Comments on Final proposal

1. Please provide a summary of your organization's comments on the IPE 2021 phase 2 final proposal:

AES Clean Energy appreciates the opportunity to comment on the Final Proposal for the Interconnection Process Enhancements Phase 2 stakeholder initiative. AES Clean Energy supports the CAISO’s deferment on higher fees based on stakeholder feedback. AES Clean Energy looks forward to further engagement with the CAISO on these issues once FERC has released a final order on Improvements to Generator Interconnection Procedures and Agreements. AES Clean Energy supports CAISO’s final proposal on data transparency which will make the proposed project information public to stakeholders. In addition, AES Clean Energy supports CAISO’s final proposal to use previously queued projects as the base case study assumption for affect system studies and to use existing policy for RNU reimbursement for RNUs resulting from an affected system study.

AES Clean Energy continues to oppose the CAISO’s final proposal to allocate any costs for low voltage network upgrades above a 15% threshold to be financed by interconnection customers without cash reimbursement. AES reiterates its prior comments that developers will not be made whole to the investments already made to develop the project even if the project is allowed to withdraw without penalty if the 15% cap is reached.[1] 

[1] See AES Clean Energy’s comments on the Draft Final Proposal here

2. Provide your organization’s comments on section 3.1 - Transparency enhancements:

Please refer to comments in Question 1.

3. Provide your organization’s comments on section 3.2 - Revisiting the criteria for PPAs to be eligible for a Transmission Plan Deliverability (TPD) allocation:

4. Provide your organization’s comments on section 5.1 - Should the ISO re-consider an alternative cost allocation treatment for network upgrades to local (below 200 KV) systems where the associated generation benefits more than, or other than, the customers within the service area of the Participating TO owning the facilities:

Please refer to comments in Question 1.

5. Provide your organization’s comments on section 5.2 - Policy for ISO as an Affected System – how is the base case determined and how are the required upgrades paid for:

Please refer to comments in Question 1.

6. Provide your organization’s comments on section 5.2 - While the tariff currently allows a project to achieve its COD within seven (7) years if a project cannot prove that it is actually moving forward to permitting and construction, should the ISO have the ability to terminate the GIA earlier than the seven year period:

7. Provide your organization’s comments on section 6.1 - Examining the issue of when a developer issues a notice to proceed to the PTO, requesting the PTO/ISO should start planning for all upgrades that are required for a project to attain FCDS, including the upgrades that get triggered by a group of projects:

1. Please provide a summary of your organization's comments on the IPE 2021 phase 2 final proposal:

The California Community Choice Association (CalCCA) supports the California Independent System Operator’s (CAISO’s) proposal regarding the Transmission Plan Deliverability (TPD) allocation process. This includes (1) requiring projects have power purchase agreements (PPAs) of a minimum 5-year term to be eligible for a TPD allocation and (2) requiring non-load serving entity (LSE) procurement entities to demonstrate a resource adequacy (RA) contract with an LSE, or post a deposit in lieu of an RA contract, to be eligible for a TPD allocation.

Regarding the CAISO’s proposed transparency enhancements, CalCCA continues to request the CAISO publish whether or not a PPA has been executed and the MW amount of the PPA when the CAISO has such information. CalCCA understands that the CAISO does not always have complete information when it comes to whether or not a project has a PPA, because the CAISO only obtains PPA status information if the project needs to meet commercial viability criteria or retain deliverability.[1] However, to the extent the CAISO does have the PPA status information, the CAISO should provide it. The CAISO could also allow projects to voluntarily make the PPA status available. In its comments to the Revised Straw Proposal, the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) Energy Division Staff indicate that PPA statuses are sometimes disclosed in other forums but “not easily cross referenced with the CAISO queue.”[2] The ability to identify the PPA status of projects in the queue will aid in LSE procurement efforts necessary to bring new resources online to meet IRP procurement orders.

[1]             CAISO Interconnection Process Enhancements Final Proposal at p. 8: http://www.caiso.com/InitiativeDocuments/FinalProposal-InterconnectionProcessEnhancements2021Phase2.pdf  

[2]             California Public Utilities Commission Energy Division Comments on the Revised Straw Proposal (submitted July 8, 2022): https://stakeholdercenter.caiso.com/Comments/AllComments/47c8ab46-0fe6-41ad-9d69-8d7ac894fd5b#org-6f43867a-ad73-4743-ad54-1d97eba834fa

2. Provide your organization’s comments on section 3.1 - Transparency enhancements:

CalCCA has no additional comments at this time.

3. Provide your organization’s comments on section 3.2 - Revisiting the criteria for PPAs to be eligible for a Transmission Plan Deliverability (TPD) allocation:

CalCCA has no additional comments at this time.

4. Provide your organization’s comments on section 5.1 - Should the ISO re-consider an alternative cost allocation treatment for network upgrades to local (below 200 KV) systems where the associated generation benefits more than, or other than, the customers within the service area of the Participating TO owning the facilities:

CalCCA has no additional comments at this time.

5. Provide your organization’s comments on section 5.2 - Policy for ISO as an Affected System – how is the base case determined and how are the required upgrades paid for:

CalCCA has no additional comments at this time.

6. Provide your organization’s comments on section 5.2 - While the tariff currently allows a project to achieve its COD within seven (7) years if a project cannot prove that it is actually moving forward to permitting and construction, should the ISO have the ability to terminate the GIA earlier than the seven year period:

CalCCA has no additional comments at this time.

7. Provide your organization’s comments on section 6.1 - Examining the issue of when a developer issues a notice to proceed to the PTO, requesting the PTO/ISO should start planning for all upgrades that are required for a project to attain FCDS, including the upgrades that get triggered by a group of projects:

CalCCA has no additional comments at this time.

1. Please provide a summary of your organization's comments on the IPE 2021 phase 2 final proposal:

CESA appreciates the California Independent System Operator’s (CAISO or ISO) continued efforts to enhance the interconnection process in Phase 2. The collective proposals of the 2021 Interconnection Process Enhancements (IPE) will go a long way to managing overheated and large interconnection queues, better aligning cost allocation and various procurement and planning processes, and efficiently bring on the new capacity resources needed to support the state’s decarbonization goals and reliability needs.

The Phase 2 Final Proposal represents a culmination of significant staff effort and stakeholder input. In the context of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) on generator interconnection processes and procedures, the ISO naturally contemplated how this Phase 2 Final Proposal would align and advance the NOPR, even as FERC is still in the process of soliciting stakeholder comments before issuing a Final Rule on the matters. In particular, in the Draft Final Proposal, the ISO proposed a suite of changes that would institute higher fees, deposits, and withdrawal penalties, conditioned on whether projects met certain commercial readiness criteria, which determined the specific track of fees, deposits, and withdrawal penalties. In response, CESA recommended a narrower set of incremental changes at this late stage of the process, limited to the NOPR’s study cost allocation formula and the $/MW study deposit amounts without the commercial readiness component of the NOPR proposal. We viewed these incremental changes as reasonably balanced for managing the overheated queue while not excessively deterring market participation when considering the range of Phase 1 and 2 proposals, which collectively would have unclear net impacts on upcoming queue clusters.

However, the ISO has withdrawn this proposal altogether in light of the widespread stakeholder opposition and the short lead time to the October Board of Governors (BOG) meeting, preferring instead to address these issues through the FERC NOPR process. Even though still supportive of the aforementioned incremental change to institute $/MW study deposits, CESA also supports the ISO’s proposal to remove these suite of changes from the Phase 2 Final Proposal. Indeed, being at a late stage in the stakeholder process, any significant reform could not be fully vetted, and stakeholder consensus building could not be feasibly achieved before October 26-27, 2022. Rather, CESA looks forward to engaging the ISO in the FERC NOPR process.

In addition to these high-level comments on the fees, deposits, and withdrawal penalties, CESA reiterates our position that additional transparency enhancements could be achieved in spite of the FERC NOPR with greater automation and development of necessary platforms, as well as how the ISO should consider alternatives to setting power purchase agreement (PPA) term requirements as it pertains to Transmission Plan Deliverability (TPD) allocation group criteria.

2. Provide your organization’s comments on section 3.1 - Transparency enhancements:

CESA continues to strongly support the ISO’s efforts to make more data categories publicly and transparently available to stakeholders, which will advance more rational and smart siting decisions and reduce to some degree the more speculative interconnection requests that enter the queue mostly to seek transmission availability and project cost information. While data transparency in itself does not resolve the current interconnection logjams, it is an important contributing factor to addressing the current and future queues. To this end, CESA commends the ISO for making many project-level information available in the current Final Proposal.

Upon review of comments, however, the ISO maintained its Draft Final Proposal and did not make any changes to the Final Proposal, even though CESA continues to believe that there are still merits to our recommendations and pathways to pursue them without necessarily awaiting the NOPR conclusion.

One major recommendation made by CESA and many other stakeholders was the production of heat maps, akin to those made available on California’s distribution grid via the Integrated Capacity Analysis (ICA) maps. Though the transmission capability estimates produced by the ISO are helpful, they are snapshots in time and lack the granularity needed to support siting decisions. Yet, the ISO explained that it would wait for the NOPR process to play out before agreeing to produce a map. CESA does not believe that the development of such a map needs to wait for the conclusion of the NOPR with a Final Rule, which may or may not require the production of heat maps. The FERC rules will likely establish common guidance and minimum standards for the interconnection process and procedures, but there is no reason why the ISO cannot exceed them if such tools could help ease queue management in the nearer term, especially as the timeline for any Final Rule is unclear and could be at least one year out into the future. Given the timelines for development and implementation of heat maps, the ISO should get started as soon as possible.

Additionally, CESA offered comments on how certain information (e.g., site exclusivity, milestones) could be presented in aggregated form to protect commercially-sensitive information, yet the ISO declined to add them into the Final Proposal because of the challenge of consistently producing, enforcing, and making accessible such information. While recognizing the costs and effort to make such information public even in aggregated form must be weighed against the benefits of doing so, CESA believes that this reasoning points to how the ISO should strive to automate the inputs and outputs of such information. Based on how the ISO described the work required to do so, CESA presumes that such information is tracked and analyzed in a very manual process, making it a tall task to even produce the aggregated information on whether projects had site exclusivity or used in-lieu deposits in making the case for site exclusivity-related proposals in Phase 1 of this initiative. Given the value of making this information public to inform siting decisions, CESA strongly encourages the ISO to consider ways to automate the process of receiving updates and information from interconnection customers in an automated fashion such that the production of outputs in aggregated form can be similarly streamlined and made available.

3. Provide your organization’s comments on section 3.2 - Revisiting the criteria for PPAs to be eligible for a Transmission Plan Deliverability (TPD) allocation:

CESA reiterates our principled position that the ISO should not define minimum term lengths for qualifying PPAs, but if the ISO is intent on doing so, CESA urges that the ISO return to the 3-year minimum contract term requirement to apply for Allocation Groups A and B and retain deliverability for Allocation Groups B and D. Yet, the ISO has not budged in its position from the Draft Final Proposal, though we appreciate the reasonable and balanced accommodations to enable projects with non-LSE to qualify for these groups. Overall, while understanding the ISO’s motivations, CESA does not agree with the ISO’s position in this regard, where valid alternatives have been proposed, such as LSA’s in-lieu deposit alternative for projects that have secured a PPA of at least one year but less than the required 5-year term. Another alternative could be to weigh PPA term lengths in the BPM scoring process, thus not using term length as an eligibility criterion but more of a scoring criterion to favor projects that can best utilize long-term ratepayer-funded deliverability. CESA strongly urges the ISO to more deeply consider and adopt some form of these alternatives, or at least minimally, return to the 3-year minimum contract term requirement that the ISO previously included in the Phase 1 Final Proposal.

4. Provide your organization’s comments on section 5.1 - Should the ISO re-consider an alternative cost allocation treatment for network upgrades to local (below 200 KV) systems where the associated generation benefits more than, or other than, the customers within the service area of the Participating TO owning the facilities:

CESA has no comment at this time.

5. Provide your organization’s comments on section 5.2 - Policy for ISO as an Affected System – how is the base case determined and how are the required upgrades paid for:

CESA has no comment at this time.

6. Provide your organization’s comments on section 5.2 - While the tariff currently allows a project to achieve its COD within seven (7) years if a project cannot prove that it is actually moving forward to permitting and construction, should the ISO have the ability to terminate the GIA earlier than the seven year period:

The ISO made no change to the Draft Final Proposal to the Generator Interconnection Agreement (GIA) termination period, and no discussion was provided in response to limited and broadly supportive stakeholder comments. CESA reiterates our support for this reasonable proposal to exercise and enforce the ISO’s existing authorities and procedures in order to manage the interconnection queue and ensure projects are demonstrating development progress.

7. Provide your organization’s comments on section 6.1 - Examining the issue of when a developer issues a notice to proceed to the PTO, requesting the PTO/ISO should start planning for all upgrades that are required for a project to attain FCDS, including the upgrades that get triggered by a group of projects:

The ISO continues to defer this issue to either bilateral discussions and/or updates in the quarterly Transmission Development Forum (TDF). At this stage of the stakeholder initiative, there is limited time to advance this issue toward developing solutions, so we instead request that the ISO immediately take up this issue in another stakeholder initiative since bilateral discussions and the TDF is currently ill-suited for creating broader standards and protocols related to getting timelines for all upgrades associated with projects getting FCDS.

1. Please provide a summary of your organization's comments on the IPE 2021 phase 2 final proposal:

CalWEA has no objection to the topics in the final proposal except the cost treatment for network upgrades to local systems.

2. Provide your organization’s comments on section 3.1 - Transparency enhancements:

CalWEA supports the CAISO proposal. 

3. Provide your organization’s comments on section 3.2 - Revisiting the criteria for PPAs to be eligible for a Transmission Plan Deliverability (TPD) allocation:

CalWEA has no comments on the CAISO proposal.

4. Provide your organization’s comments on section 5.1 - Should the ISO re-consider an alternative cost allocation treatment for network upgrades to local (below 200 KV) systems where the associated generation benefits more than, or other than, the customers within the service area of the Participating TO owning the facilities:

CalWEA reiterates its opposition to requiring ICs to finance network upgrade costs exceeding 15% of the aggregate of a PTO’s net investment for all low voltage network upgrades. The cost should be borne by all parties that benefit from accessing the generation enabled by the transmission upgrades. 

5. Provide your organization’s comments on section 5.2 - Policy for ISO as an Affected System – how is the base case determined and how are the required upgrades paid for:

CalWEA has no objection to the CAISO proposal.

6. Provide your organization’s comments on section 5.2 - While the tariff currently allows a project to achieve its COD within seven (7) years if a project cannot prove that it is actually moving forward to permitting and construction, should the ISO have the ability to terminate the GIA earlier than the seven year period:

CalWEA has no objection to the CAISO proposal.

7. Provide your organization’s comments on section 6.1 - Examining the issue of when a developer issues a notice to proceed to the PTO, requesting the PTO/ISO should start planning for all upgrades that are required for a project to attain FCDS, including the upgrades that get triggered by a group of projects:

CalWEA has no comments on the CAISO proposal.

1. Please provide a summary of your organization's comments on the IPE 2021 phase 2 final proposal:

CAISO has not revised most of the proposal since the draft final proposal thus, EDF-Rs position has not changed on remaining items.

EDF-R applauds CAISO for withdrawing the “higher fees, deposits, or other criteria for interconnection requests” item. Waiting for more information on the NOPR outcome is the most prudent decision at this time.

2. Provide your organization’s comments on section 3.1 - Transparency enhancements:

EDF-R strongly supports CAISO’s proposed transparency additions and appreciates that CAISO will seek to integrate the data into the RIMS system where possible. EDF-R requests CAISO deliver transparency upgrades in time to support developers’ submission of interconnection requests in April 2023 for Cluster 15.

3. Provide your organization’s comments on section 3.2 - Revisiting the criteria for PPAs to be eligible for a Transmission Plan Deliverability (TPD) allocation:

EDF-R appreciates that the CAISO has dropped the Phase I commercial readiness item from this proposal because it was incompatible with the proposed 5-year term. EDF-R remains uncertain that the 5-year proposal is empirically justified, and believes CAISO is incorrect in its statement on the stakeholder call that LSEs do not execute PPAs for terms shorter than 5 years.

4. Provide your organization’s comments on section 5.1 - Should the ISO re-consider an alternative cost allocation treatment for network upgrades to local (below 200 KV) systems where the associated generation benefits more than, or other than, the customers within the service area of the Participating TO owning the facilities:

EDF-R does not support this. EDF-R views the proposal as a similar proposal rejected at FERC before and believes it is unjust and unreasonable to impose different and discriminatory refundability rules in different ISO-area locations. 

5. Provide your organization’s comments on section 5.2 - Policy for ISO as an Affected System – how is the base case determined and how are the required upgrades paid for:

EDF-R supports the CAISO’s proposal to use its existing policy for RNU reimbursement for RNUs resulting from an affected system study. 

6. Provide your organization’s comments on section 5.2 - While the tariff currently allows a project to achieve its COD within seven (7) years if a project cannot prove that it is actually moving forward to permitting and construction, should the ISO have the ability to terminate the GIA earlier than the seven year period:

EDF-R believes this procedure is already supported by CAISO's tariff and existing GIA language.

7. Provide your organization’s comments on section 6.1 - Examining the issue of when a developer issues a notice to proceed to the PTO, requesting the PTO/ISO should start planning for all upgrades that are required for a project to attain FCDS, including the upgrades that get triggered by a group of projects:

EDF-R is in agreement with LSA on this item, and also objects to the CAISO’s removal of the item about Interconnection Customers Notices to Proceed from the scope of this initiative. EDF-R strongly affirms that the PTO should begin work on the longest lead-time upgrade, followed by work on shorter lead-time upgrades, consistent with GIA milestones and obligations, and in time for the PTO to fulfill its commitments under the GIA.

CAISO’s response to these concerns has been “the ISO encourages the Interconnection Customers to work closely with the Participating TOs to ensure that both the generation and transmission projects required to interconnect their generating facilities are on track to meet the GIA milestone dates.” Interconnection Customers already do this as much as possible. With this item Interconnection Customers are looking to the CAISO to support them with these interactions with the PTO in its capacity as an Independent Operator when these efforts do not work, and create a system of accountability around this item, which is a matter of GIA compliance. With this IPE proposal CAISO seeks to put more pressure on projects to achieve a timely COD and warns of GIA breach for those who do not – CAISO’s efforts should be equally focused on on ensuring PTOs meet their construction obligations as laid out in the GIA.

EDF-R appreciates CAISO’s continued commitment to the Transmission Development Forum. This helps to ensure that stakeholders have a transparent, equitable, and accessible forum and document set for understanding transmission construction status.

As a next step for improving that forum, EDF-R and other stakeholders have requested CAISO facilitate more transparent access to the PTOs’ processed and criteria for prioritizing transmission upgrades for new-resource interconnection vs. other work, prioritizing work between interconnection-related projects. For example, whether upgrades get higher priority based on: (1) First-come, first served; (h) original in-service date; (2) how many projects or how much capacity is depending on them; (3) whether they are RNUs (needed for interconnection) vs DNUs (needed for deliverability).

1. Please provide a summary of your organization's comments on the IPE 2021 phase 2 final proposal:

 Golden State Clean Energy (“GSCE”) supports many of the changes to the interconnection process the California ISO is making in the 2021 Interconnection Process Enhancements initiative. However, we have been and remain concerned that the proposals do not go far enough to address a fundamental issue with the queue: too few projects succeed to commercial operation, and a far higher rate of success is needed to fulfill critical California policy goals. GSCE has developed and shared the attached white paper with the objective of promoting a needed, broader discussion about reforms that are required for California to meet its policy goals and that emphasize the commercial viability elements critical for successful project development.   

The vast majority of projects that enter CAISO’s queue fail to reach commercial operation. At such a low success rate, the queue would need to be at a minimum four times bigger to allow California to reliably meet some of its fast-approaching clean resource capacity targets. Cluster 14 showed that CAISO and the participating transmission owners can be overwhelmed by interconnection requests due to limited resources and staff. The queue must undergo more fundamental reforms to accommodate the new capacity that California needs to add to the grid. While many of CAISO’s revisions in this initiative will improve aspects of the interconnection process, the reforms fall short of avoiding future superclusters while ensuring sufficient capacity can come online to meet California’s policy and reliability requirements.

We do believe the requirement to demonstrate site exclusivity to enter into Phase II is an important step in the right direction, and we fully supported this change that emerged in phase 1 of the initiative. However, we continue to believe that imposing this requirement as part of a Phase I study readiness requirement would be far more effective. With CAISO deferring to FERC’s eventual rulemaking, it means that Cluster 15 (and possibly 16) will not see more aggressive reforms, which in turn will result in making CAISO vulnerable to a future supercluster that risks further delays to subsequent request windows and adds to the quantity of queued capacity while still not taking meaningful steps to value the quality of projects in the queue.

Our white paper contains specific recommendations that focus on commercially viable projects and promote a better balance between meaningful reform and the need to ramp up development to meet aggressive policy goals. This is in contrast to FERC’s interconnection process NOPR, which does not strike that balance and instead creates new issues that impede California’s policy pursuit.

2. Provide your organization’s comments on section 3.1 - Transparency enhancements:

 GSCE does not have a comment on the project-specific data that CAISO will be making public, but we believe there were very good ideas about additional transparency and form of availability for data that would help minimize the “prospecting” type of interconnection request that CAISO is trying to avoid. We urge CAISO to make this effort on transparency an evergreen one and to continue with efforts to improve both data availability and accessibility.

3. Provide your organization’s comments on section 3.2 - Revisiting the criteria for PPAs to be eligible for a Transmission Plan Deliverability (TPD) allocation:

GSCE does not support the 5-year minimum term proposal.

While GSCE sees some merit in creating a minimum term requirement for deliverability (e.g., 1-3 years), we do not agree with comments CAISO has shared on stakeholder calls that LSEs are not signing shorter term contracts with greenfield projects. We have experience with very large California LSEs (not the IOUs) requesting shorter term capacity contracts from greenfield projects as part of a layered portfolio approach. We believe the 5-year contract is arbitrary and not supported by commercial experience and as such will harm projects capable of bringing on new generation and storage facilities in the near future to support grid reliability.

We have proposed alternatives in our attached white paper to better address the issues CAISO faces here. We urge that these alternatives be paired with a Phase I readiness requirement. We believe that the TPD allocation groups should include projects that have made a financial commitment to major equipment or interconnection facilities, and projects that have made their third financial security posting (meaning the entire financial security is at risk of forfeiture if the project withdraws) and have issued a notice to proceed to construction.

4. Provide your organization’s comments on section 5.1 - Should the ISO re-consider an alternative cost allocation treatment for network upgrades to local (below 200 KV) systems where the associated generation benefits more than, or other than, the customers within the service area of the Participating TO owning the facilities:

 No comment

5. Provide your organization’s comments on section 5.2 - Policy for ISO as an Affected System – how is the base case determined and how are the required upgrades paid for:

 No comment

6. Provide your organization’s comments on section 5.2 - While the tariff currently allows a project to achieve its COD within seven (7) years if a project cannot prove that it is actually moving forward to permitting and construction, should the ISO have the ability to terminate the GIA earlier than the seven year period:

GSCE does not oppose these proposals. 

7. Provide your organization’s comments on section 6.1 - Examining the issue of when a developer issues a notice to proceed to the PTO, requesting the PTO/ISO should start planning for all upgrades that are required for a project to attain FCDS, including the upgrades that get triggered by a group of projects:

  No comment

1. Please provide a summary of your organization's comments on the IPE 2021 phase 2 final proposal:

These comments from Intersect Power (Intersect) focus on Question 3 below, regarding PPA criteria to qualify a project for a Transmission Plan Deliverability (TPD) allocation.  Specifically, Intersect believes as follows:

• Minimum PPA term for TPD allocation:  Intersect continues to oppose CAISO establishment of a minimum PPA term for Transmission Plan Deliverability (TPD) Allocation, or certainly a minimum term that does not exceed one year and, if the CAISO proceeds with the current five-year minimum term, believes that the CAISO should offer an in-lieu deposit option for contracts with terms less than that benchmark.  Our comments address the latest CAISO statements on this topic.

• PPAs with non-LSEs:  Intersect supports the CAISO’s decision to allow PPAs with non-LSEs to qualify for TPD Allocations and believes the proposed conditions are reasonable.

• COD extensions:  Intersect supports the CAISO’s proposal to apply the rules in effect when projects received their TPD allocations to later COD extensions, for TPD allocation group 3 (to match a PPA COD) and to go beyond 7 years time in queue.

2. Provide your organization’s comments on section 3.1 - Transparency enhancements:

Like LSA, Intersect strongly opposese the CAISO’s proposal for a minimum PPA term to qualify for TPD Allocations, and most certainly opposes a term above one year.  The CAISO has failed to justify a minimum term as long as five years: (1) using an inaccurate portrayal of stakeholder positions; and (2) on the merits.

The CAISO’s characterization of stakeholder positions continues to be inaccurate. 

The CAISO stated in the Final Proposal and meeting presentation that those supporting a minimum term of three years or less are all developers, while those supporting a minimum term of five years or longer are a mix of developers and LSEs.  Those statements fail to recognize the organization and members of AReM (Alliance for Retail Energy Markets), which includes Constellation New Energy, Direct Energy, and Calpine Energy Solutions. 

These entities are Energy Service Providers (ESPs) in California retail markets, i.e., LSEs, with the same Resource Adequacy obligations as other LSEs.  Like Amazon Energy, these are the kinds of less-traditional entities that may use creative arrangements like shorter-term RA agreements in their procurement activities.  They may not be as active as others in CAISO stakeholder processes, but their intervention here on this issue should be noted by the CAISO and not ignored.

Likewise, the CAISO should note that two of the three largest LSEs – PG&E and SDG&E – did not submit comments on this issue (instead of reaching back to SDG&E’s last comments, which notably were not re-submitted here).  This is not a sign of support but only neutrality.

Finally, several organizations (such as LSA) support no minimum term but are listed as supporting minimum terms in the Final Proposal (p.11).  For example, LSA's comments support "no minimum term, but in no case a term longer than one year,” but it is listed as supporting a term of one year.  Fall-back positions are not primary positions and should not be so characterized.

The Final Proposal continues to fail to justify a 5-year minimum PPA term, on the merits.

The CAISO’s statements regarding RA contract term as a measure of financial viability (e.g., ability to finance) are misguided.   RA revenue is a key viability indicator for technologies such as energy storage, but even then focusing solely on term length ignores other key indicators such as price.  A project with a higher PPA price but shorter term may be more “viable” than a project with a lower PPA price but a longer term.  In fact, many PPAs are being canceled by developers or under negotiation because they are not viable under the prices originally negotiated, regardless of term.

Moreover, RA as a viability indicator for other technologies, regardless of contract term, is an increasingly small portion of the overall value  of such projects.  For example, the 2023 Solar Technology Factors highlight the fallacy of using any RA contract measure, including PPA term length, as an indicator of general project viability:

Clearly, the RA value of solar projects is fast disappearing, with even the peak-month values falling by more than 2/3 compared to 2022 values.  At this point, it would be more accurate to state that RA value for solar (and, to a lesser but similar degree, wind) projects, including the term of RA contracts, is a completely insignificant indicator of project viability for these technologies.

Intersect continues to urge CAISO to develop a more holistic assessment of project viability, i.e., considering relevant inputs like real estate, permitting, interconnection, and offtake status more generally (not just for RA).  There is plenty of time for the CAISO and stakeholders to develop more realistic and applicable viability measures before the Cluster 15 TPD allocation process.

Intersect supports the CAISO’s decision to apply the TPD Allocation criteria when a project received its award to later COD extensions.  This opinion covers:

• PPAs needed under to extend CODs under Permissible Technological Advancements, e.g., for projects in TPD Allocation Group 3; and

• PPAs needed to comply with Commercial Viability Criteria (CVC), to extent CODs beyond 7 years time in queue.

Intersect supports the CAISO’s decision to allow PPAs with non-LSEs to qualify for TPD Allocations and believes that the proposed conditions are reasonable.

Intersect is pleased to see that the CAISO has provided a path for PPAs with non-LSEs.  Other jurisdictions allow such PPAs, and non-LSEs will be highly incented to offer valuable RA benefits into the market even if they cannot use those benefits themselves.

The LSE PPA timing requirements seem reasonable, and Intersect supports the CAISO’s proposed in-lieu deposit-based alternative to LSE PPAs. 

3. Provide your organization’s comments on section 3.2 - Revisiting the criteria for PPAs to be eligible for a Transmission Plan Deliverability (TPD) allocation:

4. Provide your organization’s comments on section 5.1 - Should the ISO re-consider an alternative cost allocation treatment for network upgrades to local (below 200 KV) systems where the associated generation benefits more than, or other than, the customers within the service area of the Participating TO owning the facilities:

5. Provide your organization’s comments on section 5.2 - Policy for ISO as an Affected System – how is the base case determined and how are the required upgrades paid for:

6. Provide your organization’s comments on section 5.2 - While the tariff currently allows a project to achieve its COD within seven (7) years if a project cannot prove that it is actually moving forward to permitting and construction, should the ISO have the ability to terminate the GIA earlier than the seven year period:

7. Provide your organization’s comments on section 6.1 - Examining the issue of when a developer issues a notice to proceed to the PTO, requesting the PTO/ISO should start planning for all upgrades that are required for a project to attain FCDS, including the upgrades that get triggered by a group of projects:

1. Please provide a summary of your organization's comments on the IPE 2021 phase 2 final proposal:

LSA’s positions on the Final Proposal (Proposal) issues are summarized below.

Data Transparency (Q2): 

• LSA continues to urge the CAISO to standardize and update the data in the queue, at least for projects currently active.

• LSA supports the disclosure of project-related items listed in the Proposal.  LSA encourages the CAISO to include as much of these data in the regular queue listings as possible, facilitated by removal of some data currently in the queue that are not useful.

• LSA continues to support additional data transparency for information on transmission constraints, including “heat maps” and other interactional tools developed by other ISOs.

• LSA supports the CAISO’s prior proposal to provide a publicly available forum for developers to voluntarily post contact and other additional information. 

PPA definitions for TPD Allocations (Q3):

• Minimum PPA term for TPD allocation:  LSA continues to oppose CAISO establishment of a minimum PPA term for Transmission Plan Deliverability (TPD) Allocation, or certainly a minimum term that does not exceed one year.  Our comments address the latest CAISO statements on this topic.

• PPAs with non-LSEs:  LSA supports the CAISO’s decision to allow PPAs with non-LSEs to qualify for TPD Allocations and believes the proposed conditions are reasonable.

• COD extensions:  LSA supports the CAISO’s proposal to apply the rules in effect when projects received their TPD allocations to later COD extensions, for TPD allocation group 3 (to match a PPA COD) and to go beyond 7 years time in queue.

Cost allocation treatment for network upgrades to local (below 200 KV) systems (Q4):  LSA recognizes the problem but continues to oppose the CAISO’s proposal for fixing it, asking the CAISO to consider a different direction.  If the CAISO nevertheless proceeds with this proposal, it should adopt LSA’s proposed mitigation measures and clarifications; these mitigation measures do not appear to have been fully considered by the CAISO in the Final Proposal determinations, and LSA asks that the CAISO please do so in this final comment round.

CAISO as an Affected System – Network Upgrade (NU) reimbursements (Q5):  LSA supports the CAISO proposal, for the reasons stated.

Time in queue/GIA milestone enforcement (Q6):  LSA supports the CAISO’s proposals for more stringent enforcement of deadlines and communication requirements.

PTO upgrade actions after IC Notice to Proceed (NTP) (Q7):  The CAISO shouldn’t reject this issue as too complex.  Instead, LSA favors CAISO oversight to ensure that PTOs actually proceed after receiving an IC’s NTP, at a timing/pace to meet the PTO’s GIA commitments.

Higher fees, deposits, or other criteria for IR Interconnection Request (IR) submittals (no question in comment template):  LSA is pleased to see CAISO remove the Draft Final Proposal elements for revising cost allocations and requiring commercial readiness to enter the queue, for the many reasons cited in the Final Proposal. 

However, LSA notes that it was not opposed generally to the concept of higher Study Deposits, only to a structure based on project size when there was no indication that CAISO study costs differed based on project size.  The CAISO data used to establish the current $150K/project Study Deposit is now several years old, and it is certainly possible that study costs are now considerably higher.  LSA would support higher Study Deposits per project based on updated CAISO study costs.

2. Provide your organization’s comments on section 3.1 - Transparency enhancements:

LSA continues to urge the CAISO to clean up and update the data in the queue, at least for projects currently active.  For example, projects in the active queue are listed with CODs that have already passed, the fuel data should be standardized by column, and POI substation and other names should be standardized.

The Final Proposal states (at p. 9) that there are “impediments” to these suggestions, citing as an example COD corrections that the CAISO cannot make unilaterally.  The proposal says that “while the ISO contacts these projects on a regular basis requesting them to submit the MMA, to date the ISO has not exercised the breach of contract mechanism to require them to submit an MMA, but the ISO may move in that direction to enforce GIAs.”

To be clear, LSA is not suggesting that the CAISO unilaterally make COD or other changes that it is not permitted to do.  Instead, LSA suggests that the CAISO do exactly what it says, i.e., use the existing tariff mechanisms to effectuate this clean-up.  (The fuel formats are covered in the comments below, and the CAISO can already standardize the POI formats and other names without tariff changes.)

LSA supports the disclosure of the project-related items listed in the Proposal and appreciates CAISO’s commitment to do the additional work to provide this information. 

LSA stated earlier that these data should preferably be included in the regular queue listings where possible, to avoid having to flip back and forth between different reports.  The Final Proposal states that CAISO “intends to add items to the queue report where appropriate and only have additional reports if it makes sense to do so.”

LSA had also suggested deletion of some useless columns in the queue listings (e.g., duplicative or not used, like Interconnection Request Receive Date, Application Status, Feasibility Study or Supplemental Review, or Optional Study).  The Final Proposal says CAISO is concerned about deleting such information because “the queue report is a report that was ordered by FERC for the ISO to publish monthly.”  LSA recommends that CAISO request FERC approval in the upcoming tariff filing for deleting this information from the queue listings, if such approval is required.

LSA supports Vistra’s request to add repowering requests, emergency fast track process, and Qualifying Facility Conversions to the queue listings (or otherwise provide that information).  With deliverability an increasingly scarce commodity and upgrade durations increasingly long, developers must evaluate the likely availability of both interim and “permanent” deliverability in different areas, and/or opportunities to propose retrofits of existing projects.  Provision of the information requested by Vistra will greatly assist developers in those assessments.

LSA supports the CAISO’s earlier proposal to provide a publicly available forum for developers to voluntarily post contact and other additional information.  During the stakeholder meeting, the CPUC staff asked whether developer names could be posted on a voluntary basis, e.g., if a developer is seeking to contract a project.  LSA’s consultant noted in the meeting that the CAISO’s last proposal included such a voluntary posting element, but the CAISO representatives said they did not recall such a proposal.

LSA refers the CAISO to its statements in the Draft Final Proposal (pp.10-11), in response to suggestions from LSA, PG&E, Rev Renewables and the CPUC: “…However, if the Interconnection Customers would like the ISO to put together a list of developers to be posted on the ISO website, that is possible.”)  The discussion in the earlier stakeholder meeting referred to a developer’s ability to post information on capacity available for contracting, for example.  LSA again urges the CAISO to consider and adopt this proposal.

3. Provide your organization’s comments on section 3.2 - Revisiting the criteria for PPAs to be eligible for a Transmission Plan Deliverability (TPD) allocation:

LSA continues to oppose the CAISO’s proposal for a minimum PPA term to qualify for TPD Allocations, and most certainly opposes a term above one year.  The CAISO has failed to justify a minimum term as long as five years: (1) using an inaccurate portrayal of stakeholder positions; and (2) on the merits.

The CAISO’s characterization of stakeholder positions continues to be inaccurate. 

The CAISO stated in the Final Proposal and meeting presentation that those supporting a minimum term of three years or less are all developers, while those supporting a minimum term of five years or longer are a mix of developers and LSEs.  Those statements fail to recognize the organization and members of AReM (Alliance for Retail Energy Markets), which includes Constellation New Energy, Direct Energy, and Calpine Energy Solutions. 

These entities are Energy Service Providers (ESPs) in California retail markets, i.e., LSEs, with the same Resource Adequacy obligations as other LSEs.  Like Amazon Energy, these are the kinds of less-traditional entities that may use creative arrangements like shorter-term RA agreements in their procurement activities.  They may not be as active as others in CAISO stakeholder processes, but their intervention here on this issue should be noted by the CAISO and not ignored.

Likewise, the CAISO should note that two of the three largest LSEs – PG&E and SDG&E – did not submit comments on this issue (instead of reaching back to SDG&E’s last comments, which notably were not re-submitted here).  This is not a sign of support but only neutrality.

Finally, several organizations (such as LSA) support no minimum term but are listed as supporting minimum terms in the Final Proposal (p.11).  For example, LSA’s comments support no minimum term, but in no case a term longer than one year” but is listed as supporting a term of one year.  Fall-back positions are not primary positions and should not be so characterized.

The Final Proposal continues to fail to justify a 5-year minimum PPA term, on the merits.

As LSA noted in its last comments, the CAISO’s statements regarding RA contract term as a measure of financial viability (e.g., ability to finance) are misguided.   RA revenue is a key viability indicator for technologies such as energy storage, but even then focusing solely on term length ignores other key indicators such as price.  A project with a higher PPA price but shorter term may be more “viable” than a project with a lower PPA price but a longer term.  In fact, many PPAs are being canceled by developers or under negotiation because they are not viable under the prices originally negotiated, regardless of term.

Moreover, RA as a viability indicator for other technologies, regardless of contract term, is an increasingly small portion of the overall value  of such projects.  For example, the 2023 Solar Technology Factors highlight the fallacy of using any RA contract measure, including PPA term length, as an indicator of general project viability:

Clearly, the RA value of solar projects is fast disappearing, with even the peak-month values falling by more than two-thirds compared to 2022 values.  At this point, it would be more accurate to state that RA value for solar (and, to a lesser but similar degree, wind) projects, including the term of RA contracts, is a completely insignificant indicator of project viability for these technologies.

LSA continues to urge CAISO to develop a more holistic assessment of project viability, i.e., considering relevant inputs like real estate, permitting, interconnection, and offtake status more generally (not just for RA).  There is plenty of time for the CAISO and stakeholders to develop more realistic and applicable viability measures before the Cluster 15 TPD allocation process.

LSA supports the CAISO’s decision to apply the TPD Allocation criteria when a project received its award to later COD extensions.  This opinion covers:

• PPAs needed under to extend CODs under Permissible Technological Advancements, e.g., for projects in TPD Allocation Group 3; and

• PPAs needed to comply with Commercial Viability Criteria (CVC), to extent CODs beyond 7 years time in queue.

LSA supports the CAISO’s decision to allow PPAs with non-LSEs to qualify for TPD Allocations and believes that the proposed conditions are reasonable.

LSA is pleased to see that the CAISO has provided a path for PPAs with non-LSEs.  Other jurisdictions allow such PPAs, and we continue to believe that non-LSEs will be highly incented to offer valuable RA benefits into the market even if they cannot use those benefits themselves.

The LSE PPA timing requirements seem reasonable, and LSA supports the CAISO’s proposed in-lieu deposit-based alternative to LSE PPAs. 

4. Provide your organization’s comments on section 5.1 - Should the ISO re-consider an alternative cost allocation treatment for network upgrades to local (below 200 KV) systems where the associated generation benefits more than, or other than, the customers within the service area of the Participating TO owning the facilities:

LSA recognizes the problem but continues to oppose the CAISO’s proposal for fixing it.  If the CAISO nevertheless proceeds with this proposal, it should adopt LSA’s previously proposed mitigation measures and clarifications, repeated below because they were not fully addressed in the Final Proposal, and supplemented.

LSA appreciates the CAISO’s clarification that the determination of refundability under this proposal would take place at the time of GIA execution, and not be subject to potential revision later, and that the calculation would be based only on costs in executed GIAs. 

Alternative recommendations if this proposal is adopted

If the CAISO proceeds with this framework, LSA recommends the following:

• Any such significant rule changes should not apply to projects already in the queue.  As with other significant rule changes, it would be unfair to change NU refundability rules after a project has already entered the interconnection process.  As noted above, the ability to withdraw with an IFS refund does not make up for the considerable resources already invested in projects currently in the queue.

LSA is disappointed that the CAISO did not accept this recommendation and believes that this element makes the proposal more likely to be challenged at FERC.  CAISO proposals often give great weight to commitments already made by developers of projects in the queue, and the current proposal does not even do so for projects in late stages of development.

• Projects moving to a higher-voltage POI due to application of the cap should qualify for “lower of” Phase I/Phase II cost-cap protection.  As stated in our last comments, LSA has not found any tariff provision stating that this protection would not apply in that situation, and the CAISO should provide a tariff reference if one exists.  Regardless, the cost protection should be retained if this proposal is implemented.  It is likely that the original IR would have proposed the most economical interconnection, and so the developer should not lose cost-cap protection for trying to connect in the least-cost manner. 

The Final Proposal acknowledges LSA’s earlier comment but fails to respond.  LSA requests here that the CAISO provide that response.

• Projects that did not receive full Network Upgrade reimbursement due to the 15% limit should be entitled to additional reimbursements if the target dollar amount increases.  As the CAISO pointed out in the stakeholder meeting, this limit is dynamic, e.g., it could increase with additional investments in low-voltage facilities. 

LSA still believes that projects that were earlier refused reimbursement should be “first in line” for such reimbursement should such limits increase in the future.

• The CAISO should post additional information about PTO areas where this provision is more likely to apply.  LSA appreciates the CAISO’s decision to post relevant information about PTO LVTRRs and applicable refund limits, but LSA also asks that the CAISO include all projects in the queue, and not just those with executed GIAs, so developers can consider the potential for refund limits when determining whether to submit an Interconnection Request for a project in a potentially affected area. 

The CAISO said at the stakeholder meeting that this would be complicated given the number of projects in larger PTO areas, but that it might be feasible for just VEA and SDG&E, where the IRs are fewer and the potential for exceeding the refund threshold is higher.  LSA maintains that VEA and SDG&E are the only PTO areas where this provision is likely to apply, and so repeats this request.

5. Provide your organization’s comments on section 5.2 - Policy for ISO as an Affected System – how is the base case determined and how are the required upgrades paid for:

LSA continues to fully support the CAISO’s proposed policy for refunds for CAISO-area Network Upgrades funded by resources interconnecting in other BAAs. 

LSA still urges the CAISO to seek reciprocal arrangements with other jurisdictions, so that CAISO-area projects can receive similar treatment from those other jurisdictions.  As LSA clarified in the stakeholder meeting, LSA is not necessarily seeking special treatment not afforded other projects in those jurisdictions, only equivalent treatment to other projects developed there.

The CAISO has been reluctant to seek such reciprocal arrangements, saying that the CAISO refund policies apply to CAISO-area NUs regardless of project location, and that other BAAs’ “non-refund” policies apply to NUs funded in their areas regardless of project location.

LSA explained at the stakeholder meeting that most other BAAs actually do refund NU costs to projects located in their areas, through credits to their transmission charges.  Projects located in the CAISO area funding NUs in those other BAAs do not have access to those refunds, because they do not pay transmission charges to those BAAs; thus, LSA is simply seeking equal treatment in receiving refunds already provided by those BAAs.  However, any individual generator is not likely to get any consideration for such a refund request – hence the request for the CAISO to initiate such arrangements.

6. Provide your organization’s comments on section 5.2 - While the tariff currently allows a project to achieve its COD within seven (7) years if a project cannot prove that it is actually moving forward to permitting and construction, should the ISO have the ability to terminate the GIA earlier than the seven year period:

LSA supports the CAISO’s proposals for more stringent enforcement of deadlines and communication requirements.  However, the CAISO’s statements here still seem unclear and lack certainty, which LSA finds puzzling. 

LSA urges the CAISO to enforce timing and reporting requirements (e.g., updating CODs) to ensure that projects remaining in the queue are actively moving ahead as required, and that non-viable projects are removed from the queue.

7. Provide your organization’s comments on section 6.1 - Examining the issue of when a developer issues a notice to proceed to the PTO, requesting the PTO/ISO should start planning for all upgrades that are required for a project to attain FCDS, including the upgrades that get triggered by a group of projects:

The CAISO shouldn’t reject this issue as too complex.  Instead, LSA favors CAISO oversight to ensure that PTOs actually proceed after receiving an IC’s NTP, at a timing/pace to meet the PTO’s GIA commitments.

In fact, the CAISO’s characterization of this issue has been mischaracterized from the start.  Developers are not asking for the PTO to start working on “every project’s network upgrades when the GIA is executed or the [NTP] is received by the [PTO].”  Instead, the PTO should be required to begin work on all upgrades in time for the project to achieve its COD and deliverability status.  Work on the longest lead-time upgrades should begin first, followed by work on shorter lead-time upgrades, so the PTO can fulfill its commitments under the GIA.

If developers could just “work closely with the PTO” to resolve this problem, it would already be resolved.  Instead, PTOs frequently delay work on needed upgrades after NTP is provided, delaying project progress toward the milestone dates the PTO has committed to in the GIA.

To repeat questions (not answered in the Proposal) from our last comments, what is the purpose of an Interconnection Customer “Notice to Proceed” (often accompanied by a third (non-refundable) posting) if the PTO does not, in fact, actually proceed?  Why should ICs make a unilateral commitment when the PTO is not doing the same?  We again ask the CAISO to respond to these questions.

This issue is not complex, and the CAISO is not (despite its professions to the contrary) completely powerless or unable to influence PTOs in this manner.  The CAISO is a full party to three-party GIAs, and its opinions (public and private) can have considerable weight.  Given the importance of this issue to the need to bring on resources in a timely way to maintain system reliability, LSA maintains that the CAISO should closely monitor whether PTOs are commencing upgrades in a timely fashion to meet commitments made in executed GIAs.

This oversight should extend to the unfortunate recent trend in annual Reassessment Reports of late-identified additional upgrades that are extending project CODs for years, seriously jeopardizing PPAs and project viability.  Reassessment Reports were originally intended primarily to remove the need for earlier-identified upgrades, potentially lowering project costs or cost exposure and allowing for earlier CODs.  Instead, they have become the “poster child” for imposition of additional upgrade requirements and COD delays, years after completion of interconnection studies supposedly conducted to identify all upgrades needed for a project.

Each time a PTO identifies circuit-breaker, CRAS, or other upgrades that should have been included in regular interconnection studies, developers are assured that these are only one-off situations and that they should not happen again.  Instead, they have become the norm.

The CAISO should be actively working with PTOs to ensure that all upgrades are identified in the regular studies are begun in time to meet the timing commitments of all parties to the GIA, and that the studies are thorough and actually identify all the upgrades needed.

1. Please provide a summary of your organization's comments on the IPE 2021 phase 2 final proposal:

In general, REV Renewables (REV) supports the Phase 2 Final Proposal, but offers a “does not oppose” position on the cost allocation treatment for network upgrades to local systems and on the PTO planning for upgrades issues.

REV appreciates CAISO deciding not to move forward with its proposal to change fees or deposits at this time. REV agrees that CAISO should not do any changes for Cluster 15, and can focus on participating in the FERC NOPR on interconnection and revisit this topic after the final ruling from FERC.

2. Provide your organization’s comments on section 3.1 - Transparency enhancements:

REV supports CAISO’s final proposal on transparency enhancements.

3. Provide your organization’s comments on section 3.2 - Revisiting the criteria for PPAs to be eligible for a Transmission Plan Deliverability (TPD) allocation:

REV has no comment at this time.

4. Provide your organization’s comments on section 5.1 - Should the ISO re-consider an alternative cost allocation treatment for network upgrades to local (below 200 KV) systems where the associated generation benefits more than, or other than, the customers within the service area of the Participating TO owning the facilities:

REV does not oppose CAISO’s final proposal, but still disagrees with the proposal on alternative cost allocation treatment for network upgrades below 200 kV. REV agrees with concerns raised by other stakeholders that any such change should not apply to projects already in the queue, and CAISO should continue to improve transparency on where PTOs are in regard to this threshold. Any network upgrades that get built on the low voltage transmission side provide overall reliability and other benefits to the bulk high voltage transmission as well, similar to upgrades that get built on high voltage transmission. Separating the cost allocation on high and low voltage would not only be cumbersome but would also go against the fundamentals that are in place today.

5. Provide your organization’s comments on section 5.2 - Policy for ISO as an Affected System – how is the base case determined and how are the required upgrades paid for:

 REV has no comment at this time.

6. Provide your organization’s comments on section 5.2 - While the tariff currently allows a project to achieve its COD within seven (7) years if a project cannot prove that it is actually moving forward to permitting and construction, should the ISO have the ability to terminate the GIA earlier than the seven year period:

 REV has no comment at this time.

7. Provide your organization’s comments on section 6.1 - Examining the issue of when a developer issues a notice to proceed to the PTO, requesting the PTO/ISO should start planning for all upgrades that are required for a project to attain FCDS, including the upgrades that get triggered by a group of projects:

REV continues to disagree with CAISO about the potential actions on this topic. REV will continue to engage with the Participating TOs and in the Transmission Development Forum to track milestone dates and monitor whether this situation changes.

1. Please provide a summary of your organization's comments on the IPE 2021 phase 2 final proposal:

RWE is a member of several industry groups and generally support the proposals presented by LSA(Large-scale Solar Association) and ACP-CA if submitted. Our comments below are included if additional information to or different from our industry group parties.

2. Provide your organization’s comments on section 3.1 - Transparency enhancements:

In addition to other transparency items, RWE encourages CAISO to develop and provide data visualization tools to help IC identify POI based on the current system capacity availability and resource retirement plan. RWE suggests reviewing the MISO public tool posted for suggestions.

3. Provide your organization’s comments on section 3.2 - Revisiting the criteria for PPAs to be eligible for a Transmission Plan Deliverability (TPD) allocation:

RWE generally support the proposals presented by LSA(Large-scale Solar Association). 

4. Provide your organization’s comments on section 5.1 - Should the ISO re-consider an alternative cost allocation treatment for network upgrades to local (below 200 KV) systems where the associated generation benefits more than, or other than, the customers within the service area of the Participating TO owning the facilities:

RWE generally support the proposals presented by LSA(Large-scale Solar Association). 

5. Provide your organization’s comments on section 5.2 - Policy for ISO as an Affected System – how is the base case determined and how are the required upgrades paid for:

RWE generally support the proposals presented by LSA(Large-scale Solar Association). 

6. Provide your organization’s comments on section 5.2 - While the tariff currently allows a project to achieve its COD within seven (7) years if a project cannot prove that it is actually moving forward to permitting and construction, should the ISO have the ability to terminate the GIA earlier than the seven year period:

RWE would note that if a project can demonstrate progress other than permitting/construction that it should be included.  Projects process their timing on many factors and so long as they are not negatively impacting another project, withholding PTO NTP and are at a minimum funding the required upgrades and facilities they should not be cancelled.  As upgrades coming out of the C14 results have been seen to be as high as 90 months and this is after an LGIA is executed and NTP provided, this puts a project well beyond the 7 years from when they enter the interconnection queue.  In the scenario of 90 months, nearly 8 years plus the interconnection and LGIA process of 3 years, most projects do not need to start construction on the physical project until the last two years of that window.

7. Provide your organization’s comments on section 6.1 - Examining the issue of when a developer issues a notice to proceed to the PTO, requesting the PTO/ISO should start planning for all upgrades that are required for a project to attain FCDS, including the upgrades that get triggered by a group of projects:

Timing of upgrades by PTOs is critical for projects to be successful and have access to deliverability allocations in a timely manner.  It is a combination of projects providing NTP and not being able to hold that back when others are dependent on those, but also coordination and clear communication from the PTOs.  CAISO should address from both sides, and not place this just on projects.  The timing upgrades has become extremely long in CAISO and completion in a timely manner is imperative.

1. Please provide a summary of your organization's comments on the IPE 2021 phase 2 final proposal:

SDG&E appreciates CAISO’s efforts on the Interconnection Process Enhancements. While some of these items are being addressed in the FERC NOPR (RM22-14), it may not be feasible to wait for a resolution at the federal level. Many of these topics arose out of necessity to address issues from cluster 14. It may be that we will have a few subsequent clusters (which may greatly benefit from input from this IPE process) before a final rule is issued by FERC. 

In particular, SDG&E opposes removing the study deposit amounts and withdrawal penalties topics from the IPE. SDG&E recommends reinstating, and moving forward with, the proposal presented by the CAISO in the Draft IPE proposal in August. SDG&E agrees with, and refers to, CAISO’s original intent of using this proposal as a means to manage the overheated queue that will likely grow in the coming years.  It is important to streamline/fine tune this process now, as opposed to a more potentially inopportune time down the road.

2. Provide your organization’s comments on section 3.1 - Transparency enhancements:

no comment

3. Provide your organization’s comments on section 3.2 - Revisiting the criteria for PPAs to be eligible for a Transmission Plan Deliverability (TPD) allocation:

SDG&E agrees with the 5-year minimum PPA option already selected by CAISO in order to qualify for TPD allocation. While we still maintain that a 10-year minimum would be ideal, the 5-year option may be a suitable compromise to ensure that we are still managing the overheated interconnection queue effectively.  

4. Provide your organization’s comments on section 5.1 - Should the ISO re-consider an alternative cost allocation treatment for network upgrades to local (below 200 KV) systems where the associated generation benefits more than, or other than, the customers within the service area of the Participating TO owning the facilities:

SDG&E opposes this cost allocation proposal as it does not allow for comprehensive cost allocation to all beneficiaries of these network upgrades. The arbitrary limit of 15% of the PTO’s TRR may not be a defendable solution. Further, it may lead to developers looking to interconnect into less favorable locations to avoid costs associated with differences in each PTO’s TRR. SDG&E also notes that this proposal may not ease the burden on the overheated interconnection queue, but rather exacerbate this issue due to developers trying to optimize these cost differences between PTOs.

Generator interconnection-driven low voltage network upgrades broadly benefit CAISO consumers and therefore the costs of these facilities need to be broadly allocated while observing the existing CAISO cost cap. For example, a generator interconnecting into any low voltage network can still provide system RA and ancillary services for the benefit of all CAISO ratepayers. Therefore, allocation of the unrecovered costs of existing low voltage network upgrades, as well as the costs of new low voltage network upgrades, to the high voltage TAC will provide reasonable alignment with FERC’s cost allocation principles.  

5. Provide your organization’s comments on section 5.2 - Policy for ISO as an Affected System – how is the base case determined and how are the required upgrades paid for:

no comment

6. Provide your organization’s comments on section 5.2 - While the tariff currently allows a project to achieve its COD within seven (7) years if a project cannot prove that it is actually moving forward to permitting and construction, should the ISO have the ability to terminate the GIA earlier than the seven year period:

SDG&E supports this proposal as a means to manage the overheated interconnection queue. As the interconnection queue increases in future years, similar steps to streamline the process will be required moving forward.

7. Provide your organization’s comments on section 6.1 - Examining the issue of when a developer issues a notice to proceed to the PTO, requesting the PTO/ISO should start planning for all upgrades that are required for a project to attain FCDS, including the upgrades that get triggered by a group of projects:

no comment

1. Please provide a summary of your organization's comments on the IPE 2021 phase 2 final proposal:

Vistra supports the CAISO making strides towards improving its interconnection process. We continue to hold the positions contained in our Draft Final Proposal Comments[1]. We provide the following narrow summary of our additional comments to the Final Proposal:

• Vistra appreciates the CAISO deferring proposal on Section 4.1 on whether there should be higher fees, deposits, or other criteria be required for submitting an Interconnection Request. We agree with the CAISO that it is prudent to focus efforts in advocacy in the FERC proposed rulemaking.
• Vistra continues to strongly oppose the position the CAISO is taking that restrict PPA eligibility with counterparties with an affiliation. We are disappointed the CAISO dismissed these concerns without any additional outreach to Vistra and maintained its position without further reflection.

We will continue to engage on these topics communicating our continued concerns with the narrow element of this proposal that presumes arrangements between affiliates are shams.

[1] Comments on the Interconnection Process Enhancements Phase 2, Vistra Corp, August 18, 2022, https://stakeholdercenter.caiso.com/Comments/AllComments/8cb6959d-b747-4a17-8140-5b7c4e33cc40#org-bf423c81-03a1-4214-b13f-f3c8b81c7d3d.

2. Provide your organization’s comments on section 3.1 - Transparency enhancements:

CAISO’s answer to Vistra’s request to maintain on its website a list of all interconnection requests including repowering requests and emergency interconnection requests mischaracterizes the Tariff requirement and is inconsistent with CAISO’s recent commitment in July in the FERC Docket No. ER22-2018 to make at a minimum the emergency interconnection requests public.

On July 8, 2022, the CAISO filed at FERC its intention to include the emergency interconnection requests in its Answer[1] regarding Interconnection Process Enhancements in FERC Docket No. ER22-2018.  In the Answer, CAISO stated on Page 7:

“The existing tariff states that “[t]he CAISO will maintain on the CAISO Website a list of all Interconnection Requests.”²⁵ Requests for emergency interconnection are a type of Interconnection Request,²⁶ and therefore they will be subject to the Internet posting requirements. Nothing in proposed section 3.10 states or suggests otherwise.”

CAISO’s response in the Final Proposal is inconsistent with its Answer. Based on CAISO July 8^th filing at FERC, at a minimum the CAISO Final Proposal for transparency needs to include the emergency interconnection requests. Otherwise, the CAISO will not fulfill what it committed to FERC.

Vistra believes the CAISO is administering the definition of what is an interconnection request too narrowly for the purposes of maintaining the public queue. We observe actual market challenges with not making the repowering agreements public and urge the CAISO to also include these projects to avoid market confusion.

[1] Answer of the California Independent System Operator Corporation to Comments of Vistra, July 8, 2022, http://www.caiso.com/rules/Pages/Regulatory/RegulatoryFilingsAndOrders.aspx

3. Provide your organization’s comments on section 3.2 - Revisiting the criteria for PPAs to be eligible for a Transmission Plan Deliverability (TPD) allocation:

Vistra reiterates its comments on the Draft Final Proposal. Vistra strongly opposes the CAISO adopting its restriction on eligible long-term RA contracts to view arrangements between affiliates as shams. This removes the ability of Interconnection Customers to use the full array of legitimate financing options available to them. We do not believe this is in the best interest of California consumers. Vistra maintains its view that the CAISO should revise its proposal to allow for long-term RA contract eligibility for arrangements between the IC and non-LSE counterparties, regardless of their affiliations potentially with appropriate safe guards. We will continue to advocate for a more reasonable policy.

4. Provide your organization’s comments on section 5.1 - Should the ISO re-consider an alternative cost allocation treatment for network upgrades to local (below 200 KV) systems where the associated generation benefits more than, or other than, the customers within the service area of the Participating TO owning the facilities:

Vistra appreciates the CAISO commitment to transparency.

5. Provide your organization’s comments on section 5.2 - Policy for ISO as an Affected System – how is the base case determined and how are the required upgrades paid for:

No comments in addition to previously submitted comments on the Draft Final Proposal.

6. Provide your organization’s comments on section 5.2 - While the tariff currently allows a project to achieve its COD within seven (7) years if a project cannot prove that it is actually moving forward to permitting and construction, should the ISO have the ability to terminate the GIA earlier than the seven year period:

No comments in addition to previously submitted comments on the Draft Final Proposal.

7. Provide your organization’s comments on section 6.1 - Examining the issue of when a developer issues a notice to proceed to the PTO, requesting the PTO/ISO should start planning for all upgrades that are required for a project to attain FCDS, including the upgrades that get triggered by a group of projects:

No comments in addition to previously submitted comments on the Draft Final Proposal.