements are, in certain instances, governed by the terms of agreements with parties that are not CAISO PTOs or the tariffs of non-PTOs (such as the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power).  Considering the unique nature of the Six Cities’ Entitlements will be critical in assessing how any revisions to CAISO policy may be applicable in the context of the Six Cities’ TO Tariffs. 

Finally, the Six Cities generally support the CAISO’s assertions that existing ratemaking mechanisms under the FERC System of Accounts may help to address concerns regarding cost shifting as between TAC areas.  These mechanisms may already be features of PTO tariffs or formula rates, but in the event they are not, the Six Cities request that the CAISO work with the PTOs to ensure such mechanisms are implemented. 

3. Please provide your organization’s comments on section C. Co-Location Arrangements and Load with Behind-the-Meter Generation.
a. Please provide comments on terminology. b. Please provide comments on serving co-located loads. c. Please provide comments on cost allocation for co-located loads. d. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

The Six Cities do not have comments on this element of the CAISO’s proposal at this time.

4. Please provide your organization’s comments on section D. Extending New Transmission Services to Eligible Customers Taking Service on Behalf of Flexible Large Loads.

The Six Cities do not have comments on this element of the CAISO’s proposal at this time.

5. Please provide your organization’s comments on section E. Interconnection Customers Serving Electrically Proximate Large Load and Co-Located Load.

The Six Cities do not have comments on this element of the CAISO’s proposal at this time.

6. Please provide any additional comments on the draft final proposal or October 1 meeting discussion.

The Six Cities have no additional comments at this time.

Southern California Edison
Submitted 10/15/2026, 04:42 pm

Contact

Fernando Cornejo (fernando.cornejo@sce.com)

1.   Please provide your organization’s comments on section A. Transmission Service to eligible customers on Behalf of Large Loads.
a. Please provide comments on the definition of large loads. b. Please provide comments on the large load application process and interconnection study procedures. c. Please provide comments on the large load operational requirements. d. Please provide your comments on the large load service agreements. e. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

SCE generally supports the CAISO’s proposal to define Large Loads as “End User located at a single site whose Point(s) of Interconnection is/are connected to the CAISO Controlled Grid, and that has a peak load of 50 MW or greater.”

In Tariff Section 25.7 Large Load Interconnections and Appendix KK, Section 2.4.4    Large Loads, SCE suggests for clarity adding that Large Loads connect to the CAISO Controlled Grid pursuant to Participating TO tariffs and, as applicable, state law tariffs. As retail customers, Large Load interconnections will continue to be governed by California state law tariffs, in addition to any requirements arising out of the TO Tariffs as a result of the Large Loads’ interconnection to the CAISO-controlled grid.

25.7 Large Load Interconnections; Appendix KK, Section 2.4.4 Large Loads

End Users, including Large Loads, interconnect to the CAISO Controlled Grid pursuant to Participating TO tariffs and, with respect to Large Loads as applicable, state law tariffs.

2. Please provide your organization’s comments on section B. Cost Shifting Among Transmission Customers.
a. Please provide comments on roles and responsibilities to prevent cost shifting. b. Please provide comments on data transparency. c. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

To prevent cost shifting, the CAISO needs to play a much more prominent role in identifying the specific costs and the associated Large Load (LL) responsible for driving network transmission costs.  This is particularly important for costs in the High Voltage TAC since these costs are socialized among all transmission customers. Simply deferring the TOs to handle this without CAISO engagement is inconsistent with and does not satisfy the requirements of the OSC.

The current CAISO proposal to identify costs for LL with executed interconnection agreements, while directionally helpful, is not sufficient. Many high voltage network upgrade costs will be driven by TPP load assumptions that will not identify the specific LL customers and instead will rely on generic LL assumptions. Thus, the CAISO proposal will not provide the information necessary to identify the costs in order to prevent cost shifting. 

Before the PTOs can address cost-shifting, the CAISO must take more dispositive role in identifying network transmission costs, especially network transmission developed as part of the TPP, attributed to LL.   There are certain network costs which the TOs identify, and the CAISO then reviews to concur (“concurrence costs”). Some of these types of costs may have sufficient transparency through this concurrence process for the PTO to identify independently.  However, cost driven elsewhere in the TPP that are not directly related to a PTO’s study process associated with a specific LL (“non-concurrence” network upgrade costs) require active CAISO identification. In fact, the CAISO is the only entity in the position to study these costs and determine the amount attributable to a specific LL.

Thus, the CAISO should 1) commit to clearly identify all network transmission cost attributable to both specific LL (e.g., LL with a signed interconnection) and more generic TPP “non-concurrence” costs expected to ultimately serve LL, and 2) the CAISO should provide these costs to the PTOs for use in the PTO’s cost-shifting protection mechanisms. 

SCE acknowledges that these generic “non-concurrence” network costs are not immediately transparent and will require some form of study to identify and track. However, since identification of these costs is absolutely necessary to address potential cost-shifting among CAISO transmission customers, the CAISO is obligated to develop a method to identify them.  Rather than include the details of such a process in the tariff at this time, SCE instead recommends the CAISO commit to a stakeholder process to develop a methodology to identify these costs (that the CAISO will then provide to the PTOs).  In addition to a stakeholder process to develop, this methodology will likely require additional FERC approval before implementation.   

With that in mind, the CAISO should revise their proposed tariff language as follows:

24.19.1                        Large Load Data

The CAISO will provide all impacted PTOs these attributable costs for use in the PTO’s cost-shifting mitigation methodologies and inclusion in any applicable cost-shifting mitigation agreements.  The Transmission Plan will include data specifically related to proposed Large Loads as identified by the PTOs, as well as any other Large Load forecasts included in the Transmission Plan, including:

  1. Aggregate amounts of proposed Large Load additions on the CAISO Controlled Grid by Transmission Zone; and
  2. Planned Network Upgrades and their estimated costs needed to accommodate Large Loads with executed interconnection agreements, identified by type of equipment and Network Upgrade.  Such data will include attributable costs for Planned Network Upgrades associated with each specific Large Load that forms the basis of the Transmission Plan that have not been specifically identified via an executed agreement or other method.

In these proposed changes, SCE has clarified that the CAISO will need to identify the attributable costs prior to the LL signing any applicable agreements, which will themselves need to describe such costs.  Additionally, SCE is not contemplating the end-user LL signing an “interconnection agreement” as such under its TO Tariff, so SCE suggests that the term “interconnection agreement” be revised or defined in such a way that it includes the types of pro forma agreement(s) that the CAISO is contemplating.  For instance, SCE is currently planning to create a pro forma Large Load Transmission Security and Reliability Agreement rather than an Interconnection Agreement.

On a separate item, the CAISO must better address cost-shifting by certain CAISO participants that are not ordered to comply with the OSC.  The CAISO’s current approach to have PTOs address cost-shifting solely in their PTO tariffs is inadequate.  Importantly, and as acknowledged in the CAISO draft final proposal, this approach will not address cost-shifts from LL interconnecting to non-FERC jurisdictional municipal PTOs (e.g. Six Cities), or PTOs who interconnect municipals operating as Metered Subsystems (MSS) who have LL connected to non-CAISO facilities (e.g. Silicon Valley Power in PG&E’s service territory).  Such entities can create CAISO transmission costs that, unless addressed, could shift costs to other CAISO transmission customers. Moreover, state law currently does not address cost-shifting from all of these LL entities so additional CAISO action is required.

In its final proposal, to ensure equal treatment to LL interconnecting to differently situated PTOs, CAISO should be more explicit and certain about committing to a process that ensures these entities have like-treatment for cost-shifting as the FERC jurisdictional PTOs.  The CAISO has a right, as a condition for participation in the CAISO, to ensure its tariff results in non-discriminatory treatment, even for entities that are not required to make a compliance filing in this OSC.  The CAISO should also communicate this commitment to FERC in its November compliance filing.

Absent such a review and completion of its tariff, the CAISO tariff will be unjust and unreasonable, and unduly discriminatory.  Without addressing this issue, the CAISO would create a discriminatory set of rules for certain participants, and in turn this could lead to LL “forum shopping” and ultimately creating unjust and unreasonable cost-shifts to other CAISO transmission customers.  

3. Please provide your organization’s comments on section C. Co-Location Arrangements and Load with Behind-the-Meter Generation.
a. Please provide comments on terminology. b. Please provide comments on serving co-located loads. c. Please provide comments on cost allocation for co-located loads. d. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

As previously indicated in comments on the CAISO’s LL straw proposal, SCE generally supports the CAISO’s proposal which would require generation facilities injecting energy into the CAISO Controlled Grid to go through the CAISO’s generator interconnection process.  Also, SCE proposed the CAISO Tariff should not allow necessary short circuity duty studies to be bypassed to ensure that short circuity duty impacts of co-located generation are evaluated, even if the generator is not injecting energy into the CAISO Controlled Grid. SCE appreciates the CAISO’s clarification in its draft final proposal regarding the study (or restudy) request procedure if the owner of a co-located generator proposes to change from not exporting to the CAISO Controlled Grid to exporting to the CAISO Controlled Grid. In this regard, SCE supports the CAISO proposal to allow Interconnection Customers to remove co-located loads from an Interconnection Request in the study process if that removal does not increase the requested Interconnection Service level.  The CAISO would evaluate whether the requested change is a Material Modification in determining whether it can accommodate the request as is or whether that project would have to re-enter the queue. SCE encourages CAISO to clarify that co-located generation should also submit to the CAISO when either the generation is reasonably anticipated to trigger transmission upgrades or in cases where the PTO is unable to determine the impact of the generation on the transmission system (i.e. electrical dependence on an existing queue).

4. Please provide your organization’s comments on section D. Extending New Transmission Services to Eligible Customers Taking Service on Behalf of Flexible Large Loads.

The CAISO tariff no longer contemplates a permanent form of flexible transmission service/interconnection (previously labeled as “FLIP”).   While SCE understands that implementing a permanent type of service will require additional coordination and issue resolution, SCE continues to believe exploring permanent flexibility holds promise and this technical and policy discussion should commence as soon as practical.  SCE recommends that the CAISO, as part of its proposal and transmittal to FERC, commit to a near-term date and a formal stakeholder process to continuing this design discussion.   The CAISO should commit to a schedule that begins early next year with a goal of reaching a policy proposal and associated tariff changes before the end of 2027.

5. Please provide your organization’s comments on section E. Interconnection Customers Serving Electrically Proximate Large Load and Co-Located Load.

SCE supports the CAISO’s proposal to not pursue permitting interconnection customers to serve electrically “proximate” large loads.

6. Please provide any additional comments on the draft final proposal or October 1 meeting discussion.

SCE currently has no additional comments.

State Water Contractors
Submitted 10/15/2026, 03:21 pm

Contact

Jonathan Young (jyoung@swc.org)

1.   Please provide your organization’s comments on section A. Transmission Service to eligible customers on Behalf of Large Loads.
a. Please provide comments on the definition of large loads. b. Please provide comments on the large load application process and interconnection study procedures. c. Please provide comments on the large load operational requirements. d. Please provide your comments on the large load service agreements. e. Please provide any other comments on this topic.
2. Please provide your organization’s comments on section B. Cost Shifting Among Transmission Customers.
a. Please provide comments on roles and responsibilities to prevent cost shifting. b. Please provide comments on data transparency. c. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

SWC supports the CAISO's proposal to increase transparency by making cost data available on the CAISO website in a searchable format. SWC also supports CAISO publicly posting planned network upgrades, aggregate amounts of proposed large load additions in the CAISO operating area and in each transmission pricing zone, and cost estiamtes for each planned network upgrade identified as needed for large loads.

We believe these transparency measures will result in better accounting of costs for all stakeholders. 

3. Please provide your organization’s comments on section C. Co-Location Arrangements and Load with Behind-the-Meter Generation.
a. Please provide comments on terminology. b. Please provide comments on serving co-located loads. c. Please provide comments on cost allocation for co-located loads. d. Please provide any other comments on this topic.
4. Please provide your organization’s comments on section D. Extending New Transmission Services to Eligible Customers Taking Service on Behalf of Flexible Large Loads.
5. Please provide your organization’s comments on section E. Interconnection Customers Serving Electrically Proximate Large Load and Co-Located Load.
6. Please provide any additional comments on the draft final proposal or October 1 meeting discussion.

SWC believes the CAISO misunderstands the position SWC has taken in suggesting enhancements to the Transmission Access Charge structure. The current volumetric structure is punitive to large, flexible loads and allows entities to lean on the CAISO transmission network when the grid is strained. Since the CAISO transmission network is built to respond to peak demand during grid stressing conditions, that results in a shift of costs to users such as the State Water Project and by extension, its customers. 

Re-aligning the TAC structure to recognize multiple constrained hours sends market signals to large users on the wholesale and retail levels to curb or shift usage. It would also recognize that over time, generation, and load will shift in the CAISO market to different hours and seasons. 

SunZia Transmission LLC
Submitted 10/15/2026, 01:27 pm

Submitted on behalf of
SunZia Transmission LLC

Contact

Robert Daileader (rdaileader@nixonpeabody.com)

1.   Please provide your organization’s comments on section A. Transmission Service to eligible customers on Behalf of Large Loads.
a. Please provide comments on the definition of large loads. b. Please provide comments on the large load application process and interconnection study procedures. c. Please provide comments on the large load operational requirements. d. Please provide your comments on the large load service agreements. e. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

No further comments.

2. Please provide your organization’s comments on section B. Cost Shifting Among Transmission Customers.
a. Please provide comments on roles and responsibilities to prevent cost shifting. b. Please provide comments on data transparency. c. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

No further comments.

3. Please provide your organization’s comments on section C. Co-Location Arrangements and Load with Behind-the-Meter Generation.
a. Please provide comments on terminology. b. Please provide comments on serving co-located loads. c. Please provide comments on cost allocation for co-located loads. d. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

No further comments.

4. Please provide your organization’s comments on section D. Extending New Transmission Services to Eligible Customers Taking Service on Behalf of Flexible Large Loads.

No further comments.

5. Please provide your organization’s comments on section E. Interconnection Customers Serving Electrically Proximate Large Load and Co-Located Load.

SunZia Transmission respectfully urges CAISO to reconsider its decision not to address in its proposed tariff changes the issue of facilitating the interconnection of electrically proximate load and generation to the transmission grid.  While CAISO has yet to address an interconnection request involving proximate generation and load, it seems clear that this is a timing issue rather than an indication that such requests are unlikely to appear in the near future.  As discussed in the comments of NextEra Energy Resources and the Solar Energy Industries Association to the CAISO Straw Proposal, the Southwest Power Pool’s recent approval and implementation of its High Impact Large Load Generation Assessment and the Midcontinent Independent System Operator’s proposed Large Load Resource Study process demonstrate that other RTOs/ISOs are proactively preparing to be able to efficiently study and process proximate generation/load interconnection applications.  While there may be State regulatory issues that need to be addressed to deal with the interconnection customer seeking to provide service to the large load, there is no reason to believe at this time that those issues cannot be addressed in such a way as to allow proximate generation/load combinations to move forward in the interconnection process.  This is particularly true for unique HVDC transmission lines such as SunZia Transmission, where the next closest substation is 550 miles away, inside the jurisdiction of a neighboring State.  While SunZia Transmission remains fully supportive of CAISO’s proposed response to the Commission’s Order to Show Cause in Docket No. EL26-71-000, we believe that the CAISO’s and SunZia Transmission’s respective responses may be strengthened by accommodating unique opportunities to support proximate generation/load interconnection issues in its November 16 tariff filing.

6. Please provide any additional comments on the draft final proposal or October 1 meeting discussion.

No further comments.

Voltus, Inc.
Submitted 10/15/2026, 03:21 pm

Contact

Jared Satrom (jsatrom@voltus.co)

1.   Please provide your organization’s comments on section A. Transmission Service to eligible customers on Behalf of Large Loads.
a. Please provide comments on the definition of large loads. b. Please provide comments on the large load application process and interconnection study procedures. c. Please provide comments on the large load operational requirements. d. Please provide your comments on the large load service agreements. e. Please provide any other comments on this topic.

In response to Voltus’s previous comments, Section A.3 states (emphasis added):

“The CAISO incorporates demand response and distributed energy resources into the transmission planning process via the CEC’s statewide demand forecasting efforts. Both types of resources with the appropriate attributes are considered as inputs to the transmission planning process to reduce the need for new transmission. The CAISO proposes clarifying how demand response and distributed energy resources are included in these processes in its tariff.”

 

Voltus noted there were no draft revisions to the tariff to this effect, so we included suggestions in our redlines, submitted separately under that comment portal.

2. Please provide your organization’s comments on section B. Cost Shifting Among Transmission Customers.
a. Please provide comments on roles and responsibilities to prevent cost shifting. b. Please provide comments on data transparency. c. Please provide any other comments on this topic.
3. Please provide your organization’s comments on section C. Co-Location Arrangements and Load with Behind-the-Meter Generation.
a. Please provide comments on terminology. b. Please provide comments on serving co-located loads. c. Please provide comments on cost allocation for co-located loads. d. Please provide any other comments on this topic.
4. Please provide your organization’s comments on section D. Extending New Transmission Services to Eligible Customers Taking Service on Behalf of Flexible Large Loads.
5. Please provide your organization’s comments on section E. Interconnection Customers Serving Electrically Proximate Large Load and Co-Located Load.

The draft proposal states: “The CAISO proposes considering provisions for interconnection customers to serve electrically proximate large loads in a future stakeholder initiative.” 

If it is not possible to incorporate this topic in the Large Load Initiative, Voltus emphasizes it is important this topic is urgently addressed in a subsequent initiative. Delaying recognition of the ability for electrically proximate customers to serve large loads will likely result in increased cost, delays in interconnection, and reduced community benefits.
 

6. Please provide any additional comments on the draft final proposal or October 1 meeting discussion.
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